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Scott W. Reed, ISB#81.8
Attorney at Law
P. 0. Box A
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816
Phone (208) 664-2161
FAX (208) 765-51 17

IN THE DISTRICT COURT O F THE F R S T JUDIC
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
NEIGHBORS FOR RESPONSIBLE
GROWTH, a non-profit, unincorporated
association; PRESERVE OUR RURAL
COMMUNITIES, a non-profit
unincorporated association; KOOTENAI
ENVIRONMENTAL ALLIANCE, INC., a
non-profit corporation; NORBERT and
BEVERLY TWILLMANN; GREG and
JANET TORLINE; SUSAN MELKA;
MERLYN and JEAN NELSON;

1
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

1
)
)

1
)
)
)

KOOTENAI COUNTY,
a political
subdivision of the STATE O F IDAHO
acting through the KOOTENAI COUNTY
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS; S.J.
ELMER
"GUS" JOHNSON,; -C
R., "RICK" CURRIE and KATIE
BRODIE, COMMISSIONERS, in their
official capacities; and KATIE BRODIE,
personally and individually,
Defendantsmespondents,
and
POWDERHORN COMMUNITIES, LLC,
and HEARTLAND, LLC,
Intewenors/Respondents.

BRIEF OF PETITIONERS

1
)

1
)
)
)
)

1
)

i
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-06-8574
BRIEF OF PETITIONERS I N OPPOSITION
TO INTERVENORS' MOTION TO DISMISS
FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION

Intervenors make t h e e arguments in support of their motion to dismiss.
Arguments "A" mootness and "B" timeliness are both grounded upon the claim that
the November 16th Amended Order of Decision required a second petition for
review.

"C" is that the amendment to the Comprehensive Plan sought by

Powderhorn Communites, LLC and Heartland, LLC was a legislative matter, not
a quasi judicial action. As will be shown, none of the three grounds have merit.
Heading "A" is that the November 9, 2006 Order of Decision from which
appeal was made was rendered moot by the Amended Order of Decision made
November 16, 2006. As will be explained further in this response, Kootenai
County Board of Commissioners lacked jurisdiction to enter the November 16th
Amended Order of Decision. However, for purposes of argument, petitioners will
assume that the board had the power to amend its November 9th Order of Decision.

I.

Original and Amended Order of Decision were Identical
Properly Appealed on November 15. 2006

In the conlplete Amended Order of Decision, no amendments were made on
November 16th to "I. Course of Proceedings," "111. Applicable Legal Standards,"
"VI. Conclusions of Law" or "VII. Order of Decision."

The "Conclusions

of Law" and the "Order of Decision" are identical on the November 9th and
November 16th decisions.

I

BRIEF OF PETITIONERS

VI.

Conclusions of Law

6.01 The proposed Comprehensive Plan amendment from Agricultural
and Timber to Rural is reasonably necessary and appropriate
given the substantial change that has occurred in the area.
6.02 The proposed amendment would seem to be consistent with
similarly located properties in the southern portion of Kootenai
County.
6.03 The proposed amendment is consistent with the goals and policies
of the Comprehensive Plan as outlined in Section IV of this Order.
VII. ORDER O F DECISION
Based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth in this
document, the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners orders that the
application for Case No. CP-080-05, a request by Powderhorn
Communities, for a Comprehensive Plan Map from Agricultural to
Rural be APPROVED.

The "Board Analysis" in the November 16th document has all the words in
the November 9th document and adds one and one-half sentences about distance
from population centers.
What petitioners made appeal from is the final Order of Decision which
approved the request by Powderhorn Communities for a comprehensive plan map
amendment from Agricultural to Rural. The November 9th Order of Decision is
not moot; the November 16th Order of Decision is identical.
1.

Mootness Doctrine does not Aoplv

Intervenors argue that the November 16th Amended Order of Decision
replaced the November 9th Order of Decision and cite in support McCandless v.
BRIEF OF PETITIONERS

233

3

Kmrner, 76 Idaho 510,286 P.2d 334 (1955). In that case, the Idaho Supreme Court
held as quoted in Intervenors Memorandum (p. 77) that a second judgment entered
after appeal of the first judgment superseded the original judgment which became
moot so the first appeal therefrom was dismissed.
Under the procedural record reported in the opinion, the decision is entirely
correct, but totally distinguishable from this case. In this personal injury lawsuit,
the jury awarded $3,117.71 on the first cause of action and $8,272.21 on the
second cause of action. Judgment was entered for $1 1,389.92. Defendantlappellant
moved for a new trial asserting error in double damages and at the same time filed
an appeal.
The trial court denied the motion for new trial upon the condition that the
judgment be reduced to one award only on the second cause of action of $8,272.21.
Plaintifflrespondent accepted; judgment

was entered for $8,272.21 and

defendantlappellant filed a second appeal. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the
second judgment.
What intervenors' quoted citation recognizes is two-fold. (1) That part of
the first appeal related to double verdict was satisfied by the trial court's ruling on
the motion for new trial (2) The second judgment was different from the first
judgment in an amount and any remaining contentions of error asserted by
defendant/appelIant were fully addressed when the Court affirmed judgment for
$8,272.21 on the second appeal.
BRIEF OF PETITIONERS

Here, the orginal and the second Orders of Decision were identical.
The November 16th document amended the factual findings but did not alter
in the slightest the original Order of ~ecision.(') If findings of fact canno;
constitute an appealable order, then changing the findings of fact cannot constitute
a different Order of Decision.
2.

November 9.- Order of Decision was Final Jud~ment

The Amended Order of Decision entered November 16, 2006 made
significant (and insupportable) changes in the Findings of Fact and in the
Comprehensive Plan Analysis. The latter is another form of fact findings intended
to match found facts with the Comprehensive Plan goals.
The Findings of Fact and Comprehensive Plan Analysis together with the
Conclusions of Law are the county board of commissioners' equivalent of a trial

h he caption on the November

16th document does not accurately reflect the contents:

CASE NO. CP-08005
FINDINGS OF FACT
APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
COMPREHENSIVE PLAN
ANALYSIS AND AMENDED ORDER OF DECISION
The correct description of what follows should read like this:
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND
COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS AND
ORIGINAL APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
ORDER OF DECISION

BRIEF OF PETITIONERS

court memorandum decision or opinion.

As such, t h i s

.is not

something from

which an appeal can be made.
In Hamblen v. Go& 90 Idaho 180, 409 P.2d 429 (1965), defendants filed a
notice of appeal from the opinion and from the findings and conclusions but not
from the judgment subsequently entered. The Idaho Supreme Court dismissed the
appeal:
The opinion contains only the reasoning of the trial judge, and the
authorities considered in arriving at his decision. The findings and
conclusions are only what they purport to be. They contain the
conclusion of the court as to the judgment to be entered. They are not
in form a judgment, and contain no order for the execution of the
judgment of lien foreclosure therein directed to be entered. They did
not constitute a final judgment appealable under I.C. $13-201.

90 Idaho at 182.
The Idaho Supreme Court in Blaine County Investment Co, v. Mays, 521
Idaho 381, 15 P.2d 734 (1932) made a similar observation:
A judgment is the Anal determination of the rights of the parties in an
action or proceeding. (C.S. sec. 6826.) As the judgment is based upon
the decision, i.e., the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it follows
that such findings and conclusions cannot be considered as a final
judgment or order within the meaning of C.S., sec. 7152, from which an
appeal will lie, and the attempted appeal therefrom is therefore
dismissed.

52 Idaho at 384.
I

Although Judge Burnett subsequently found a way to bail out a pro se
plaintiff in Kuglev v. Novhtwest Aviation, Inc., 108 Idaho 884, 702 P.2d 922 (App.
. 1985), his initial conclusion was the same as the above cases:
BRIEF OF PETITIONERS

The attorney's notice of appeal, filed on January 18, 1983, recites that
the appeal is taken from an amended "memorandum decision" dated
November 28, 1982. It fails to mention the judgment entered in the
meantime. A district judge's memorandum decision is not appealable
unless it disposes of an appeal from the magistrate division. When a
district court acts as a trial court, an appeal may be taken only from a
final judgment o r as otherwise provided in Idaho Appellate Rules 11 and
12.

105 Idaho at 886.
In the administrative procedure the last paragraph "VII Order of Decision"
is the equivalent of a judgment: Both orders of decision approved the request by
Powderhom Communities for a Comprehensive Plan map amendment from
"Agricultural" to "Rural."
3.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Not Applicable

Intervenors suggest that petitioners failed to exhaust their administrative
remedies:
The Board's November 9, 2006, Order was not a final order, it was
administratively remedied by the Board's subsequent Amended Order
one week later on November 16, 2006. Thus, Petitioners sought judicial
review of an agency decision before exhausting all administrative
remedies in violation of I.C. 467-5271.

Intervenor Brief, p. 9.
It is a fundamental predicate to application of the exhaustion of remedies
defense that there has been an administrative remedy available to the appellant to
exhaust. There was none in this case.

BRIEF OF PETITIONERS

At the end of the public hearing on September 14, 2000, Chairman Johnson,

with the concurrence of the other two commissioners, directed that the public
hearing would be closed with no more input or cornmunication from the
appliancant or the public. Transcript, p. 99, L. 14 - 21; p. 103, L. 1 - 3.
The board and staff then made a site visit on September 25, 2006. Because
there was communication between representatives of the applicant and two board
members heard by the public, the board held another public hearing on October 4,
2006 for the limited purpose of listening to complaints about the site visit, but with
"no new information." Transcript, p. 212, L. 23 - 25; p. 212, L. 1 - 2.
That public hearing was closed and Chairman Johnson directed that at
deliberations the following day, no one was to speak to any of the commissioners.

-

Transcript, p. 226, L. 9 - 15; p. 22-27, L. 1 9.
On the following day, the commissioners deliberated among themselves and
voted two to one to grant the application. Transcript, p. 234, L. 15 - 25. With
that vote, the administration case was closed awaiting only the written order of
decision which was made on November 9, 2006. Absolutely no one, applicant,
public, protestors, supporters or curious onlookers, could have spoken to any of the
commissioners nor taken any action under the Kootenai County Code nor under
state law to have any effect on the decision to be made in written form on
November 9th. After the Order of Decision had been made no outsider could have
,

any influence on the Amended Order of Decision on November 16th.
BRIEF OF PETITIONERS

The November 9th Order of Decision was the equivalent of a final judgment
that ended the administrative case, adjudicated the subject matter of the controversy
and made a final determination of the rights of the applicant and of the protesting
petitioners. Rake v. Rake, 142 Idaho 83, 85, I23 P.3d 216,

(App. 2005).

Idaho-Best, Inc. v. First Sec. Bank of Idaho 99 Idaho 51 7, 519, 584 P.2d 1242,

In Canal/Norcrest/ColunzbusAction Committee

Cify of Boise, 136 Idaho

666, 39 P.3d 606 (2001), the Idaho Supreme Court reversed dismissal by the trial
court on exhaustion of remedies grounds upon determining that the city's approval
of a conditional use application was a final decision subject to judicial review. 136
Idaho at 671. So was the Order of Decision on November 9, 2006.
11. Petition for Review Deprived Board of Jurisdiction to Enter
Amended Order of Decision

As a matter of law, the Board of County Commissioners did not have the
power to take any action of any kind after the Petition of Review was filed on
November 15,,2006.. This conclusion follows from a careful reading of 1.R.Civ.P.
Rule 84 (a) "judicial review of state agency and local government actions."
The subsections in small letters follow setting forth detailed rules with this
catchall Rule 84 (a):

Rule 84 (r).

Other procedural rules.
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Any procedure for judicial review not specified o r covered by these rules
shall be in accordance with the appropriate rule of the Idaho Appellate
Rules to the extent the same is not contrary to this Rule 84. . .

.

Rule 84 (m) reserves to the local government the power to enforce any
decision it may have made:
Rule 84 (m)
Stay of proceedings. Unless otherwise provided by statute, the filing of
a petition for judicial review with the district court does not
automatically stay the proceedings and enforcement of the action of an
agency that is subject to the petition. Unless prohibited by statute, the
agency may grant, or the reviewing court may order, a stay upon
appropriate terms.

"Proceedings" means as related to enforcement. This becomes klear upon
examining the comparable words in the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act:'
Idaho Code 567-5274
67-5274. Stay. The filing of the petition for review does not itself stay
the effectiveness o r enforcement of the agency action. The agency may
grant, or the reviewing court may order, a stay upon appropriate terms.

Respondent Kootenai County after the November 9th Order of Decision did
have the power, unaffected by the appeal, to make the order approving the
amendment effective and did so by accepting the application for zone change and
setting a hearing date. This was the action that required the court stay as sought
and granted.
Rule 84 (m) and Idaho Code 567-5274 relating to stay were the only
procedures specified and covered within the meaning of Rule 84 (r). Therefor
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judicial review would otherwise be covered by the Idaho Appellate Rules governing
appeals from the District Court to the Idaho Supreme Court.
There the applicable rule is Rule 13 I.A.R. where the first subsection imposes
an automatic fourteen day stay:

Rule 13 (a) Temporary Stay in Civil Action Upon Filing a Notice of
Appeal or Notice of Cross-Appeal. Unless otherwise ordered by the
district court, upon the filing of a notice of appeal or notice of crossappeal all proceedings and execution of all judgments, orders or decrees
in a civil action in the district court, shall be automatically stayed for a
period of fourteen (14) days.

...

The Amended Order of Decision was made one day after the filing of the
appeal. If this was a "Proceeding" (which it was not), it is void as having
occurred within the fourteen day period. It is the county that failed to recognize
the time restrictions and neglected to re-enter the Amended Order of Decision
fifteen or more days later.
Legally, the board of commissioners could not have been done so. Rule 13
(b) I.A.R. has a laundry list of powers of the District Court [under Rule 84 (r),
powers of the agency] retained during the pendency of the appeal. None apply to
cover the Amended Order of Decision.
Unless within the list of powers (1) through (20), all proceedings are stayed
until the district court decides the Petition for Review.

A long line of decisions have ruled upon the loss of jurisdiction after an
appeal is filed.
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Once an appeal is taken from the district court, the district court is
divested of jurisdiction, except to take action in aid of the appeal. Coeur
d'Alene Turf Club, Inc. v. Cogswell, 93 Idaho 324, 461 P.2d 107 (1969);
7 Moore's Federal Practice 560-30 [2] (2d ed, 1975); 4 Am.Jur.Zd,
Appeal and Error $352. The district court properly ruled that the Van
Tassell's complaint of May 24, 1976 did not state a valid claim; the
district court therefore did not err in dismissing the action.

First Security Bank v. Neibauer, 98 Idaho 598, 604, 570 P.2d 276, -

Hells Canyon contends the district court was without authority to enter
the September 5 order. We agree.
In Dolbeer v. Harten, 91 Idaho 141, 417 P.2d 407 (1966) our Supreme
Court noted:
"The general rule is that upon an appeal being perfected the trial court
is divested of jurisdiction of the cause; having lost jurisdiction pending
an appeal the lower court may not allow amendments; and it is error to
enter a substituted and supplemental decree after appeal is taken.
[Footnotes omitted.]"
91 Idaho at 147-48, 417 P.2d at 413-14. See also Coeur d7A1ene Turf
Club, Inc. v. Cogswell, 93 Idaho 324,461 P.2d 107 (1969; First Security
Bank v. Neibaur, 98 Idaho 598, 570 P.2d 276 (1977); Avondale Irrigation
District v. North Idaho Properties, k c , 99 Idaho 30, 577 P.2d 9 (1978).

The district court therefore had no power or authority -- because it
lacked jurisdiction -- to reconsider its earlier decision and to enter a
different ruling in respect to the respondent's motions.

Hells Canyon Excursions, Inc. v. Oakes, 111 Idaho 123, 134-25, 721 P.2d
223 (App. 1986).
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Once a notice of appeal has been perfected the district court is divested
of jurisdiction and the proceedings are stayed during the pendency of
the appeal. Dolbeer v. Harten, 91 Idaho 141, 144, 417 P.2d 407, 410
(1966).

H. V. Engineers, Inc. v. Idaho State Board of Professional Engineers and
Land Surveyors, 113 Idaho 646, 648, 747 P.2d 55, -(1 988).
The Websters assert that the trial court abused its discretion in not
granting the Webster's motions to amend their counterclaim and to
compel the bank to produce documents. We disagree. Because both of
these motions were made after the Websters had appealed to this Court
from the judgment and decree of foreclosure, the trial court had no
jurisdiction to consider these motions.

First Security Bank of Idaho, NA. v. Webster, 119 Idaho 262, 268, 805 P.2d
468 -(1991).

* * *

Once an appeal has been filed, the authority of the district court is
limited; in a civil action, the district court may rule on certain motions
and take certain actions which are enumerated in I.A.R. 13 (b). Idaho
Appellate Rule 13 (b) does not provide the district court with the
authority to rule on a motion to disqualify a judge after an appeal has
been filed. Thus, the district court correctly ruled that it did not have
the authority to rule on Christensen's motion.

Christensen v. Ransom, 123 Idaho 99, 103, 844 P.2d 1349,
1993).

(APP.

111. Case No. CP-080-05 was Contested Case Subject to
Quasi-Judicial Standards

Intervenors assert that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this challenge to
the amendment of the Comprehensive Plan because it is a legislative matter. The
argument following this assertion is supported by lengthy quotations from two
Florida opinions and footnote citations to three more Florida cases.
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Florida is a developer's paradise and an environmentalist's hell with
permanent migration of snowbirds in the hundreds of thousands every year. There
is real danger that the shoreline may sink under the weight of condominiums even
before global warming floods the state. The recent news story about the 500 trailer
park owners being paid over a million dollars each for their beach facing mobile
home and pads gives some idea of the kind of money that makes for irreparable
development.
In examining the decision reported in the Pacific Reporter in general and in
Idaho in particular, it is apparent that the genera1 practice is very different out west.
Amendments to a comprehensive plan made for specific properties are appealable
and challengeable regardless of how these are described by non-lawyers filling in
application forms.
There is absolutely no question that the application by Powderhorn
Communities, LLC and its affiliates to amend the Comprehensive Plan from
Agricultural to Ruralfiestricted Residential on 3,000 acres was a contested case
within the meaning of the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act. Idaho Code 675201 (6). A person aggrieved by a final order of an agency in a contested case is
entitled as a matter of right to the judicial review. Idaho Code 67-5270 (3).
The distinction between the city or county created broad and encompassing
comprehensive plans which must be a legislative act and this
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amendment for

a specific tract of land was succinctly explained by the Kansas Supreme Court in
Golden v. City of Overland Park, 584 P.2d 130 (Kansas, 1978):
A city, in enactidg a general zoning ordinance, or a planning commission
exercising its primary and principal function under K.S.A. 12-704 in
adopting and annually reviewing a comprehensive plan for development
of a city, is exercising strictly legislative functions. When, however, the
focus shifts from the entire city to one specific tract of land for which
a zoning change is urged, the function becomes more quasi-judicial than
legislative. While policy is involved, such a proceeding requires a
weighing of the evidence, a balancing of the equities, an application of
rules, regulations and ordinances to facts, and a resolution of specific
issues. Keopf v. City of Sterling Heights, 391 Mich. 139, 215 N.W.2d 120
(1974); Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash3d 292,502 P.2d 327 (1972);
Fasano Washington Co. Comm., 264 Or. 574, 574 P.2d 23 (1973); and
See Zoning Amendments -- The Product of Judicial or Quasi-Judicial
Action, 33 Ohio State Law Journal 130 (1972).

Intervenors rely upon Burt v. City of Idaho Falls, 105 Idaho 65, 665 P.2d
1075 (1983), as authority holding that amendments to the comprehensive plan are
legislative matters' not subject to judicial review. In the quotation in petitioners
memorandum, those words are included. 105 Idaho at 68. However, the issue
before that court was the annexation of property with the amendment to the
comprehensive plan and the rezoning being merely the attendant actions mandated
by Idaho Code 567-6525,
Annexation is a legislative action. In Coeuvd ;Ilene Industrial Park Property
Owners Association, Znc. v. City of Coeur d'rilene, 108 Idaho 843, 702 P.2d 881

(App. 1983), Judge Burnett for the Court of Appeals noted that annexation
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authority under Idaho Code $50-222 long predated the enactment of the Local Land
Use Planning Act, Idaho Code $367-6501 et seq:

The act' of annexation does not await an exercise of the zoning power.
See Burt v. City of Idaho Falls, 105 Idaho 65, 665 P.2d 1075 (1983).
108 Idaho at 845.
The out-of-Idaho supporting authorities cited in the quotation from Burt
repeated in Intervenors Brief (pp. 11 - 12) were to the Kansas opinion, Golden v.

City of Overland Park, supra, and to City of Louisville v. District Court of Boulder,
190 Colo. 33, 543 P.2d 67 (Colo. 1975). The City of Louisville case involved
only annexation.
As it happens, the Colorado Court of Appeals in Condiotti v. Boafd of

County Commissioners of the County of LaPlata, 983 P.2d 184 (Colo. App. 1999),
I

reversed the trial court's dismissal of a complaint by a property owner challenging
the county order amending the land use system:

I

In our view, the same reasoning should apply to the present situation in
which an owner is attempting to protect his property from adverse
effects caused by the adoption of an amendment to a land use system.
See Piscitelli v. Township Commitfee of Scotch Plains, 103 N.J. Super.
589 248 A.2d 274 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 12968) (ownership of
property in area affected by zoning is sufficient to create standing to
contest validity of zoning ordinance); Zeltig Land Development Corp. v.
Rainbridge Townslzip Board of Trustees, 785 Ohio App3d 302, 599
N.E.2d 383 (1991) (owner had standing to challenge constitutionally of
zoning as applied to its own property because owner may be limited by
the zoning o r may be harmed by restrictions placed on the property).
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In McCuskey v. Canyon County, 123 Idaho 657, 851 P.2d 953 (1993), the
Idaho Supreme Court, while taking note of Burt v. City of Idaho Falls, supra,
specifically held that a property owner had standing and the court had jurisdiction
to consider the challenge to the comprehensive plan and general zoning even
though the owner had not made a timely appeal at the time of enactment of the
zoning code:
Thus, this case is more like Jerome County 1). Holloway, 118 ldaho 681,
799 P.2d 969 (1990). In Jerome, this Court stated that "the district
court had jurisdiction to issue its declaratory judgment regarding the
validity of the 1985 amendment to the [Jerome County] zoning
ordinance," but appeals involving the issuance of a particular permit
should be reviewed under the procedures established by the Local
Planning Act. Jerome, 118 Idaho at 685, 799 P.2d at 973. See Burt v.
City of Idaho Eirlls, 105 Idaho 65, 66 n. 2, 665 P.2d 1075, 1076 'n. 2
(1983) ("While we hold that a legislative zoning decision is not subject
to direct judicial review, it nonetheless may be scrutinized by means of
collateral actions such as declaratory actions.").
123 Idaho at 660.

Although it should not be necessary for all the reasons recited in this
responding brief, petitioners on Februa;ry 5, 2007 filed an amended petition for
review an amendment adding a fourth cause of action for declaratory judgment to
come squarely within the McCuskey precedent.
In all three adjoining states, the appellate courts have held that property
owners have the absolute right to challenge amendments to a conlprehensive plan
or the comprehensive plan itself with no bar as "legislative action." In Ash Gvove

,Cement Conzpany v. J e f f e o n County, 943 P.2d 35 (Mont. 1997), the trial court
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and the Montana Supreme Court looked at and ruled in detail in a declaratory
judgment action on seeking to overturn a "Local Vicinity Plan" as being
inconsistent with the county's master plan.
Intervenors cite Jones v. King County, 74 Wash. App. 467, 874 P.2d 853
(1 994) as holding that the courts could not consider a suit challenging amendments
to the comprehensive plan.

King County had undertaken an area community

plan and zoning update commencing in 1988 and reaching final adoption by the
county council on December 17, 1991. Jones filed suit on January 16, 1972
alleging that he had not received adequate notice and that the plan had down zoned
his property.
The Court of Appeals relied upon a Washington statute RCW 42.36.010
which specifically excluded from "quasi judicial" all "'.

.

.legislative actions

adopting, amending or revising comprehensive, community or neighborhood
plans."' 874 P.2d at 857. No comparable statute exists in Idaho.
The Court's holding was that one propetty owner cannot attack in court an
area wide plan:
Jones' argument mirrors Raynes' argument. Jones argues that the
County, by asking landowners to submit rezone requests as a means of
objecting to the proposed plan and area rezone, effectively created an
adversarial process with identifiable parties. Under Raynes and RCW
42.36.010, however, the County's action were clearly area-wide zoning
and comprehensive plan amendments. Thus, they were legislative
actions. The method chosen by the Council to acquire input from
property owners allowed the owners to specifically discuss their own
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properties. This does not, however, transform the event into a quasijudicial proceeding.

The difficulty was examined in some detail in Holbvook, Inc. v. Clark
County, 112 Wash. App. 354, 49 P.3d 142 (Wash. App. Div. 2 2002). In 1993,

Holbrook bought 75 acres zoned "rural estate" which allowed five acre lots.
At that time Clark County had initiated development of a comprehensive plan.
This process continued for two years with all the attendant public hearings and
published notice finally resulting in adoption. In December of 1994 with the
Holbrook property classified as forest resource land allowing only 20 acre tracts.

Holbrook sued claiming due process violations. In affirming dismissal the
Court wrote:
No bright line separates judicial from legislative actions. Raynes v. City
of Leavenworth, 118 Wash.2d 237,243,821 P.2d 1204 (1992). But areawide actions, such as the adoption of comprehensive plans and zoning
ordinances, involving the exercise of the legislative body's policy-making
role, are generally considered legislative. See Raynes, 118 Wash.2d at
245-49,821 P.2d 1204; Jones, 74 W a s h . ~ p ~a t. 474-75,874 P.2d 853; see
also RCW 42.36.010. .

.

As Holbrook points out, there are circumstances in which even
legislative decisions can give rise to individual constitutional due process
protections. When one person, or relative few people, are exceptionally
affected by a decision on individual grounds, then such persons may be
entitled to basic due process rights, including individual notice.
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Exactly that circumstance in which legislative decisions - adoption of
conlprehensive plans

-- entitled a few people to sue occurred three years earlier in

a Washington Supreme Court case, King County v. Central Puget Sound Growth,
138 Wash.2d 161, 979 P.2d 374 (Wash. 1999). The short caption is misleading.
The suit was an administrative appeal from King County's adoption of a
comprehensive plan.

The petitioners named in the full caption as appellants

included eight governmental entities, twenty-seven corporations and organizations
and five individuals.
Even though the comprehensive plan covered a wide area, the Washington
Supreme Court held that the environmental groups could challenge portions of the
plan and that:
Any individual, partnership, corporation, o r other entity with standing
may appeal a provision of a county's plan to ensure that it is in
compliance with the requirements of the GMA (Growth Management
Act) RCW 36.70A.280 (2)-(3). This appeal process benefits both those
who seek to limit development and those who seek to protect their
development rights.

In the most recent reported case, Low Income Housing Institute v. Lalcewood,
77 P.3d 653 (Wash. App. Div. 2, 2003) affordable housing advocates successfully
challenged the City of Lakewood's comprehensive plan resulting in a remand to
I

revise the plan. 77 P.3d at 658.
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In Oregon, arguably the state with the most extensive and detailed planning
process (and probably the most litigation), the right of individual residents and of
developers to sue entities upon the grounds of defective comprehensive plans has
been recognized.
With a very similar name, Neighbors for Livability v. City of Beaverton, 168
Or. App. 501, 4 P.3d 765 (Or. App. 2000), was procedurally very like this case.
The developers, Sorrento Construction, and others applied to the city to amend the
comprehensive plan to change the designation of 10 acres fiom residential to
commercial.
The non-profit corporation and eight individuals in the neighborhood went
through the administrative levels and then filed the appeal with the Oregon Court
of Appeals. The opinion recognized that the challenge was not to a present zone
change but, as here, to the future intentions of the developer as were fully disclosed
in the record:

Although respondent Sorrento Construction's (Sorrento) application and
the city's decision directly sought and granted only the plan
amendments, and did not include related zoning changes or specific
developmental permits, the ultimate objective of both Sorrento and the
city is to develop a supermarket complex at the Murray site.

The opinion gave careful consideration to all of the petitioners' claims and
then affirmed the city's approval without ever suggesting that the amendment was
, a legislative action.
BRIEF OF PETITIONERS

Warren v. Lane County, 297 Or. 290, 686 P.2d 316 (Or. 1984), provides
favorable precedent on two grounds. Petitioner Cole, nearby neighbors and others
appealed administratively the amendment to Comprehensive Plan to allow a
commercial resort on a 186 acre tract, in the 'Coastal Subarea."
As here, the Lane County Planning Commission had recommended denial of
the amendment; the developer appealed and the board of commissioners reversed
686 P.2d at 319. Oregon has created a Land Use Board
the planning commissio~~.
of Appeals (LUBA) to which appeal was made and, following affirmance, appeal
was made to the Oregon Court of Appeals which also affirmed.
During the pendency of the appeal, Lane County adopted a new
comprehensive plan which incorporated the change as part of the newly adopted
plan and not as an amendment. Lane Cohnty and the developers moved to dismiss
the appeal from the Court of Appeals decision to the Oregon Supreme Court on the
grounds that the adoption of the new comprehensive plan made the appeal from the
earlier amendment moot.
This claim of moobless based on a year later change has far more merit than
intervenors claim of mootness on a week later appeal. Nonetheless, the Oregon
Supreme Court rejected the mootness argument:

In enacting the new plan and adopting a plan amendment for the same
property in dispute, the Lane County Board of Commissioners
readopted the same findings of fact and conclusions of law to support an
exception to Goal 4 as those relied upon in the first plan amendment.
Because these same findings of fact and conclusions of law form the
BRIEF OF PETITIONERS
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basis of the county's new comprehensive plan for the subject property,
the issues raised by petitioners questioning the sufficiency of those
findings to support the goal exception, plan amendment and zone
changes are not moot.

For purposes of judicial review, adopting a new comprehensive plan,
which, in effect, readopts a prior plan amendment and is enacted on
essentially the same findings, does not moot a prior appeal challenging
the adequacy of those findings.

The petitioners argued that change in a small comprehensive plan had wide
effects,which affected all residents in the area and was a quasi-judicial change. 686
P.2d at 323. In Oregon Supreme Court agreed, reversed the dismissal by the Court
of Appeals for lack of standing and remanded the case back to the LUBA.
The Kansas Supreme Court analysis in Golden v. City of Overland Park, has
been followed in Colorado, Montana, Washington and Oregon.

That Kansas

decision was cited in Burt v. City of Idaho Falls, 105 Idaho at 68. The two or
three year process of adoption of a new comprehensive plan by a city or a county
for its entire area is a legislative action which should be invnune from challenge
by a single owner of an isolated parcel.
The action taken by the city or county on amendment upon application of the
owners of a specific tract of land for which a zone change will be ultimately sought
is a quasi-judicial action subject to judicial review.
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Idaho Code 967-5270 (3) grants an absolute right of judicial review by a
party aggrieved by a final order in a contested case. The six volumes of agency
record with hundreds of letters and petition signatures of protest and the two
volumes of transcript are weighty and solid evidence that this was a contested case.
CONCLUSION

The Order of Decision entered November 9th was a final decision. The final
part of the Amended Order of Decision made November 16th is identical and
encompassed in the November 15th Petition for Review. The appeal was from a
quasi-judicial contested case. The board of co~nmissionershad no jurisdiction to
act after November 15th.
The Motion to Dismiss must be denied.
Respecthlly submitted, this 16th
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Attorney for Applicants Coeur d'Alene Land Company and H. F. Magnuson
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

NEIGHBORS FOR RESPONSIBLE
GROWTH, a non-profit unincorporated
association; PRESERVE OUR RURAL
COMMUNITIES, a non-profit
unincorporated association; KOOTENAI
ENVIRONMENTAL ALLIANCE, INC.,
a non-profit corporation; NORBERT and
BEVERLY TWILLMANN; GREG and
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RIGHT AND/OR MOTION FOR
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$61
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KOOTENAI COUNTY, a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho acting
through the KOOTENAI COUNTY
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS; S.J.
"GUS' JOHNSON, CHAIRMAN;
ELMER R. "RICK CURRlE and KATIE
BRODIE, COMMISSIONERS, in their
official capacities; and KATIE BRODIE,
personally and individually,
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and
POWDERHORN COMMUNITIES, LLC,
and HEARTLAND, LLC,

IntervenorsIRespondents.
COME NOW Applicants Coeur d7Alene Land Company and H. F. Magnuson, by and
through their attorney of record, John F. Magnuson, pursuant to R C P 24(a) and 24(b), and move the
Court for entry of an order granting them the right to intervene in this action as
DefendantslRespondents. This motion is supported by the pleadings and submissions on file herein,
including the supporting Memorandum filed herewith.
Oral argument is requested.

otr-

Dated this ,
&
l
day of February, 2007.

eur d'Alene Land
Company and H. F. Magnuson
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Attorney for Applicants Coeur d'Alene Land Company and H. F. Magnuson
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

NEIGHBORS FOR RESPONSIBLE
GROWTH, a non-profit unincorporated
association; PRESERVE OUR RURAL
COMMUNITIES, a non-profit
unincorporated association; KOOTENAI
ENVIRONMENTAL ALLIANCE, INC.,
a non-profit corporation; NORBERT and
BEVERLY TWILLMANN; GREG and
JANET TORLINE; SUSAN MELKA,
MERLYN and JEAN NELSON,

NO. CV-06-8574

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO INTERVENE AND/OR
MOTION FOR PERMISSIVE
INTERVENTION

VS.

KOOTENAI COUNTY, a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho acting
through the KOOTENAI COUNTY
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS; S.J.
"GUS" JOHNSON, CHAIRMAN;
ELMER R. "RICK" CURRLE and KATIE
BRODIE, COMMISSIONERS, in their
official capacities; and KATIE BRODIE,
personally and individually,
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and
POWDERHORN COMMUNITIES, LLC,
and HEARTLAND, LLC,

COME NOW Applicants Coeur d'Alene Land Company and H. F. Magnuson, by and
tluough their attorney of record, John F. Magnuson, pursuant to IRCP 24(a) and 24(h), and submit
the following Memorandum in support of their motion for entry of an order granting them the right
to intervene in this action as DefendantsiRespondents.

I. APPLICABLE AUTHORITIES.
IRCP 24(a) provides:
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action ... (2)
when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is
the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the
action may as a practical matter impair or impede applicant's ability to protect that
interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
See IRCP 24(a).
IRCP 24(b) provides:
Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action ... (2)
when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or
fact in common.. .. In exercising its discretion, the Court shall consider whether the
intenention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the
original parties.
See IRCP 24(b)
-
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XI. TEIE STATUS OF APPLICANTS COEUR D'ALENE LAND
COMPANY AND MAGNUSON.
Through the subject action, PlaintiffsIPetitioners seekjudicial review ofaNovember 9,2006
Order of Decision entered by the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners. That Order granted
a request by Powderhorn Communities, LLC for a Comprehensive Plan Amendment (from
agricultural to rural) as to approximately 3,000 acres of land located in unincorporated Kootenai
County.'
These Applicants (Coeur d' Akene Land Company and Magnuson) own a considerable portion
of the acreage that was rezoned through the County's November 9, 2006 Order that is currently
under appeal. See Amended Petition for Judicial Review at 114.
111. ARGUMENT.

Pursuant to IRCP 24(a), these Applicants claim an interest in the "transaction which is the
subject of this action." The Kootenai County Board of Con~missionerssigned an Order amending
the County's Comprehensive Plan to change the designation of these Applicant's properties from
Agricultural to Rural. In other words, these Applicants own property that was favorably decided
upon bythe Board through the subject amendment. The County's decision has been appealed herein
and is the "subject of this action." These Applicants seek to intervene in order to protect their
interest in that decision. Said interest is real and concrete and consists of actual property ownership
affected by said decision.
These Applicants' interests may not be adequately represented by the existing parties. The

I

Powderhorn Communities, LLC was previously granted permission to intervene
through this Court's Order of December 19,2006.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO INTERVENE AS OF RIGHT
AND/OR MOTION FOR PERMISSIVE INTERVENTION -- PAGE 3

PlaintiffsiPetitioners are adverse to these Applicants' interests. Kootenai County is a political
subdivision. Its elected officials do not necessarily have the same vested interest in seeing the Order
upheld as do these Applicants. Moreover, Kootenai County and the present PlaintiffsIPetitioners
could enter into some amicable resolution, through an alternative dispute resolution mechanism,
unacceptable to these Applicants which might otherwise impair these Applicants' vested interest in
the subject decision.
At this point, theseApplicantsl interests are aligned with those ofPowderhorn Communities,
LLC. However, properties owned by Powderhorn are not the same properties owned by these
Applicants.

Without conceding the same, arguments that may apply to some portion of

Powderhorn's properties may not apply to the properties of the Applicants which have heretofore
had little or nothing to do with agricultural (prior "ayicultural" use of portions of the property is
alleged by the present Plaintiffs/Petitioners to constitute some basis for reversal of the Board's
Order)'.
Further, these Plaintiffsil'etitioners have apparently determined to appeal the subject Order
not on the merits but in part through an attempted effort to apparently impugn the character of Rand
Wichman, the former Planning Director for Kootenai County. If it is the intention of the
PlaintiffsIPetitioners to challenge the subject Order not on law or the facts but rather through an
unsupported and tangential mud-slinging contest, then these Applicants would sooner argue the
merits of their own cause.'

2

This is not to say that these Applicants concede in any way that the attacks launched
by the PlaintiffsiPetitioners on Mr. Wichman have any merit whatsoever. To the contrary, based
upon the submissions to date, it would appear that issues raised by thePlaintiffs/Petitioners as to Mr.
Wichman are either gross mischaracterizations, red herrings, and unsupported by any binding legal
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT O F MOTION TO INTERVENE AS OF RIGHT
AND/OR MOTlON FOR PERMlSSIVE INTERVENTION -- PAGE 4

At a minimum, permissive intervention is proper under IRCP 24(b). These Applicants have
established that their "claim or defense in the main action have a question of law or fact in common."
This intervention will not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of Kootenai
County, Plaintiffs/Petitioners, or Powderhorn. These Applicants agree to be bound by the briefing
schedule in effect or hereafter to be established by the Court.
IV. CONCLUSION.

Based upon the reasons and authorities set forth herein, Applicants Coeur d'Alene Land
Company and Magnuson respectfully request that the Court grant them leave to intervene as
additional
Dated this

as a matter of right or through permission.
of February, 2007.

~ t t b r f e for
~ Applicants $oeur
Company and H. F. Magnuson

authority in this State.
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d'Alene Land

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
onect copy of the foregoing document was served upon the
I certify that a true a
following, via facsimile this &ay
of February, 2007:
Scott W. Reed
Attomey at Law
P.O. Box A
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816
Fax: 208\765-5117

Mischelle Fulgham
Lukins & Annis, PS
1600 Washington Trust Financial Center
717 W. Sprague Avenue
Spokane, WA 99201-0466
Fax: 509\747-2323

John A. Cafferty, Sr. Staff Attomey
Kootenai County Department of
Legal Services
451 Government Way
P.O. Box 9000
Coeur dtAlene, ID 838 16-9000
Fax: 208\446-1621
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JOHN F. MAGNUSON
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 2350
1250 Northwood Center Court, Suite A
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Phone: (208) 667-0100
Fax: (208) 667-0500
ISB #4270
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Attorney for Applicants Coeur d'Alene Land Company and H. F. Magnuson

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

NEIGHBORS FOR RESPONSLBLE
GROWTH, a non-profit unincorporated
association; PRESERVE OUR RURAL
COMMUNITIES, a non-profit
unincorporated association; KOOTENAI
ENVIRONMENTAL ALLIANCE, INC.,
a non-profit corporation; NORBERT and
BEVERLY TWILLMANN; GREG and
JANET TORLINE; SUSAN MELKA,
MERLYN and JEAN NELSON,

VS.

KOOTENAI COUNTY, a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho acting
through the KOOTENAI COUNTY
BOARD OF COMMISSIOhERS; S.J.
"GUS' JOHNSON, CHAIRMAN;
ELMER R. "RICK" C U R . and KATIE
BRODIE, COMMISSIONERS, in their
official capacities; and KATIE BRODIE,
personally and individually,

NOTICE OF HEARlNG -- PAGE 1

NO. CV-06-8574
NOTICE OF HEARING

and
POWDERHORN COMMUNITIES, LLC,
and HEARTLAND, LLC,

TO:

PLAINTFFSIPETITIONERS AND YOUR ATTORNEY OF RECORD, SCOTT
W. REED;

AND TO:

DEFENDANTSIRESPONDENTS AND YOUR ATTORNEY OF RECORD, JOHN
CAFFERTY;

AND TO:

INTERVENORSIRESPONDENTS AND YOUR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD,
MISCHELLE FULGHAM AND LUIUNS & ANNIS, PS.

You and each of you will please take notice that Applicants Coeur d'Alene Land Company
and H. F. Magnuson will call their Motion to Intervene as of Right andlor Motion for Permissive
Intervention on for hearing before the Honorable Charles W. Hosack, District Judge, on February
27,2007 at 3:30 p.m. at the Kootenai County Courthouse. You are invited to attend and participate
as you see fit.

k

Dated this

L(i day of February, 2007.
,
ur d'Alene Land
Company and H. F. Magnuson

NOTICE OF HEARING --PAGE 2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a true and o ~ e c copy
t
of the foregoing document was served upon the
following, via facsimile this &day
of February, 2007:

Scott W. Reed
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box A
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83816
Fax: 208\765-5117
John A. Cafferty, Sr. Staff Attorney
Kootenai County Department of
Legal Services
45 1 Government Way
P.O. Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, ID 838 16-9000
Fax: 208\446-1621

NOTICE OF HEARING

-- PAGE 3

Mischelle Fulgham
Lukins & Annis, PS
1600 Washington Trust Financial Center
717 W. Sprague Avenue
Spokane, WA 99201-0466
Fax: 509\747-2323
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MlSCHELLE R. FULGHAM
ISB #4623
PETER J. SMITH 1V
1SB #6997
LUKNS & ANNIS. P.S.
Ste 102
250 Northwest Blvd.
Coeur d'Alene. ID 838 14-2971
Teleuhone: (208) 667-0517
Facsimile No.: (509) 363-2478
Attornevs for POWDERHORN COMMUNITIES LLC and HEARTLAND LLC

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF TDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAl
NEIGHBORS FOR RESPONSlSLE
GROWTH, a non-profit unicorporated
associatton; PRESERVE OUR RURAL
COMMUNITIES, a non-profit unicorporated
association; KOOTENAI ENVIRONMENTAL
ALLIANCE, TNC.,a non-profit corporation;
NORBERT and BEVERLY TWILLMANN;
GREG and JANET TORLINE; SUSAN
MELKA; MERLYN and JEAN NELSON,

NO. CV-06-8574
POWDERHORN COivlMLNTIES LLC
AND HEARTLAND LLC'S REPLY
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO DISMTSS DUE TO LACK
OF JURISDICTION

Plaintiffs,
v.

KOOTENAI COUNTY, a political subdivision
of the STATE OF IDAHO act inn^ through the
KOOTENAI COUNTY BOA& OF
COMMISSIONERS; S.J. "GUS" JOHNSON,
CHATRMAN; ELMER R. "RICK"CURRIE
and KATIE BRODIE, COMMISSIONERS, in
their official capacities; and KATIE BRODIE,
personally and individually,

-

Defendants,
and
POWDERHORN COMMUNITIES LLC, and
HEARTLAND LLC
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POWDERHORN COMMUNITIES LLC and HEARTLAND LLC (hcreinafter
"Powderhonl") lile this reply memorandum in support of their Motton to Dismiss filed wlth
this Court on lanuttry 29, 2007. Also on January 29,2007, Powderhorn noted this matter for
hearing beforc the Court set for February 27,2007. On February 21,2007, just six days before
the heanng, Powderhom received a 25 page opposition brief. Petitioners' opposition
arguments are untimely, unnecessarily lengthy, complcx, and in some instances
incomprehensible. Yet, Powderhom will attempt to reply and more importantly will reiterate
the unrebutted reasons this Court lacks jurisdiction and must dismiss the action. Given the stay
rmposed and the lack of any bond, Powderhorn seeks a prompt dismissal.

'

THE BOCC'S ORIGINAL ORDER OF DECISION WAS RENDERED MOOT UPON
THE ENTRY OF THE AMENDED ORDER OF DECISION, AND PETITIONERS'
S
MOOT.

D

Petitioners argue that the November 91h Order of Decision and the November 16'''
Amended Order of Decision are exactly thc same, except for changes to the findings of fact and
conclusions of law.' Thus, the appeal of the Order of Decision should be treated as an appeal
of the Amended Order of Decision. Petitioners provide no authority for this assertion; rather,
Petitioners' attempt to distinguish McCandless v. ~ r a m e r ?

'

The two- to three-month time frame to complete this case, which Petitioners represented to the Court and which
Respondents immediately questioned, has passcd,,and the case is no where near completion.
The Noven~ber9" Order of Decision will be refelmd to as the "Order of Decision" and the November 16"'
Amendad Order of Decision will be referred w as the "Amended Order of Decision."
Petitioners anempr ro distinguish McCandless is specious. The facts in McCandless and this case are nearly
identical. ?he only diii~renceis McCandless involved a judgmm entered by the District Court and this case
involves the tinal decision ofthe 130CC. This difference is immaterial.

POWDERHORN COMMUNITIES LLC AND
HEARTLAND LLC'S REPLY MEMORANDUM M
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In McCandless, the jury delivered a judgment in favor of the pla~ntiff.Defendant
appealed. The judgment was amended by the trial court.4 The defendant failed to appeal the
ammded judgment. The Idaho Supreme Court held that an appeal of the original judgment did
not constitute an appeal of the amended judgment because the original judgment was rendered
moot by the amended judgmcnt. The holding of McCandless ts that an amended judgment or
order must be appealed. An appeal of the original judgment will not automatically constitute
an appeal of an amended judgment.
Here, the Board of County Commissioners (hereinafter "BOCC") entered the Order of
Decision. Petitioner filed a petition for judicial review of the Order of Decxsion. The BOCC
amended the Order oTDecision and entered the Amended Order of Decision. As in
McCandless, the Amended Order of Decision rendered the original Order of Decision moot and

any appeal from the original Order of Decision was likewise rendered moot.
The holding in McCandless is supported by the overarching principle of mootness.
When the Order of Decision was amended, any pending controversy arising out of the Order of
Decision was nultified.' A judicial determination of Petitioners' appeal of the Order or
Decision will have no practical effect.6 It is not enough that an actual controversy existed at the
time Petitioners filed their petition for review. The a c d controversy must cxist at all stages
of review, not merely at the time the complaint (petition) was filed.7 Here, the actual
controvcrsy was rendered moot by the Amended Order of Decision. As a result, the petition for
judicial review should be dismissed by this Court.

76 Idaha 510,286 P.2d 334 (1955).
'See Fenn v. Noah, 142 Idaho 775, 133 P.3d 1240 (2006).
'See Srufe v Hoylc, 140 Idaho 679.99 P.3d 1069 (2004).
S e e Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S.452,459 fn. 10.39 L. Ed. 2d 505,94 S. Ct 1209 (1974).

POWDERHORN COMMUNITIES LLC AND
HEARTLAND LLC'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS:3

02/23/07

FRI 16:58 FAX 5 0 9 7 4 7 2 3 2 3

LUKINS

&

ANNIS

THE APPROVALS ARE NOT IDENTICAL AND PETITIONERS HAVE NOT
Petitioners inaccurately advised this Court that the November 9,2006, approval and the
November 11, 2006, approval were identical. See Brief of Petitioners, p. 2. Not only is this
untrue, but Petitioners know it is untrue. Their Opening Brief documents and discusses the
differences in the two decisions. See Petitioners' Opening Brief, pp. 16-36, Appendix A, pp. 1-

The factual findings, a~ialysis,conclusions, and order of decision differences as between
the November 9, 2006, decision and the November 16,2006, decision are key to the dismissal
of this appeal. Petitioners have asked this Court to vacate the November 9,2006, BOCC
approval partly because under 1.C. 67-5270(3), Petitioners claim the BOCC's factual findings,
inferences, analysis, and conclusions do not support the decision. See Petition, p. 9 and p. 15.

In their November 15, 2006, petition8, Petitioners specifically and expressly complain that
several of the BOCC's November 9,2006, findings, analysis, and conclusions do not support
the outconIe and are grounds for reversal. At paragraph 33, on page 9 of their Petition,
Petitioners set out the basis for their appeal and allege:
The Findings of Fact, Applicable Legal Standards, Conclusions of Law,
Comprehensive Plan Analysis, and Order of Decision executed by Chairman
Johnson and Commissioner Brodie on November 9,2006 contain the following
Findings of Fact which do not support but are counter to amendment of the
Comprehensive Plan for the 3,000 acres from Agricultural to Rural:
Petitioners then go on to list many pages of alleged errors. Because several of the
alleged errors cited by Petitioners were revised in the BOCC's November 16, 2006, decision,
this appeal (which relies &on the old November 9,2006, findings, analysis, and

' Powderhorn only cites and relies upon thePetxtioners' initial Petition as the Petitioners' subsequent attempt to
file a purported "A~ncndcdPetition" is void and of na lcgal impact.

POWDERHORN COMMUNITIES LLC AND
HEARTLAND LLC7SREPLY MEMORANDUM IN
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conclusions) is moot. What good does it do to have this Court evaluate the November 9,2006,
findings in order to see whether they are deficient as Petitioners contend and whether they fail
to support the Order of Decision as Petitioners' contend, when those old allegedly erroneous
findings were subsequently replaced? Even if the Court remanded this appeal of the November
9,2006, decision, such a remand is of no effect because that November 9,2006, decision has
already been replaced by the November 16,2006, decision-from which there was no appeal.
Since Petitioners have not timely appeaied the November 16,2006, decision, those findings,
analysis, conclusions, and order are not before the Court for judicial review. In fact, Petitioners
claim the Amended Order of Decision is void because the BOCC lacked jurisdiction, so
Petitioners certainly cannot rely on it in any fashion.

THE NOVEMBER 1 6AMENDED
~ ~
ORDER OF DECISION WAS THE FINAL
ORDER OF THE BOCC, WHICH PETITIONERS HAVE RAILED TO TlMELY
APPEAL.
Petitioners argue that the Order of Decision was a final judgment and the Amendcd
Order of Decision was the equivalent of a trial court's memorandum of decision or opinion.
Unfortunately, Petitioners provide no authority to support this conclusion and their reasoning is
difficult to follow. Without any legal authority and without any explanation of why a
Comprehensive Plan Map Amendment is the same to Petitioners as a trial court memorandu~n,
they simply charge into the axgument that the Amended Order of Decision could not be
appealed because it was the equivalent of a memorandum decision or opinion, and, thus, no
appeal was necessary or possible.
Petitioners cite Hamhlen v. Goffin support their argument. Hambien is clearly
distinguishable from the facts in this case. First and most obviously, this is a legislative map

POWDERHORN COMMUNITIES LLC AND
HEARTLAND LLC'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN
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amendment approved by elected county officials and Hamblen was an adjudicative trial
resulting in a judicial decision Erom the court. Second, when Kootenai County's elected
officials issue their Order of Decision, there is never a judgment to follow Unlike a court, the
County Commissioners simply do not have that legal decision making authority.
Specifically, in Namhlen, the trial court filed its findings of fact and conclusions of law
on October 2, 1964.' Defendant filed a notice of appeal on October 19, 1964." The judgment
was filed October 23, 1964." The Idaho Supreme Court held that the appeal of the findings of

fact and conclusions of law was not an appeal of a final judgment and, thus, lhe Supreme Court
was deprived of jurisdiction over the appeal."
Petitioners argue that Harnblen is controlling in this case. However, the facts in this
case are more like to those the City of Preston v. Barter decision. In the City of Preston, the
Idaho Supreme Court discussed and distinguished Hambfen.

F the City of Preston v. Baxrer, the trial court entered a memorandum, decision, and
order which included a specific direction as to the judgment to be entered.I3 The City of
Preston asserted that the memorandum, decision, and order did not constitute entry of a
judgment as in ~amblen." The Idaho Supreme Court disagreed and held that the
memorandum, decision, and order constituted an entry of a judgment.15 The Court

~ Hczrnblen, the memorandum and fmdings did not contain the
distinguished ~ a r n b l e n . 'In

' Hamblcn, 90 Idaho at 181,409 P.2d at 429.
'O
/I

Id.
Id.
Id.

" 120 Idaho 418,816 P.2d 975 (1991).
12.

Iq

'"d.
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specific d~rcctionas to the judgment to be entered.17 However, in Preston, the memorandum,
d
a specific direction as to the judgment, thus it was appealable is
decision and order d ~ contain
As in the Czty of Preston, the BOCC included a specific duection in both Order of
Decision and Amended Order of Decision along with its findings of fact and conclusions of
law. Under Ciry of Preston, the Order of Decision and Amended Order of Decision were both
the equivalent of "final judgments" entered by a trial court. As staled above, under

McCandless, the Amended Order of Decision rendered the Order of Decision moot.'g
Petitioners' own brief belies their argument that the Amended Order of Decision was
not the equivalent of a final judgment. Petitioners assert that the Order of Decision was the
equivalent of a final judgment That could be appealed. They also assert that the Amended
Order of Decision is "identical" to the Order of Decision. Despite being "identical," Petitioners
state that only the Order of Decision could be appealed because only it was the equivalent of a
final judgment. Tf the Order of Decision was the equivalent of a final judgment as Petitioners'
assert, then the Amended Order of Decision is also the equivalent of a final judgment and can
also be appealed. Petitioners failed to timely appeal the fmal judgment.

THE NOVEbIBER 1 6 AMENDED
~ ~
ORDER OF DECJSION DID NOT VIOLATE A
STAY BECAUSE NO STAY BAD BEES IMPOSED BY THE FILING OF THE

Petitioners also argue that the BOCC did not have jurisdiction to amend the Order of
Dccision after an appeal was filed by the Petitioners. Thus, the Arnendcd Order of Decision is
null and void. In support of this argument, Petitioners engage in a "careful reading" of I.R.C.P.
Rule 84.

" Id. at 420,

" Id.

10

816 P.2d at 977.

Pelirioners failed to appeal the Anicnded Order of Decision within the statutory time period.
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Rule 84(a)(I) provides the scope of Rule 84. "When judicial review of an action of a
state agency or local government is expressly provided by statute but no stated procedure or
standard of review is provided in that statute, then Rule 84 provides the procedure tbr the
District Court's judicial review."20 The judicial review of a decision by the BOCC amending
the comprehenstve plan is expressly provided for by statute, namely Tdaho Code 8 67-6521(d).
l&ho Code § 67-6521(d) specifically references the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act as
governing any judicial review.''
Both Rule 84 and the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act state that filing of a petition
does not stay the "proceedin~s,""effectiveness," and "enforcement" of the agency action."
Petitioners argue that the entry ofthe Amended Order of Decision was outside of the scope of
Rule 84 because the amendment: of Order of Decision does not fall within the definition of
"procceding" as that term is used in Rule 84. It 1s Petitioners' posilion that "proceeding"
relates only to enforcement of the agency decision. In other words, ihe BOCC had the right to
move forward on the enforcement of the Order of Decision, but it did not have the authority to
amend tliat decision. This argument fails.
The language of Rule 84(m) does not support the Petitioners' position that
'"proceedings' means as related to enforcement." Rule 84(m) expressly provides that there is
no automatic stay of the '>roceedin~sand enforcement of the action of an agency that is
subject to the petition" for judiciai review.23 Petitioners' reading of Rule 84(m) would render
the insertion of the word "proceedings" unnecessary.

'"I.R.C.P.Rule 84(a)(I).
Idaho Cod= $67-6521(2).
22 I.R.C.P. Rule 84(m) (emphasis added); Idaho Code $67-5274.
21
I.R.C.P. R l ~ l e84(in) (emphasis added).
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B;

The word "proceedings" is presumed to have bgen inserted for a purpose. This Court
must interpret any rule or statute as whole and in such a way that does not render a provision
superfluous. It is only reasonable to conclude that the definition of "proceedings" includes the
act of amending a prior order by the agency. Any other findjng would result in the constructive
removal of the word "proceedings" from Rule 84(m).

I

The word "proceedings" is not defined in the 1iaho Rules of Civil Procedure or the
Idaho Administrative Procedure Act. In the context of litigation before a trial court, it is
generally given a very broad meaning.

The term ')roceeding" is broader than the w o ~ d"action." As ordinarily used, it
is broad enough to include ail metho& of invoking the act ion of courts and is
generally applicable to any step taken to obtain the interposition or action of a
court. A proceedzng has also been definedm some act or acts done in
furtherance of the enforcement of an existing right, real or imaginary, and may be
by petition in a court o competentjurisdiction or by a summary remedy
prescribed by statute.'

f

The definition of "proceedings" should be given a similar broad definition in the context of an
agency proceeding.
Finally, LA.R. Rule 13 is contrary to Rule 84. Rule 84(m) expressly provides that no
automatic stay results when a petition for judicial review is filed. Rule 84(m) creates a
presumption that after a petition is filed, the administra'tive process continues unless the agency
or a court deems it necessary to issue a stay. This prevents t11e agency fiom having to s t a t and
stop each time a petition for judicial review is filed. This is a reasonable approach where
public hearings have to be scheduled, notices sent out, 'and public confusion could result it.the
process stopped and started with each petition for judicial review. In contrast, 1.A.R Rule 13(b)
mandates a stay upon appeal. The stay is automatic for fourteen (14) days, unless one of the

24

1 Am. Jur. 2d Actions 5 3 (2006).
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exceptions of I.A.R. 13(b) applies. ?his approach is reasonable in the context of litigation
where the proceedings in the trial court basically end tipon the rendering of a judgment.
Under Rule 84(r), where the Idaho Appellate Rules are contrary to any portion of Rule
84, Rule 84 controls. In this case, the automaiic stay of4:A.R. 13@) is clearly contrary Rule
84(m). Thus, the amendment of the Order of Decision by the BOCC did not violate any stay
!

because no stay was in place.

THIS LEGISLATIVE MATTER IS NOT SUBJECTTO JUDICIAL REVIEW.
No where in the Petitioners' lengthy arguments ;bposing dismissal do the Petitioners
ever rebut the single piece of key evidence d&umenting that this is a legislative matter not
subject to a petition for judicial review. Kootenai County determined this Comprehensive Plan
Amendment decision was a legislative mattei.?s petitioners simply ignore this evidence and the
consequences thereof. Having determined and in fact having its designated agent and
representative document in writing that this i i a legislative matter, Kootenai County is now
Idaho law is well
entitled to a presumption of correctness in that legiklati& dete~mination.~~
established in holding that when govemmenGofficials $sue decisions, particularly when
{

interpreting and applying their own regulatio& and ordinances, the agency determination is
presumed correct and the court shall not subkitute its jAdgment for that of the government
agency."' Thus, the County's legislative det-inati?nishall
.

not be substituted or reje~ted.~'

,

County Planner Mark Mussman wrote: "$he request involves numerous pieces of property.
Because this is a leeislative matter, specific property owner authorization is not required."
R.Vol. 1,p. 131.
,I
25

.

.

There is a strong presumption that the ac;ions of c&ny officials, where they have
interpreted and applied their own ordinances, are valid; Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71
(Idaho 2003)
i

26

i

'

Evans v. Bd. of Cornm'Rs (in Re Bd. of ~ohty
~om$Rs), 137 Idaho 428,43 I (Idaho 2002)
holding this Court will not substitute its judgment for +at of the agency as to the weight of the
27

'i
i
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While pontificating about developme$t regulatidns in Florida (or Montana, or Oregon,
or Kansas) is apparently entertaining for ~etijioners,it is not necessary or legally relevant in
!.

this case because Idaho courts have previously ~le'dthatle~islative
action is shielded from
.
,
!

!:

direct judicial review." In Burt, citing ~ o o ~v. iBoardof
r
County Commissioners ofAda
.

.I,

,

~ o u n t y ~the
? Idaho Supreme Court held "Le~islative~~tion
is sllielded from direct judicial
review by 'its high visibility and widely felt impact, ontbe theory that appropriate remedy can
, .,

be had at the polls.'

"3'.

Consistent with ldatio case 1134
and the above cited Court's analysis,
,

,

j

this legislative action had extremely "high viiibility and, Widely
.
felt impact."32 Also consistent
8

i

,

with the Court's legislative analysis in Burt, <sthe fact that the public spoke at the polls and
, .,

obtained its "appropriate remedy" in that co&nissiqne$ Brodie and Johnson were voted out of
!

!

office. Thus, regardless what the jurisdiction: of Florid4 tolds, pursuant to relevant on point
,

'1

:,

'Idahoprecedent, no further judicial review isinecessiryich
1 . allowed of this admittedly legislative
:

matter.

,.

!

I

.

,., .,

.

,,

:

coN~Lvsia~i
.

.

, .
. ..

'!

.

Powderhorn is entitled to a prompt diAmissiliof:@is
appeal. The Court lacks
,! .;
!

/I

/

jurisdiction. First, the only Order appealed bb petition&,
the November 9 Order, is moot.
.
:

evidence on questions of fact, citing1.C. Ij 6'$5279(1);1;amar
COT. v. City of Twin Falls, 133
.. ..
.
Idaho 36, 39,981 P.2d 1.146, 1149 (1999). /
,

f$ ',

2R

.

id.

i:. ,:
.!

:.

"Burt v. Idaho Fa/ls, LO5 Idaho 65,68,665 b.ld 1075 (@ah0 19831,
!

, ,.
,
i i

.

"Cooper v. Board of County ~ommissioners'of~da~d&ty,
101 Idaho 407,409,614 P.2d 947,
: ,
949 (1980)
...,! ....
. . ;i
Id.
i
32 The Application's "high visibility" resulted in six v o b e s of public testimony, extensive
print and television media coverage, and public hearin@iwt.hatran past midnight. The
Application had a "widely felt impact'' in that it invqlv& the entire area of the Powderhorn
Peninsula, including several thousand acres, approxi'm+ely 186 pieces of property, owned by
approximately 50 different individuals and entities, iiI: :
,

1:.. J,

!I

/

POWDERHORN COMMUNITIES LLC An?)
1: ,
:
HEARTLAND LLC'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN! :'
: /,::
SUPPORT OF MOTTON TO DISMISS: 11 j
,,

: , /, I
,,

1

K:\P\FOXXO24912\0ODDRPLDG\REDLY
IN SUPPORT OF MOTILN TO ~ ~ S ~ $ ~ - O ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - M2/23/07
W - M4:52:50
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DOC
i

02/23/07

FRI 17:00 FAX 5 0 9 747 2323

,

!

.
!

would have no practical effect because the appealed dlfldion
. ,. has already been amended and
. ,. .
. .

replaced.

. ,

,
:

Second, the County's Amcnded 0rdei of
.

, ,*
t

,i.e., its "final decision" dated

, a

'

November 16,2006, was never appealed. ~ h 228-d&!dbe
b
period for appealing the County's
!

final decision has expired. As the

...

I : /.

,

,

mended

,

timely appealed, this Court lacks
j:

jurisdiction to judicially review it.
not subject to judicial review.

Third, Petitioners have appealed a

fairness and judicial efficiency

Given the Court's lack of
,

.

;..

.

;i

.

require prompt dismissal. Because the stay &pqsc? ?&inst
. I
Powderhorn by this Court is
,
this Court lacks jurisdiction
without the protection of a bond or any
i
appeal dismissed without further
'over this appeal, it is necessary for ~owdeihdrn
: :

.

.

. .

1

. .

1

By.

..
.

..

for Intervenors/ftespondents
m Communities, LLC and

:

,

POWDERHORN COMMUNITIES LLC AkD
.
HEARTLAND LLC'S REPLY MEMORAI$DUK%
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS: ,121
., ;.
, ,
.
K1F\FOXXO24912\00005\PLDC\REPLY
1N SUPPORT OF MOJTION'$~

1 "

i., ;

02/23/07

FRI 1 7 : 0 1 FAY 5 0 9 7 4 7 2 3 2 3
. >

LUKIN? & ANNIS
:,

:

I::

: , . ;

I

..

0

,:

,

,

day of Fkbruary, 2007, I caused to be served a true
I hereby certify that on the
and colrect copy of the foregoing docunlent by themethod indicated below, and addressed to
the following:

,
; :

. ..
.:,'.

Scott W. Reed
Attorney at Law
401 Front St
P. 0.Box A
Coeur d' Alene, ID 838 16

ai

.

.,

'D
B

'

:
'

. ..

,

Hand-delivered
First-class Mait
Overnight Mail
Facsimile - 208-765-5 117

. .

John A. Cafferty
Kootenai County Legal Services
P.0 .Box 9000
Coeur dlAlene, ID 83816

iU

,

,

:

I

.

iiB.
.

. .

.-a

.

:

,

POWDERHORN COMMUNITIES LLC AND : :.
HEARTLAND LLC'S REPLY MEMORANDU
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS: 13
K:~7FOXX024912\00005\PLDG\RBPLY
1N SUPPORT OF MOTION

;
,

Hand-delivered
First-class Mail
Overnight Mail
Facsimile - 208-446-162 1

:

9151 :
, ,
,,

John F. Magnuson
Attorney At Law
1250 Northwood Center Ct Suite A
P. 0. Box 2350
Coeur d'Alene. ID 83816

.

.?IZli

'Q ! ' ,
,

,

'

/

,

Handdelivered
First-class Mail
Overnight Mail
Facsimile - 208-667-0500

i

SS.O22307-MRF-MRP,DOC2/23/07 4:52:50 PM

MISCHELL.3 R. FULGHAM
ISB #4623
PETER J. SEII:~HIV
ISB #6997
LUKINS & ..\h'NIS. P.S
Ste 102
250 Northwest Blvd.
Coeur d'Alene. ID 83814-2971
Teleuhone: (?08) 667-0517
Facsimile Nc-.: 1'509)363-2478
Attorneys foi: Intervenors Powderhorn Communities LLC and Heartland LLC

IN 1 HI: DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AM)FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAl
NEIGHBOR3 FOR RESPONSIBLE
GROWTH, E non-profit unioorporated
association; PRESERVE OUR RURAL
COMMUNI"'IES, a non-profit unicorporated
association; ICOIOTENAIENVIRONMENTAI
ALLIANCE, INC., a non-profit corporation;
NORBERT ~ n dBEVERLY TWILLMAW;
GREG and J.\hET TORLINE; SUSAN
MELm, MIiRLYN and JEAN NELSON,

NO. CV-06-8574
OBJECTION TO AMENDED PETITION
FOR JUDICIAL REVIEWMOTION TO
STRIKE AMENDED PETITION

Plaintiffs,
v.
KOOTENAI:COUNTY, a political subdivision
of the STATj3 OF IDAHO acting through the
KOOTENAICOUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS; S.J. "GUS"JOHNSON,
CllARMAb: ELMER R. "RICK CURRIE
and KATIE IiRODIE, COMMISSIONERS, in
their official 7apacities; and KATE BRODIE,
personally a d individually,
- - -

and

Defendants,

POWDERHORN COMMUNITIES LLC, and
HEARTLAK D LLC

OBJECTION r0 AMENDED PETITION FOR JUDICIAL
REVEW/MOTION TO STRIKE: 1

I

INTFKVENORS POWDERHORN COMMUNITIES LLC and HEARTLAND LLC
object to Plaintiffs proposed Amended Petition for Judicial Review. Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 15 the
Plaintiffs arrendment is improper and should be stricken from the pleadings in this matter.
The Rule provides:

Rule ]$(a). Amended and supplemental pleadings - Amendments.
A pa? may amend the party's pleading once as a matter of course a t any time
before a responsive pleading is sewed or, if the pleading is one to which no
responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the
trial calendar, the party may so amend it at any time within twenty (20) days
after it IS served. Otherwise a party may amend a pleading only by leave of
court car by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be f~eely
give11when justice so requkes, and the court may make such order for the
payment of costs as it deems proper. A party shall plead in response to an
amended pleading within the time remaining for response to the original
pleatKing or within ten (1 0) days after service of the amended pleading,
whichever period may be the longer, unless the court otherwise orders.

I.R.C.P. IS(:.%) emphasis added).
Plaintiffs c o ~ l dnot amend their Petition "once as a matter of course at any time" because
"responsive pleadings," including Powderhorn's Motion to Dismiss, had already been filed and
served. As ::r result, Plaintiffs could & amend "by leave of court or by written consent of the
adverse party."' Neither has occurred. Thus, the Amended Petition is invalid and should be
stricken ??or3 the pleadings.
Oral argument is requested.

DATED this 27th day of February, 2007.

OBJECTIOlc TO AMENDED PETITION FOR JUDICIAL
REVIEW/M(lTION TO STRIKE: 2

LUKINS & ANNIS, P.S.

Attorneys for Intervenors Powderhorn
Communities LLC and Heartland LLC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I her1:by certify that on the 27th day of February, 2007,I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
Scott YN.Reed
Hand-delivered
Atttmey at Law
401 Front St
Overnight Mail
P.(1. Box A
U
Facsimile - 208-765-5 117
Coaw d' Alene, ID 83816
Joh I A. Cafferty
Koc~teilaiCounty Legal Services
I?. 0. Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, ID 838 16

Hand-delivered

JfFirst-class Mail

Overnight Mail
Facsimile - 208-446-1621

J o h ~F. Magnuson

U

Att~~rney
At Law
1250 Northwood Center Ct., Suite A
P. 0 . 1 3 0 ~2350
Cot ur d'Alene, ID 83816

0
Cl

0BJBCTIOE.TTO AMENDED PETITION FOR JUDICIAL
REVLEW/M~3TLONTO STRIKE: 3

Hand-delivered
First-class Mail
Overnight Mail
Facsimile 208-667-0500

-

STATE OF iClAHG
COUI.II\! OF KOCiTEN4I
FILEC

MISCHELLE R. FULGHAM
ISB #4623
PETER J. SMITH IV
ISB #6997
LUKINS & ANNIS. P.S.
Ste 102
250 Northwest Blvd.
Coeur d'Alene. ID 838 14-2971
Telephone: (208) 667-05 17
Facsimile No.: (509) 363-2478
Attomevs for Av~licantsHeartland LLC and Powderhom Communities LLC

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
NEIGHBORS FOR RESPONSIBLE
GROWTH, a non-profit unicorporated
association; PRESERVE OUR RURAL
COMMUNITIES. a non-vrofit unicornorated
association: KOOTENA~ENVIRONMENTALI
ALLIANCE, INC., a non-profit corporation;
NORBERT and BEVERLY TWILLMANN;
GREG and JANET TORLINE; SUSAN
MELKA; MERLYN and JEAN NELSON,

NO. CV-06-8574
ORDER RE MOTION TO INTERVENE

Plaintiffs,
KOOTENAI COUNTY. a aolitical subdivision /
of the STATE OF 1 ~ ~ ~ 0 ' a c tthroueh
i n e the I

personally and individually,
Defendants,

The application of Heartland LLC and Powderhorn Communities LLC, pursuant to
I.R.C.P. 24, to intervene in this action as Respondenmefendant, having duly and regularly
ORDER RE MOTION TO INTERVENE: 1

K:\F\FOXX024912\0000S\PLDG\ORDER
GRANTING MOTION TO INTERVENE-121406-JKM-MRF.DOC12114106

come before this Court and the parties having filed a Stipulation Re Motion to Intervene with
this Court.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Applicants
Heartland LLC and Powderhorn
..
Communities LLC are grante
leaver-F4
to intervene and shall be so reflected in the caption of this
%3'<
case.
DATED this

a

,LW&"I

day of &&ber,

2 0 7

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

2

&

2-3-1

I hereby certify that on the
day -of
I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to
the following:
Hand-delivered
Mischelle R Fuleham
Lukins & ~ n n i s ; ~ . ~ .
First-class Mail
7 17 W Sprague Ave., Suite 1600
Overnight Mail
Spokane, WA 99201-0466
Facsimile - 509-363-2478
Scott W. Reed
Attorney at Law
401 Front St
P. 0 . Box A
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83816
John A. Cafferty
Kootenai County Legal Services
P. 0. Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816

C]

Hand-delivered
First-class Mail
Overnight Mail
Facsimile - 208-765-5 1 17

C]

Hand-delivered
First-class Mail
Overnight Mail
Facsimile - 208-446-1621

7

ORDER RE MOTION TO INTERVENE: 2

K:~F\FOXX024912\00005~PLDG\ORDER
GRANTING MOTION TO INTERVENE-121406-JKM-MRF.DOC12/14/06

Scott W. Reed, ISB#818
Attorney at Law
P. 0. Box A
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816
Phone (208) 664-2161
FAX (208) 765-51 17

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIR
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
NEIGHBORS FOR RESPONSIBLE
GROWTH, a non-profit, unincorporated
association; PRESERVE OUR RURAL
C 0M M U N I T I E S
a n on-D r ofit
unincorporated assohation; KOOTENAI
ENVIRONMENTAL ALLIANCE. INC.. a
non-profit corporation; NORBERT and
BEVERLY TWILLMANN; GREG and
JANET TORLINE; SUSAN MELKA;
MERLYN and JEAN NELSON;

.

KOOTENAI COUNTY,
a political
subdivision of the STATE OF IDAHO
acting through the KOOTENAI COUNTY
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS; S.J.
"GUS" JOHNSON,, -C
ELMER
R., "RICK" CURRIE and KATIE
BRODIE, COMMISSIONERS, in their
official capacities; and KATIE BRODIE,
personally and individually,
DefendantslRespondents,
and
POWDERHORN COMMUNITIES, LLC,
and HEARTLAND, LLC, and COEUR
D'ALENE LAND COMPANY and H. F.
MAGNUSON,

)
)
)

j

j
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

1
)

1
)

1
)
)
)

1
)
)
)

RESPONSE TO OBJECTION TO AMENDED
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

Case No. CV-06-8574
RESPONSE OF PLAINTIFFS/PETITIONERS
TO INTERVENORSIRESPONDENT
POWDERHORN COMMUNITIES, LLC AND
HEARTLAND, LLC OBJECTION . TO
AMENDED PETITION FOR JUDICIAL
REVIEWIMOTION TO STRIKE AMENDED
PETITION

Intervenors/RespondentsPowderhorn Communities, LLC and Heartland, LLC
have objected to and moved to strike the Amended Petition for Review adding a
Fourth Cause of Action for Declaratory Judgment as filed February 5, 2007.

The

basis for the objection is that Powderhorn's Motion to Dismiss was a "responsive
pleading" therefor, under Rule 15 (a) 1.R.Civ.P. requiring leave of the Court or
consent of the parties before filing.
"Responsive pleadings" are these pleadings identified in Rule 7 (a) 1.R.Civ.P.
It is universally held in federal courts referring to Rule 15 F.R.Civ.P., which is
identical to Rule 15 I.R.Civ.P., that a motion to dismiss or any other motion such
as a motion to intervene is not a "responsive pleading." Attached hereto is a copy
of Sections 1482 and 1483, pp. 580 through 589, Vol., 6, Wright-Miller-Kane
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, fully reporting applicable law upon
the subject.
The Objection and Motion to Stike should be denied.
Dated this 5th day of March, 2007.
Scott W. Reed
Attorney for Petitioners/Plaintiffs

RESPONSE TO OBJECTION TO AMENDED
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the above and foregoing is sent by first class mail,
postage prepaid, this 5th day of March, 2007 to:
JOHN CAFFERTY, ESQ.
KOOTENAI COUNTY DEPT. OF
LEGAL SERVICES
45 1 GOVERNMENT WAY
P. 0. BOX 9000
COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO 838 16-9000
FAX (208) 446-1621
MISCHELLE FULGHAM
LUKINS & ANNIS, P.S.
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
1600 WASHINGTON TRUST
FINANCIAL CENTER
717 WEST SPRAGUE AVFiNUE
SPOKANE, WA 99204-0466
FAX (509) 747-2323
JOHN F. MAGNUSON
ATTORNEY AT LAW
P. 0. BOX 2350
COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO 83816

RESPONSE TO OBJECTION TO AMENDED
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
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15(a)

Rule 15

C
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TO
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$ 1482
Rule 15

plaintiffs right to amend the complaint as of course to include a
claim against both the original defendants and the new defendant?
Although there do not appear to be any reported decisions dealing
with this question, a literal application of the language in the
Pallant opinion indicates that plaintiff would be able to amend
without leave of court even as to the original defendants.
Nonetheless, it may be argued that the liberal amendment as
of course policy of Rule 15(a) should not be extended this far. A
rule permitting the revival of the right to amend might become a
mechanism for abuse by encouraging plaintiff to add nominal
parties to keep his right to amend alive and by providing a
potential source of harassment. Indeed, although plaintiffs abili.
ty to amend is strictly limited by the time restrictions imposed by
Rule 15(a), if he can extend that time period substantially there
may be situations in which defendant has relied on the original
pleading (by responding to it, for example) and would be disadvantaged by the delayed amendment. Even though these concerns
probably are rather remote and the district court has the authority to correct any prejudice by imposing costs or conditions on
motion by defendant: the sounder approach is to require a motion
for leave to amend so that the court may consider the possible
effects of the proposed amendment on the other parties to the
action. This should not be unduly burdensome on plaintiff
much as Rule 15(a) specifically provides that leave to amend s
be freely granted.

9 1482.

~

Ch.4

-Effect
of a Motion for Leave to Amend During the Time for Amendment a s of Course

If a party erroneously moves for leave to amend before th

motion to amend before the period for amendment as of course has
expired does so inadvertently and treating the amendment as if it
had been made under the first sentence of Rule 15(a) avoids
penalizing the pleader for not understanding the rule.
However, since a motion is not a responsive pleading within
the meaning of Rule 15(a),2the question remains whether a party
desiring to amend a pleading may elect to proceed first by leave of
court, preserving the right to amend as of course. The language
of Rule 15(a) does not prevent a party from requesting leave to
amend before exercising the right to amend as of course; it only
prohibits the service of amendments as of course when the specified time for interposing them has elapsed. Nonetheless, in In re
Watauga Steam Laundry,3 the court held that plaintiff waived its
right to serve an amendment as of course by first seeking the
court's permission to alter its pleading. In that suit plaintiffs
attorney notified defendant's counsel of the day and hour when he
would move for leave to amend and the court, after hearing
arguments on the motion, denied plaintiffs request. He then fded
the same amendment with the clerk as an amendment without
leave of court in an apparent attempt to avoid the effect of the
prior adverse ruling. The court held that to allow plaintiff to
amend would prejudice defendant, who had prepared for the
hearing on the motion and had presented arguments opposing
plaintiffs motion, as well as result in a waste of judicial time. In
murt granted defendants' rnoti-d
the Ninth Circuit reversed on the
gmun-3 that the motion to dismiss did
not cowtitUte a responsive pleading
and thus plaintiffs could amend as a
matter of
-- ~inht.
~ ~ " - ~
KLrk v. U.S., CA.9th 1956, 232 F.2d

763.
Petemon &IS, Inc. v. Seidmon, C.A.
7th. 1961. 188 F.2d 193.
VerneU ri. U.S. Postal Serv.. C.A.Sth,
1987, 819 F.Zd 108.
Stewart
v . RCA Colporation, C.A.7th.
1. Ignore motion
1986. 790 F.2d 624.
Portion of pededrian's memorandum in
to
~ e dmotion
~ ~ Zeidi
> v.
~ Ehrlich, CkBth, 1984,732 F.2d
"' *.
to dismiss action under Federal Tort
name United Sbtes as defendant,
should have been construed a.motion
to amand the complaint, when no r e
sponsive pleading had been served.

580

126x6) motion to &miss and pl
tiffsin tbei. briefs responding to tba
motion indicated that they wished to
file a n amended complaint. The

But campare
Net Worth Tax
D.C.Wis.1972, 66 F.R.D. 141 (motion
to amend denied without prejudice).

''

But see
Centifanti
v. Nix,C.A.3d, 1989, 866F.Zd
R~~~~~ ", ~
i T~~~
~ a,,
d ~.~.sth,
1422
1947, 159 F.2d 239.
~

5. Imp= oonditions
See 9 1486.

Johnson v. Walsh, D.C.Mo.1946. 65
F.Supp. 157.
simmonr,
co.". Cantor, D . c , P ~ . I ~3 ~ ~ ,
F.R,D, 197,

~

Butler v. McDounell-Douglas Saudi
Actbia Corp., D.C.Ohio 1981. 93
F.R.D. ash.
Dema v. Feddor, D.C.Il1.1979, 470
F.Supp. 152, &inned without opinion
C.k?th, 1981, 661 F.2d 937, certiorari
denied 102 S.Ct. 1433, 455 U.S. 941,
71 LEd.53 651.
Jones v. Electrodyne Co., D.C.Mo.1963,
224 F.Supp. 599.

2. Motion not responsive pleading
seeg 1475.
3. In re Wabuga ease
D.C.Tenn.1947, 7 F.R.D. 657.

See also
Vars v. International Bhd. of Bailermakers, Iron Shipbuilders, Blacksmiths, Forgers & Helpers, D.C.Com.
1962, 204 F.Supp. 245.

c-'
W
!-'c

fi

1482

AMENDMENTS UNDEX RULE

IS(^)

Rule 15

short, plaintiff, by proceeding first by motion, was viewed
having waived his right to amend without leave.

Ch. 4

TERMINATION OF THE RIGHT TO AMEND

9

11483
Rule 15

claims, third-party claims, or counterclaims--may be amended
without leave of court before respozwes are served.' And if the
court orders a reply to an answer or third-party answer, the
original defendant or the third-party defendant may amend the
answer as of course before the repIy is ioterposed.
WiIson p.. Crowe-Bnds Co.. C.A.8tb Kais 7. Breier, D.C.Wis.1970, 312
1977, 666 F.Zd 870, certiorari denied
F.Supp. 19.
9.3 s.ct. 51a. 434u.s. 968,54 L . E ~ . z ~watseoeo,
v.
D.C.
456.
N.Y.1964. 232 FSUDO.3R.
.

interpretation appears sound in view of the court's earlier ruling
on
motion. No doubt the Watauga court felt that there
little reason for allowing a party to avoid an adverse ruling by
the court by reasserting the same amendment as of course after
the merits of the amendment have been considered and rejected.

was

$ 1483.

-Termination
Course

I. Dis)iscussion elsewhere
See 8 1475.

2, Defined in light d Rule T(a1
Rekeveg v. Federal Mut. los. Co., D.C.
Ind.1961, 27 F,RD. 431,
See elso voi. 5, 5s 1183-1188.

of the Right to Amend as of

motion constituted
court's discretion.
New York City Bd.
Zd, 1983, 709 F2d
nied 104 S.Ct. 537,
L,Ed,Zd ,17,
Plaintiff was not entitled to amend

Fuhrer 7. h h r e r , C.A.7th. 1961, 292
F.2d 140.
Peckham 7. Sfanlon, C.A.7th7 1957, 241
F.2d 761.
Peterson Steels, Inc. v. Seidmon, C.A.
7th. 1951, 188 F.2d 193.
%gem v. G i r d Trust Co., CA.6th.
1947, 159 F.2d 239.
~ o f i ov. or be^ Sees.. hc. D.C.N.Y.
1986, 699 FS&~. 1563.
Under Rule 15(aI permitting amendment of the eomplaiot 89 of ~ i g honly
t
before s responsive ~ i e a d i n a is
served, plaintiffs who- served a n
amended complaint on the same day
that defendant served the answer to
the original complaint were not entitled to amend their complaint as of
right, since the amendment did not
become effective until two days later
when the amendment was f i e d in the
district court. Donner v. Sulcus Computer Corp., D.C.Ga.1984, 103 F E D .
648.
Cunard Line Ltd v. Ahney, D.C.N.Y.
1982, 640 F.Supp. 657.
De La W a d d u l v. W a n e State
Univ., D.C.Mich.1980, 482 F.Supp.
1388.
De Maherbe v. International Union of
Elevator Constructom, D.C Ca1.1977,
488 F.Supp. 1121.

steiner

". %entieth

~.,
c

~~

i

Corp., D.C.Ca1.1963, 140 F.Supp. 906.

U.S. v. MacEvoy, D.CN.3.1950, 10
F.RI).
.. 323~
.
.
Park-Ia Theatres, Inc. v. ParmountRichards Theatres, he., D.C.De1.1949,
F.R.D, 267.

Cohn v. Columbia Pictures Corp., D.C.
N.Y.19493 9 *.R.D. 204.
Porter v. Montaldo's, D.C.Ohio 1946, ?I
F.Supp. 372.
Johnson v. Waish. D.C.Mo.1946, 65
F.SUPP. 157.
Pallant v. Sinatre., D.C.N.Y.1945, 7
F.R.D. 293.
Simmons Co. v. Cantor, D.C.Pa.1943, 3
F.R.D. 197.
Kuhn v. Pacific M u t Life Ins. Co., D.C.
N.Y.1941, 37 F.Supp. 102.
Gaumont v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Ine.,
D.C.ii.Y.1941, 2 F.R.D. 45.
U.S. for Use & Benefit of Darfman v.
Standard Sur. & Cas. Co., D.C.N.Y.
1940, 1 F.R.D. 239.
Bugpeln & Smith. Ine. v. Standard
Brands, Inc., D.C.N.Y.1939, 27
F.Supp. 399.
4. Couoterclaim amended
Blaurn. Inc. v. DeLuxe Game Corp., D.C.
N.Y.1965, 268 F.Supp. 416, 430.
Van D e e v. Alurninvm Air Seal Mfg.
Co., D.C.Obio 1951. I1 F.R.D. 558.

Keman v. Warren. D.CWis.lS71, 328
F.Supp. 525, & i e d Without opinion
sub nom. Niehol v, Ke-.
1972.92 See also
S.Q. 735, 404 U.S. 1055,
~ . E d 2 d B m e r v. RopLoc Prods. Co., D.C.
743.
Ohio 1949, 9 F.R.D. 208.

l~ ~

~
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Ch. 4
AMENDMENTS UNDER RRULE 151a)

Ch. 4

Rule 15

,

.

.

B u t when no responsive pleading is allowed, the right to
amend as of course is limited to 20 days after the service of the
original pleading.' For example, in one suit in which defendant
fded an answer containing a counterclaim and served it on plaintiff and plaintiff filed his reply, the court held that since the reply
was responsive only to the counterclaim and no responsive pleading $ permitted to the answer, defendant could amend the
noncounterclaim portion of his answer without leave of court at
any time within 20 days after it had been ~ e r v e d . ~
The language of Rule 7(a) indicates that a motion is not a
responsive pleading? This fact is important because certain motions may be made before, interposing a respon~ivepleading.
6. Answer amended
Lynn v. Cahen, D.C.N.Y.1973,
F.Supp. 565.

359

6. Illwtrative case
B~~
v. R O ~ L O C prods, Co.. D.C.

Ohio 1949, 9 F3.D. 208.
1. Motion not r w p o a s h e pleading

Hagee v. City of Evanatnn, D.C.IU.1982,
95 F.R.D. 344, citing Wright & Mill.

er.
Move Organization v. City of Philadelphia, D.C.Pa.1981, 89 F.R.D. 521,523,
citing Wright &
Johnson v. Duval County Teachers
Credit Union, D.C.Fla.1980, 507
F,SU~P.307.

AUen v. Veterans Administratio% C.A.

&gan v. Harhert Constr. Cop., D.C.
9th. 1984, 749 F.2d 1386.
N.Y.1980, 507 F.Supp. 254.
Textor v. Board of %gents of N. mino*
~ i s t . ,D.C.S.C.
K~IIY ~ i e h l a n d
Univ., C.A.7th, 1983, 711 F.2d 1387.
1978, 463 F.Supp. 216.
1391 n.
citing Wright &
&idgess v. Youree, D.C,Okl.l977, 436
Barksdale v. King, CA.Sth, 1983, 699
F,Supp. 458.
F.2d 744.
Kameman v. P&co as..
D.C.N.Y.1977,
MeGruder v. Phelps, C.A.Sth, 1979, 608
75 F.R.D. 673.
F.2d 1023.
Bates v. Western Elec., D.C.Pa.1976,
Smith v, Blackledge, C.A.4th, 1971, 451
420 F.s"P~, 521,
F.2d 1201,1203 n. 2, citing Wright
of defendant to amend ti,e
The
miller.
counterclaim and crass.efaim as s
Nol& v. F i t z M , C.A9th, 1971, 450
matter of right was timely when no
F.2d 958.
response had been fded to the crma
claim and counterclaim but merely a
~~,.k,,vi~h., Vasad ~orp.,D.C.Pa.1985,
motion to dismiss and strike the
617 F.SUPP. 142.
same. Cone Mills Cop. v. A.G. 5tes,
Madden v. Beland, D.C.Ga.1985, 106
he., D.C.Ga.1974, 377 F.Supp. 222.
F.R.D. 520.
wesob
Oil Co,, mdiRoberts v. Husky lndw., InCCCD I ) G T ~ .
F".D. 479.
en& D.C.Minn.1983, 568 F.Supp. 556.
Chodoa pederal B~~~~ ,I hvedjga. Oskierko v. Southwestern Horizans,
tion, D,C.N,Y.1982, 559 F.Supp. 69,
In'.* DC'IU.1973r
F'R'D. 365'
certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 741. 459 Rekeweg v. Federal Mut. fns. Co., D.C.
Ind.1961, 27 F.R.D. 431.
U.S. 1111, 74 L.Ed.2d 962.
Harfee v. Hsgen, D.C.N.Y.1982, 538 Porter v. Montaldo's, D.C.Ohi0 1946,71
F.Supp. 389.
F.Supp. 372.

".
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Indeed, a motion involving any of the Rule 12I.b)defenses normally
must be made before serving a responsive pleading, whenever such
a pleading is permitted.8 Consequently, courts have held that the
filing of a motion to dismiss will not prevent a party from
subsequently amending without leave of court.8 Similarly, an
8. Rule 12(b) motion
See voL 5, 5 1361.
9. After motion to dismiss

Jafree

7.

Barber, C.A.Tth, 1982, 689

La Ban v. Twomey, CA.7th 1975, 513

Ohio Cas. I?. Co. v. Farmera Bank,
CA.Gth, 1949, 178 F.2d 570.
Keene Lumber Co. v. Leventhal, C.A.
Ist, 1948, 165 F.2d 815.
Hantover, Inc. v. Omet, S.N.C. d
Volentieti & C., D.C.Mo.1988, 688
p . ~ 1377,
~ ~1380,
~ citing
.
wright

Miller.
Fidenan A 0 v. Honeywell lnc., D.C.N.Y.
&
1980, 501 F.Supp. 1029, 1032, citing
Wright & Miller.
Reis s. Richardson, C.A.D.C.1971, 455
v, U,S. Department of Defense,
F.Zd 1287, 1289 n. 2.
D.C.N.H.1976, 71 F.R.D. 349.
Smith "' Blackledge, C.k4th* 1971. 451 Sohns v. Dabl, D.C.Va.1975,392 F.Supp.
F.2d 1201,1203 n. 2, citing Wright &
1208, 1219, citing wright &
McNeiU v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
When
f*ed no answer Or
D.C.IU.1975, 65 F.R.D. 584.
other pleading in a civil rights action
Beck
v. Athens Bldg. Loan & Savs.
prior to the entry of an order h.
rnissiDg the
but moved ta
ASS)n, D.C.Pa.1974, 65 F.R.D. 691.
miss the complaint far failing to state Worcester County Nat. Bank v. Cahn,
D.C.N.Y.1969, 48 F.R.D. 285.
a claim for relief and in their m e m e
randam briefs plaintiffs indicated B ~ W Ohe.
~ , ". D ~ L U G~~~
X ~ carp., D.C.
that they *shed
a e an m e n d e d
N.Y.1965, 268 F S U ~ ~ . 416.
amend an of course and
had the
the order
right to
of Martin
F,R.D. v. Hunt, D.C.Mass.1961, 29
Walgren
Hawe', CA1st*
F.2d 95, 96 n.

482

dismissal was improper. Nolen v.
Fitzharris, C.k9th, 1971, 450 F.2d
Smith v. California, C.A.Sth, 1964, 336
Richerdson v. U.S., C.A9th, 1964, 336
Breier s. Northern California 80wling
Roprietors' kss'n, C.A.gth, 1963, 316

Rekeweg v. Federal Mut. Ins. Co., D.C.
Ind.1961, 27 F.R.D. 431.
Ginsburg v. Stern, D.C.Pa2956, 19
F.R.D. 238, a f f i e d in part on other
grounds C.A.3d. 1957, 242 F.2d 379.
Amos v. Prom, Inc., D.C.1ow.s 1953, 115
F.Supp. 127.
Whitternore v. Continental Mius, D.C.
Me.1951, 98 F.Supp. 387.

Fuhrer v. Fuhrer, C.A7th, 1961, 292
See also
Peterson Steels, Inc. v. Seidmon, C.A. Johnson 7. Bollinger, 1987, 356 S.E.2d
7th. 1959, 188 F.2d 193.
378, 382, 86 N.C.App. 1, citing
Kelly v. Delaware River Joint CommVn,
Wright 6t Miller.
CA.3d, 1951, 187 F.2d 93, certiorari Sonnedle v. Stedef, Inc, D.C.App.ls82,
449 A.2d 1087,1089, e i w g Wright &
denied 72 S.Ct. 25, 342 U.S. 812, 96
Miller.
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mendment as of right may be niade after a motion to strike is
led.'O Nor does a summary judgment motion made before reponding have any effect on a party's ability to amend under the
ust sentence of Rule 15(a)." Motions of this type are not ''re
ponsive pleadings" in any sense. As stated by the district court
11. Summw judgment mation
Zaidi v. Ehrlich, C.A.5th. 198473ZF.2d
1218, 1220, citing Wright 8r Miuer.
Clardy v. Duke Univ., C.A.lth, 1962
299 F.2d 368.
irk v. U.8, c.kgth, 1956, 232 F.2d

lut oompsre
.-

m

rendaots moved to dismiss the
but befow a deciI
,=on and without obtaining
sion
fomuu leave of court or the mitten
a
Consent of defendants plaintiff
second amended complaiat, if the
t i s t amended complaint were db
*d,
plaintiff woald not be allowed, f f i 8 matter of right, to submit
his second amended complaint.
Smart 7. Ellis Trucking Co., D.C.
Mich.1976,409 F.Supp. 123, judgment
affmned in part, reversed in Part
~ . ~ . 6 t 1918,580
h,
F.2d 216. certiorari
denied 99 S.Ct. 1497.440 U.S. 968.59
L.EdSd 770.

163,

Ragen v. Girard 'Rust Co.. C.A.Gth,
159 F.Zd 239'
Williams v. Wilkerson, D.C.Va.1981, 90
F.R.D. 168, 170, citiag Wright 8
Miller.
~ a n ~ i nv.g Greensville Memorial
HOSP., D . C . V ~ . I B ~
470
~ , F.SUW. 66%
if FayFirst Fed, Savs, & Loan
etteville s. Federal Rome Loan Bank

10, After motion to strike

Car Carries, Iac. v, Ford Motor Co..
C.A.?th, 1984,745 F.Zd 1101, certiorari denied 105 S C t 1758, 470 US.
1064, 84 L.Ed.2d 821.

g,E",68

V ~ , ~ , " , " , & f ~ , ~

, -.

Park-In Theatres, Inc. v. Paramout.eion of a prison -ate's
motion
xichar& meatres, bc.,
D.C.Del.1949,
.~nsider,in which be s p e & d y
F,~.D.267,
reterred to a First Amendment r&gious 2ipht to grow a beard in prison. see atso
would be treated ffi an amerdment to Miller v. American Export t i e s , k.,
a complaint in a civil rights action
C,A,2d, 1963, 313 ~ 2 ~41 8 ,
alleging that he had been forced by
piison authorities to shave his beard ~ , t
in d a t i o n of the Eighth AmendIn the case of In re Wata,,ga
men& when at the time the inmate
fded the motion to ~econsider,defendants had yet to fde a respome to the
pieading, and when defendants' mction to strike the F b t Amendment
claim demonstrated their actual notion is not regar
tice of the claim, therefore, remand
pleadiag,
was appropriate for the district court
tion is wBtmed
to address the inmate's free exercise
by its m
,,f,
it
of religion claim. Mwre v. Florida,
This is parti
C.A.llth, 1983, 703 F.2d 516.

,.

..

Neifeld v. Steiabeg, C.A.3d. 1971, 438
F.2d 423, 425 n. 3.
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in Park-In Theatres, he.v. Paramount-Richards Theatres, Inc.: '2
It responds to nothing in the preceding pleading and assumes
there are no controverted material facts to which a response
&odd be made. If such controverted materid facts exist and to
which a response should be made, then the motion for snmmary
judgment must fail. The motion in general assumes the cornedness of the facts theretofore alleged and that there is nothing to
be added by response and that, notwithstanding the correctness
of the prior facts, the judgment should he entered?
Similarly, an amendment without leave of court has been made
after defendant successfully ffied a removal petition but did not
m e r the e o m p l a i ~ t . ~ ~
Although it is clear that an amendment as of course may be
served after a motion directed to the pleadings has been made, the
question often arises whether the first sentence of Rule 15(a)
continues to be operative once the motion to dismiss is granted.
Ideally, if it is at all possible that the party against whom the
dismissal is directed can correct the defect in the pleading or state
a claim for relief, the court should dismiss with leave to amend.Is
See slso
Wangle Conduit &Cable Co. v. National Eiec. Prods. Carp., D.C.Del.1941.38
F.Supp. 533, reversed on other
grounds C.A.3d, 1942, 125 F.2d 1098,
certiorari denied 62 S.Ct. 1046, 316
U S 676, 86 L.Ed. 1750.
12. Park-In Theatres csse
D.C.Del.1949, 9 F.R.D. 267.
13. Responds to nothing
9 F.KD. a t 288 (per Rodney, 3.).

under Rules 81a) and B(e) Md for misjoinder of parties, the cwrt of appeals
held that the remedy of dismissal for
pleading errors was viewed with disfavor and remanded the w e for some
less find disposition at least permit
ting lai in tiff to amend. Nagler v.
Admiral Corp., C.A.2d. 1957,248 F.2d
319.
When the dbtrict court dismissed a
complaint on a motion for judgment
on the pleadings, but recogoized that
a claim for damages might eaist re--sulting from the fraud allege* in threply, it should have conditioned its
dismissal M We fsilure of plsintiff to
reframe his complaint to state a
eiaim for relief. Dowoey v. Palmer,
CA.Zd 1940, 114 E2d

--

14 Amendment after removal

R.F.D. Group Ltd. v. Rubber
Fabrimtom, Inc., D.C.N.Y.1g71, 323
F.Supp. 521.

15. Dismhal with leave to amend
B d o u v. General Elec. Co., C k l s t .
1968. 393 F.2d 398.
187.
Lone Star Motor Import,Inc. v. Citmen
Can Corp., C.A.5th, 1961, 288 F.2d
SQ

when the district mart granted a m o
tion to &miss for improper pleading

See also

U.S. ex rel. Atterbury v. Ragen. C.A.
Tth, 1956,237 P.2d 953, certiorari d e
nied 77 S.CL 1049, 363 U.S. 964, 1
L.Ed.2d 914.

Kubn v. Paciftc Mut. Life Ins. Co.. D.C.
N.Y.1941. 31 F.Supp. 102.
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This will afford the party against whom the dismissal is
.

the option of amending the pleading or of having a j
against him and taking an ap~eal.'~ Dismiss
leave to amend is consistent withthe mandate set fo
15(a) that amendments should be freely granted. In
puts the adverse party on notice that further proc
action are possible, whereas an order that does
.- include that right leaves the party who success
'smiss the original pleading in doubt whether his opponent can
-end under Rule 15(a). Of course, if repleading could not
&ly correct the defects in th
should dismiss the action witho
In practice a distinction appears to have bee
courts. In general it has been held that a party
course within a reasonable time after an ord
has been entered, inasmuch as no r
has been s e ~ e d . 1However,
~
if both an order
doctrine of

Neal v. Brockway, 1978, 385 A.?d 1069,

and a b a t judgment have been entered, or a substantial period of
time has elapsed since the dismissal, an amendment may be made
only by leave of court.1s As stated by one court:
damages and equitable relief because
of defendants' alleged conapiraey to
deprive plaintgf of his civil rights,
the district court dismissed the complaint because of want of prosecution
before the r e s p o ~ i v epleading was
Erled. The court af appeals noted that
st the time of dismissal, plaintiff was
coniined to prison, not represented by
counsel, and had no notlce that the
ease would be called or m y action
taken on the date of dismissal, and
sus&ed
plaintiffs
that
he wm entitled to amend his
!?laint as of right after dismksal if no
responsive pleading was filed.
l9S7,
Peckham v. Scadon.
241 F.2d 761.

Peterson Steels, Inc.
Miller.
Compare
Although defendant violated the appli.
cable rule by filing an amended counterclaim withoUt leave of mu*. the
violation did not warrant dismissal of

909, 18 L.Ed.2d 627.
Smith v. California, C.A.9th. 1964, 336
F,2d 530,

16. Appeal waives

University Club v. City of New York
C.A.2d. 1988, 842 F.2d 37, 51, citing
w,.igh* & ~ $ 1 (Opportunity
1 ~ ~
to
amend was waived when appeal tak-

?th. 1951, 188 F.2d 193.

F.2d 140.

F.2d 530.

Keene Lumber Co. v. Leventhal, C.A.
Ist, 1948, 165 F.2d 615.

F.2d 265.

Hagee v. City of Ev-ton.
D.C.IU.1962,
95 F.R.D. 344, 346, citing Wright &

.urnstance$, the h u e of noncompliwith
was moot. Home
Ins. Co. v. Ballenger Con.,D.C.08.
1977. 74 F.R.D. 93.

v. Seidmon, C.A.

When the district court dismissed plaintiffs complaint with leave to amend
within 30 days and plaintiff tendered
an amended ,complaint mare than a
month late, the mut of appeals held
that p W t i f I could fde the amendment without leave of court inasmuch
as a responsive pleading had not been
fded. Ohio &. h.Co. v. Farmers
Bank' C.A6th' 1949' 17' F'2d 570'

F

Miller.
Martin v. Hunt, D.C.Mass.1961, 29
F.R.D. 14.
F.Zd 140.

en).

See also
Cohen 7. Geosbro Hotel Co.. C.A.9th.
1968, 259 F.2d 76.

17. No leave to replead

complaint and denied leave to frle a n
amended complaint, the court of e p
held that the district court did
not commit error when no amendregardless or its
could
be presented that .nould avoid the
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19. Amendment only with leave
The priaoneys right to amend a civil
rights cumplaint as a matter of course
ended with the entry of a judgment of
dismksal Fearon 7 . Henderson, C.A.
Zd, 1986, 756 F 2 d 267.

Czeremcha v. Iateraatio&l Asr'n of
Machinists & Aerospace Workers,
MGCIO, C.A.llth, 1964, 724 F.2d
1552, 1556, citing Wright & Miller.

Con.
".

5th, 1979, 599 F.2d 659, 662. citing
Wright &
Elfenbein v. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc., C.A.
zd. 1978, 590 F . Z ~4.15.
United Steelworkers of America, AFL
CIO v. Meaker Bros. Indus., Inc., C.A.
8th. 197% 457 F.2d 91.
Kauffman u. Moss, C.A.3d, 1970, 420
F . Z ~1270, certiorari d e & d 91. s.ct.
93, 400 U.S. 846, 27 L.Ed.2d 64.
When a judgment dismirsing the origiilomplaintwithoutleave to amend
had been ordered, but the clerk had
failed to enter the order as a fmal
judgment, the court held that the
clerk's failure to perform a mhistariel function did not prevent the order
of dismissal from standing as a iinal
judgment, thus termbating the right
to amend as of course. Swan v.
Board of Higher Educ. of City of New
York CA.2d. 1963, 319 F.2d 56.
Ciardy v. Duke Univ., C.A.dth, 1962,
299 F.2d 368.
CasseU v. Michaux, C.A.D.C.1956, 240
F,2d 406.
Kelly v. Delaware River Joint Comm'n,
C.A.Sd, 1951. 167 F 2 d 93, ceitiorari
denied 72 S,Ct, 25,
U,S, 812, 96
L.Ed 614,
Feddersen Motors, Inc. v. Ward, C.A.
loth, 1950, 160 F.2d 519.
Markert v. Swift & Ca., CA.Zd, 1949,
173 F.2d 517.

Lumber &,
Leventhal, C,k
ist, 1948, 165 F,2d 815.
U.S. v. Newbury Mfg. Co., C.A.lst, 1941,
123 F.2d 453.
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plaintiff did not file an amenbment
but, rather, filed new allegations in
a separate pleading, as no responsive pleading had been filed and

TERMINATION
OF TI
pleadings of pro se plaintiff would
be read broadly. Jackson v. Strayer
College, D.C.D.C.1996, 941 F.Supp.
192.

ump, D.C.N.J.1990, 745.F.Supp.
0, 245, citing Wright; Miller &

5 1483. Amendments as of Course-Termination of
the Right to Amend as of Course
n. 3. Amendment before answer
Golden Budha Corp. v. Canadian Land Co. of America, N.V.,,
C.A.Zd, 1991, 931 F.2d 196, 202,,
citing Wright, Miller & Kane.
Prisoner would be permitted to
unilaterally withdraw procedural
due process claim asserted in federal complaint and pursue claim in
state court, when federal action
which had been dismissed was being remanded for further action,
and defendants had yet to file a
responsive pleading. Street v. Fair,
C.A.lst, 1990,918 F.2d 269.
n. 7. Motion not responsive
pleading
Doe v. U.S., C.A.gth, 1995, 58
F.3d 494.
Domino Sugar Corp. v. Sugar
Workers Local Union 392 of the
United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union, C.A.4th, 1993, 10
F.3d 1064.
Lockhart v. Cedar Rapids Community School Dist., D.C.Iowa 1997,
. 963 F.Supp. 805.
Borowstci v. International Business Machines Corp., D.C.Vt.1996,
928 F.SUDU.
424.
*
Fox .v. Sierra Devel. Co.,
D.C.Nev.1995, 876 F.Supp. 1169
(motion for more definite
statement).
Heritage Bank & Trust V.
Landon, Utah App.1989, 770 P.2d
1009, 1010, citing Wright, Miller
ik Kane.~.
n. 9. After motion t o dismiss
Plaintiff was free to amend his
complaint a t any time prior to the
entry of judgment on defendant's
motion to dismiss when defendant
did not file an answeror any other
document that could be deemed a
pleading; and the approximately
one-year period that elapsed between the filing of the motion to
dismiss and the entry of judgment
afforded plaintif? ample opportunity
to do so. Stein v. Royal Bank of
Canada, C.A.lst, 2001, 239 F.3d
389, 392, citing Wright, Miller &

-

Kane.
In a Title VII action against the
government, plaintiff employee
. could amend hiscomplaint as a
matter of right, even though tho
district court had entered a final
judgment dismissing the complaint,
when the court of appeals had reversed and remanded and the government had filed only a motion to
dismiss or in the alternative for
summary judgment; the court of appeals reversal and remand effectivelyreturned the case to the prejudffentstage a t which plaintiff
cou d amend once as a matter of
right before the government filed a
res onsive pleading. Bowden v.
u . 2 , C.A.D.C.1999, 176 F.3d 552.
Government's motion to dismiss petition for writ of habeas
corpus was not "responsive pleading," and, therefore, prisoner's objection to motion could serve as
-timely amendment to his initial
petition. Willis v. Collins, C.A,5th,
1993, 989 F.2d 187.
Motions to dismiss and for summary judgment do not qualify as
responsive pleadings for purposes
of determining whether plaintiff
may amend the complaint as of
right. Adams v. Quattlebaum,
D.C.D.C.2004,219 F.R.D. 195.
Petitioner seeking confirmation
of an arbitration award was entitled
to amend its petition without leave
of court when the respondent moved
to dismiss and cross-moved to vacate the arbitration award, but d ~ d
not serve a responsive pleading. In
the Matter-of Arbitration Between
Space Sys./Loral, Inc. v. Yuzhnoye
Design Office, D.C.N.Y.2001, 164
F.Supp.2d 397,400, oiting Wright,
Miller & Kane.
Alexander v. Fujitsu Business
Communication Sys,, Inc.,
D.C.N.H.1993,818 F.Supp. 462.
Bowers v. Robinson, 1993, 429
S.E.2d 799, 800, 311 S.C. 412, eiti n g Wright, Miller iE Kane.
n. 10. After motion t o strike
Taj Mahal Enterprises, Ltd. v.

Dismissal with leave t o
amend
Brever v. Rockwell Int'l Corp.,
C.A.lOth, 1994,40 F.3d 1119, 1131,
quoting Wright, Miller & Iiane.
Nordica USA, Inc. v. Deloitte &
Touche, D.C.Vt.1993, 839 F.Supp.
1082, 1093, citing Wright, Miller
& Kane.
n. 19. Amendment only with
leave
Even though plaintiffs amendment as of right was not extinguished when the district court
dismissed as to some but not all
defendants, since the dismissal was
not a final judgment, the district
court, which like plaintiff was under
.the misimpression that a final order had issued, did not abuse its
diseretibn by denying plaintiffs
subsequent motion f o r leave to
amend, when' plaintiff failed to attach the proposed amended,com- ,
plaint to its motion for reconslderation and failed to take the necessary
steps to make the proposed amendment part of the record on appeal.
Crestview Village Apartments v.
U.S. Department of Housing & Urban Devel., C.A.7th, 2004,383 F.3d
552.
Graue Mill Devel, Corp. v. COlonid Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago,
C.A.7th, 1991, 927 F.2d 988.
In re Baseball Bat Antitrust
Litigation, D.C.Kan.1999, 75
F.Supp.2d 1189.
Right to amend complaint as of
right at any time before responsive
pleading is filed terminates once a

n. 15.
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5 1484. Amendlnents With Le
General

If no prejudice is found, the]
gianted.'3.'
A more restrictive attitude tow
proceed in the manner prescribec
fied if it becomes necessary to
totally disregarding the requirem
'=.'Leave normally granted
Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers,
Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union
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plaintiffs right to amend the complaint as of course to include a
claim against both the original defendants and the new defendant?
Although there do not appear to he any reported decisions dealing
with this question, a literal application of the language in the
Pallant opinion indicates that plaintiff would be able to amend
without leave of court even as to the original defendants.
Nonetheless, it may be argued that the liberal amendment as
of course policy of Rule 15(a) should not be extended this far. A
rule permitting the revival of the right to amend might become a
mechanism for abuse by encouraging plaintiff to add nominal
parties to keep his right to amend alive and by providing a
potential source of harassment. Indeed, although plaintiffs ahility to amend is strictly limited by the time restrictions imposed by
Rule 15(a), if he can extend that time period substantially there
may be situations in which defendant has relied on the original
pleading (by responding to it, for example) and would be disadvantaged by the delayed amendment. Even though these concerns
probably are rather remote and the district court has the authority to correct any prejudice by imposing costs or conditions on
motion by defendant," the sounder approach is to require a motion
for leave to amend so that the court may consider the possible
effects of the proposed amendment on the other parties to the
action. This should not be unduly burdensome on plaintiff inasmuch as Rule 15(a) specifically provides that leave to amend shall
be freely granted.

4 1482. -Effect of a Motion for Leave to Amend Dur-

ing the Time for Amendment as of Course
If a party erroneously moves for leave to amend before the
time for amending as of course has expired, several courts have
held that the amendment should not be handled as a matter
addressed to the court's discretion but should be allowed as of
right.' This seems sound since in most cases, a party who makes a
5. Impose conditions

--"

S-0 6* 16%
*

1. Ignore motion
Portinn of pedestrian's memorandum in
oD,,asition to postal Service~smotion
tikismhs action under Federal Tort
Claims Act, requesting that pedestrian be allowed to amend complaint to
name United States as defendant,
should have been coastrued as motion
to amend the complaint, when no r e
spansive piesding had been served.

Verne11 v. U.S. Postal Sew., C.Abth,
1987, 819 F.2d 108.
Stewart v. RCA Corporation, C.A.7th.
1986, 790 F.2d 624.
Zaidi v. Ehrlich, C.A.5th 1984,732 F.Zd
1218.
In Nolen v. Fitzharris, CA.9th. 1971,
450 F.2d 958, defendants Tied a Rule
126H6) motion to dismiss and plaintiffs in their brief3 responding to that
motion indicated that they wished to
N e an amended complaint. The
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motion to amend before the period for amendment as of course has
expired does so inadvertently and treating the amendment as if it
had been made under the first sentence of Rule 15(a) avoids
penalizing the pleader for not understanding the rule.
However, since a motion is not a responsive pleading within
the meaning of Rule 15(a)? the question remains whether a party
desiring to amend a pleading may elect to proceed first by leave of
court, preserving the right to amend as of course. The language
of Rule 15(a) does not prevent a party from requesting leave to
amend before exercising the right to amend as of course; it only
prohibits the service of amendments as of course when the specified time for interposing them has elapsed. Nonetheless, in In re
Watauga Steam Laundry,3 the court held that plaintiff waived its
right to serve an amendment as of course by first seeking the
court's permission to alter its pleading. In that suit plaintiffs
attorney notified defendant's counsel of the day and hour when he
would move for leave to amend and the court, after hearing
arguments on the motion, denied plaintiffs request. He then filed
the same amendment with the clerk as an amendment without
leave of court in an apparent attempt to avoid the effect of the
prior adverse ruling. The court held that to allow plaintiff to
amend would prejudice defendant, who had prepared for the
hearing on the motion and had presented arguments opposing
plaintiffs motion, as well as result in a waste of judicial time. In
court granted defendants' motion and
the Ninth Circuit reversed on the
giound that the motion to dismiss did
not constitute a responsive pleading
and thus plaintiffs could amend as a
matter of rieht.
Kirk v. US., C.A.Sth, 1956, 232 F.2d
763.

-

P e t e m Steels, Inc, v. Seidmon, C.A.
7th. 1951, 188 F.2d 193.
Rogers v. Girard Trust a,,
C.A,6&,
1947, 159 F.2d 239.
Butler v. McDonnell-Douglas Saudi
Arabia Carp.. D.C.Ohia 1981, 93
F.R.D. 384.
Dema v. Feddor, D.C.lll.1979. 470
F.%pp. 152, affirmed without opinion
C.k7&, 1981,661 F.2d 937, certiorari
denied 102 S.Ct. 1433, 455 U.S. 941,
71 L.Ed2d 651.
Jones v. Electrodvne Co.. D.C.Mo.1963,

W

;
1

cv

Johnson v. Welsh, D.C.Mo.1946, 65
F.Supp. 157.
Simmons a.v, Cantor, D.C.Pa.1943, 3
F,R,D, 197.
But compare
Net Worth Tax League '. Wisconsin,
D.C.Wh.1972. 56 F.R.D. 141 (motion
to amend denied without prejrrdiee).
But see
Catifanti v. Nh, C.A.Sd, 1989, 865F.2d
1422.
2. Motion not responsive pleading
See s 1475.

3. In re Watauga case
D.CTenn'1947'
F'R'D' 657'
See also
~ ~ h d of
, ~~ ~ i l ~ ~ ~ .
vars ~
makers, Iron Shipbuilders, Blacksmiths. Forgers & Helpers, D.C.Com.
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I.

short, plaintiff, by proceeding first by motion, Was viewed as
having waived his right ta amend without leave.
The Watauga Steam Laundry decision may be criticized on
the ground that inasmuch as the rule gives a party an absolute
right to amend, he should not lose that right simply because he
mistakenly moves for leave to amend. Indeed, even if the court
believes that leave originally was requested in order to inconve~ i e n c eor harass the opposing party, which rarely will be demon;rable, this possibility should not cause the court to disregard the
liberal amendment policy embodied in Rule 15(a). Thus, the
Watauga court's decision appears inconsistent with the policy
behind the rule. Perhaps its holding that plaintiff had waived his
right to amend as of course actually masks a judicial detemination that the claim sought to be added was not meritorious. This
interpretation appears sound in view of the court's earlier ruling
on
motion. No doubt the Watauga court felt that there
was little reason for allowing a party to avoid an adverse ruling by
the court by reasserting the same amendment as of course after
the merits of the amendment have been considered and rejected.

4
,

-

1483.

-Termination
of t h e Right to Amend as of
Caurse

The first sentence of Rule 15(a) specifically limits a party's
ability to amend without leave of court to the time "before a
responsive
is served." As is discussed elsewhere,' the
term "responsive pleading" as used in Rule 15(a) must be interpreted in conjunction with the description of the pleadings allowed
in federal court actions set forth in Rule ?(a)." It is axiomatic that
the complaint may be amended as of course at any time before the
answer is served." Similarty, other affirmative p l e a d i n v o s s 1. Disoussion elsearhere
See $ 1475.
2. Defined in light of Rule 7(a)

Rekeweg v. Federnl Mut. Ins.Co., D.C.
Ind.1961, 27 F.R.D. 431.
See also vol. 5, $5 1183-1188.
3. Amendment before w w e r
Since the employer had not yet answered the
at the time %he
ee's flrst attempt to amend to add two
individuals as defendants, the employee was entitled to amend as a
matter of right and the denial of the

motion constituted an abuse of th
court's discretion. Washington
New York City Bd. of Estimate, C
2d. 1983, 709 F.2d 792, certiorari
nied I04 S.Ct 537, 464 U.S.1013,
L.Ed.2d 717.
Plaintiff was not entitled to amend his
civil rights complaint as of right be
cause some defendants had not Sled
responsive pleadings in that plaintiff
already had amended hie complaint
once. Glaros v. Perse, C.A.lst. 1980,
628 F.2d 679.
Worldwide Church of God, Inc. v. m i fornia, C.A,9th, 1980, 623 F.Zd 613,
616, citing Wright & W e r .

-7.e

"

Rule 15

claims, third-party claims, or counterclaims-may be amended
without leave of court before responses are servedl And if the
court orders a reply to an answer or third-party answer, the
original defendant or the third-party defendant may amend the
answer as of course before the repjy is interposed.
Wilson v. Crouse-Hin& Co., C.A,8th,
1977, 556 F.Zd 870, certiorari denied
98 S.Ct. 513, 434 U.S. 968, 54 L.Ed.2d
455.
Fuhrer v. Fuhrer, C.A.7th, 1961, 292
F.Zd 140.

Kois v. Breier, D.C.Wis.1970, 312
F.Supp. 19.
Watsco, Inc. v. Henry Valve Co., D.C.
N.Y.1964, 232 F.Supp. 38.
Steiner v. Twentieth Century-Fm Film
Corp., D.C.Cd.1953, 140 F.Supp. 906.
Peckham v. Scadon, C.A.7th, 1957, 241 U.S. v. MacEvoy. D.C.N.J.1950, 10
F.2d 761.
F.R.D. 323.
Peterson Steels, h e . v. Seidmon, C.A. Park-In Theatres, Inc. v. Paramount.
7th. 1961. 188 F.2d 193.
Richards Theatres, Inc, D.C.De1.1949,
9 F.R.D. 267.
Rogers v. Girard k t Co., C.A.Gth,
1947, 159 F.2d 239.
Cohn v. Columbia Pictures Corp.. D.C.
N.Y.1949, 9 F.fU). 204.
Bosio v. Norbny Secs., Inc.,D.C.N.Y.
1985, 599 F.Supp. 1563.
Porter v. Mootaldo's, D.COhio 1946, 71
F.Supp. 372.
Under Rule 15(a) permitting amendment of the earnplaint as of right only Johnson v. Walsh, D.C.Mo.1946, 65
before a responsive pleading is
F.Supp. 157.
served, plaintiffs who served an Pallant v. Sinatra, D.C.N.Y.1945, 7
amended complaint on the same day
F.R.D. 293.
that defendant =wed the answer to
Simmons
Co v. Cantor, D.C.Pa.1943, 3
the original complaint were not entiF.R.D. 197.
tied to amend their complaint as of
right, since the amendment did not Kuhn v. Pacific MM. Life Jns. Co.. D.C.
N.Y.1941, 37 F.Supp. 102.
become effective until two days inter
when the amendment was f i in the Gaumont v. Warner Bras. Pictures, lne..
district w u r t Donner v. Sulcus ComD.C.N.Y.1941, 2 F.R.D. 45.
puter Co~p.,D.C.Ga.198A 103 F.RD.
US. for Use & Benefit of Dorfman v.
648.
Standard Sur. & Cas. Co.. D.C.N.Y.
Cunard Line Ltd. v. Abney, D.C.N.Y.
1940, 1 F.R.D. 239.
1982, 540 F.Supp. 657.
Buggeln & Smith, Inc. v Standard
De La M a d d u l v. Wayne State
Brands, Inc.. D.C.N.Y.1939. 27
Univ., D.C.Mich.lgS0, 482 F.Supp.
F.Supp. 399.
1388.

De Mdherbe v. International Union of
CoDbtNcton3 D'cCal'1977'
438 F.Supp. 1121.

Gilmore v. Wibhorek, D.C.IU.1976.411
F.Suoo. 491.
---

-.

4. &unterclaim amended
Blazon, Inc. v. DeLuxe Game Gorp., D.C.
N.Y.1985, 268 F.Supp. 416, 430.
VaD Dene
Air Seal
Co.. D.C.Ohio 1951, 11 F.R.D. 558.

"

Kennan v. Warren, D.C.Wis.lg?t, 328
F.Supp. 5%. d f m e d without o~inion
sub
N ~ C ~ O".I K
~ 1972. ~92 See
~ also~
,
S.Ct. 735, 404 U.S. 1055, 30 L.Ed.2d Brunner v. RopLoc Prods. Co., D.C.
743.
Ohio 1949, 9 F.R.D. 208.

norn.
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But when no responsive pleading is allowed, the right to
amend as of course is limited to 20 days after the s e ~ c of
e the
original pleading.6 For example, in one suit in which defendant
filed an answer containing a counterclaim and served it on plaintiff and plaintiff filed his reply, the court held that since the reply
was responsive only to the counterclaim and no responsive pleading is permitted to the answer, defendant could amend the
noncounterclaim portion of his answer without leave of court at
any time within 20 days after it had been served.@
The language of Rule 7(a) indicates that a motion is not a
responsive pleading.? This fact is important because certain motions may be made before interposing a responsive pleading.
5. Answer amended

Hagee v. City of Evanston, D.C.Ul.1982,
95 F.R.D. 344, citing Wright

L~~~ v. Cohen, D.C.N.Y.1973, 359
F.Supp. 565.

e,'.

Move Organization v. City of Philadelphia, D.C.Pa.1981, 89 F.R.D. 521,523,
citing Wright
Miner.
Johnson v. Duval County Teachers
Credit Union, D.C.Fla.1980, 507
F,s,,~~,
307.

6. illustrative case

B~~~~~~".

R O ~ L ~ prods.
C
CO., D.C.
Ohio 1949, 9 F.R.D. 208.

7. Motion not responsive pleading

Allen v. Veterans Administration, C.A.
9 t h 1984, 749 F.2d 1386.
Textor v. Board of Regents of N. minois
Univ., C.A.7th. 1983, 711 F.2d 1387,
1391 n.
citing Wright
Barksdale v. King, C.A.Sth, 1983, 699
F.2d 744.
Mdjruder v. Phelps, C.A.5th, 1979,608
F.2d 1023.
Smith v. Blackledge, C.A.dth, 1971,451
F.2d 1205 1203 n. 2, citing Wright
Miller.
Nolen v. Fitrharris, C.A.9th. 1971. 450
F.2d 958.
Markovieh v. V x a d Corp.,D.C.Pa.1985,
617 F.Supp. 142.
Madden v. Cleland, D.C.Ga.1985, 105
F.R.D. 520.
Standard Oil Ca,, (Indi.
Minnesota
anal, D.C.Minn.1983.568 F.Supp. 556.
Chodos v. Federal Bureau of 1nvestigation, D.C.N.Y.1982, 559 F.Supp. 69,
certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 741, 459
U.S. 1111, 74 L.Ed.2d 962.
Harlee v. Hagen, D.C.N.Y.1962, 538
F.Supp. 389.

nogan.,.

~ ~ ~Const?.
b ~ Gorp.,
r t D.C.
N.Y.1980, 507 F.Supp. 254.
~ e l l yv. Richland School Dist., D.C.S.C.
1978, 463 F.Supp. 216.
Brjdgess v. Youree, D.C.Okl.1977, 436
F , s ~458.
~ ~ ,
Kameman v. Pskeo Cos., D.C.N.Y.1977,
75 F.R.D. 673.
Bates v. Western Elec., D.C.Pa.1976.
420 p.supp. 521.
The motion of defendant to amend the
and erossslaim ss a
matter of right was timely when no
response had been filed to the eross.
claim and counterclaim but merely a
motion to dismiss and strike the
". A.G' Estes'
Same. 'One
Mills
he., DC.Ga.1974, 377 F.Supp. 222.
Roberts v. Husky hdus., Inc., D.C.Tem.
71 F'R.D' 479'
Oskierko v. Southwestern Horiaons
In'., D-C.n1.1973,
F.R'D. 365'
Rekeweg v. Federal Mut. Ins. Co., D.C
lnd.1961, 27 F.R.D. 431.
Porter v. Montaldo's, D.C.Ohio 1946,71
F.Supp. 372.
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Indeed, a motion involving any of the Rule 126) defenses normally
must be made before serving a responsive pIeading, whenever such
~
courts have held that the
a pleading is ~ e r m i t t e d . Consequently,
filing of a motion to dismiss will not prevent a party from
subsequently amending without leave of court.g Similarly, an
8. R& 12@1 motion
See "01. 5, 5 1361.
9. After motion t o dismiss
Jafree v. Barber, C.A.7th, 1982, 689
F.2d 640.

La Batt v. Twomey, C.A.7th, 1975. 513
F.2d 641.
walgren v. Howes, C.A1et, lg7% 482
F2d 95, 96 n. citing Wright a
Miller.
Reiss v. Richardson, C.A.D.C.1971, 455
F.2d 1287, 1289 n. 2.
Smith v. Blackledge. C.A.4thr 1971,451
F.2d 1201,1203 n. 2, citing Wright

..--..
Mill*-

When
fded
answer Or
other oleadine in a civil rizhts actir-,A.
prior lo
an-order disbut moved to dis.
missing the
mi65 the comphint for failing to state
.a claim for relief and in their mem*
randum briefs plaintiffs indicated
that they wished to fde an amended
camplaint, plaintiffs had the right to
amend as of course and the order "A-c
dismissal was improper. Noien v.
Fitzharris, C.A.Sth, 1971, 450 F.2d
958.
Smith v. California, CA.9th. 1964, 336
F.Zd 530.
Richardson v. U.S., C.A.Sth, 1964, 336
F.2d 265.
Breier v. Northern California Bowling
Proprieton' Ass'n, C.A.Sth, 1963, 316
F.2d 787.
Fuhrer v. Fuhrer, C.A.7th. 1961, 292
F.2d 140.
Peterson Steels, Inc. v. Seidmon, C.A.
7th, 1951, 188 F.2d 193.
Kelly v. Delaware River Joint Comm'm
C.A.Sd, 1951, 187 F.2d 93, certiorari
denied 72 S.Ct. 25, 342 U.S. 812, 96
L.Fd. 614.

...

Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Farmers Bank,
C.A.Gth, 1949, 178 F.2d 570.
Keene Lumber Co. v. Leventhal, C.A.
1st. 1948, 165 F.2d 815.
Hantover, Inc. v. Omet, S.N.C. of
Volentieri & C., D.C.Mo.1988, 688
p.supp. 1377, 1380,
w,.ight &
xa:xanC.&.".z'.

Fidenas AG v. Honeywell Ioc., D.C.N.Y.
1980, 501 F.Supp. 1029, 1032, citing
Wright & Wer.
~ ~ ".1 U.S.
1 nepariment
nefense,
D.C.N.H.1976, 71 F.R.D. 349.
sohns V. D&I, D.C.Va.1975.392 F.s"P~.
fm8, 1219, citing wright
rnller.
McNeiil v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
D.C.Il1.1975, 65 F.R.D. 584.
Beck v. Athens Bldg. Loan & Saw.
Assh, D.C.Pa.1974, 65 F.R.D. 691.
Worcester Countv N a t Bank v. Cohn.
D.C.N.Y.1969, i 8 F.R.D. 285.
Blazon, h c . v. D e L w Game Gorp., D.C.
N.Y.1965, 268 F.Supp. 416,
Martin
Hunt, D,C.Msss,1961, 29
F.R.D. 14.
Rekeweg v. Federal Mut. Ins. Co., D.C.
Ind.1961, 27 F.R.D. 431.
Ginsburg v. Stern, D.C.Pa.1956, 19
F.R.D. 238, s f f i e d in part on other
grounds C.A.3d. 1957, 242 F.2d 379.
Amos v. Prom, Inc., D.C.1owa 1953, 115
FSupp. 127.
Whitternore v. Continental Mills, D.C.
Me.1951, 98 F.Supp. 387.

See also
Johnson v, Bollinger, 1987, 356 S.E.2d
318, 382, 86 N.C.App. 1, citing

a
Sonneville v. Stedef, Inc., D.C.App.1962,
449 A.2d 1087, 1089, citing Wright &
Miller.
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mendment as of right may be made a f t e r a m o t i o n to strike is
does a summary j u d g m e n t motion made before re.
panding have any effect on a party's ability to amend u n d e r the
irst s e n t e n c e of Rule 15(a)." Motions of this type are not "re.
,pensive pleadings" in any sense. As stated by the district court
iIed."'or

3ut compare
11. Summary judgment motion
&%?"-defendants moved to dismiss the Zaidi v. Ehrlich, C.A.Sth, 1984,732 F2d
1218, 1220, citing Wright & Miller.
d complaint but before a deci.
i
6,
,,ereon and without obtaining Clardy v. Duke Univ., CA.4th, 1962,
299 F.2d 368.
f~
lave of court or the written
eons... of defendants plaintiff filed a Kirk v. U.S., C.A.Sth, 1956, 232 F2d
second amendd complaint, if the
763.
first amended complaint were dwRogers
v. Girard T m t Co., C.A.Gth,
missed, plaintiff would not be a6
1947, 159 F.2d 239.
lowed, ss a matter of right, to submit
hi, seesnd amended complaint. Williams v. Wilkerson, DC.Va.1981. 90
FRD. 168, 170, citiag Wright &
Smart v. Ellis Trucking Co.. D.C.
Miller.
Mich.1916,409 F.Supp. 129, jildgment
sffirmed in part, reversed in part Manning v. Grsensville Memorial
C.A.Bth, 1978, 580 F.2d 215, certiorari
Hasp., D.C.Va.1979, 470 F.Supp 662.
denied 99 S.Ct. 1497, 440 U.S. 958,59
First Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass'o of Fay
L.Ed.2d 770.
etteville v. Federal Home Loan Bank
Bd., D.C.Ark.1977, 426 F.Supp. 454.
10. After motion t o stcike
affirmed on the merits C.A.Bth, 1978,
CBI Oarriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,
570 F.2d 693.
C.A.7th. 1984,745 F.2d 1101. certioraVan Dette v. Aluminum Air Seal Mfg.
ri denied 105 S.Ct. 1758. 470 U.S.
Co., D.C.Ohia 1951. 11 F.R.D. 558.
1054, 84 L.Ed.7.d 821.
Park-In Theatres, Ine. v. Parmount%+portion of a prison inmate's motion
Richards Theatres. Inc., D.C.Del.1949,
*consider, in which he specificails
9 F.R.D. 267.
.ed to s F i n t Amendment relig,,*s right to grow a beard in prison,
See ako
would be treated as an amendment to Miller v. American Export Lines, Im.,
a complaint in a civil rights action
C.A.2d, 1963, 313 F.2d 218.
alleging that he had been forced by
authorities to shave his beard But see
violation of the Eighth Amend- In the care of In re Watauga Steam
ment, when at the time the inmate
Laundry, D.C.Tenn.1947, 7 F.R.D.
f d d the motion to reconsider, defen657,660, the court held that a motion
daats had yet to Tic a response to the
for summary judgment terminsfed
pleading, and when defendants' m o
petitioner's ability to amend as Of
tion to strike the First Amendment
course. It stated: "Ordiarily a m*
daim demonstrated their actual notion is not regarded as s respowive
tice of the claim, therefore, remand
pleading.
But when the mo
waa appropriate for the district murt
tion is construed by its effect and not
to addren the inmate's free exercise
by its form, it msy be a res~onsive
of religion claim. Moore v. Florida.
pleading. This is p & i ~ d a r t ~true
C.A.1ltb. 1983 103 F.2d 516.
where the effect of granting the nfotion is to dispase of the case on its
Neifeld v. Steinbere. C.A~3d.1971, 438
F.2d 423, 425 n . j .
merits."

in

...
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in Pkk-In Theatres, Inc. v. P a r a m o u n t - R i c h a r d s Theatres, Inc.: 2'
It responds t o nothing in t h e preceding pleading a n d assumes
there are no controverted material facts t o which a response
should b e made. If such controverted material facts exist a n d to
which a response should b e made, then t h e motion for summary
judgment must fail. T h e motion i n general assumes the correctness of t h e facts theretofore alleged a n d t h a t there is nothing to
be added by response and that, notwithstanding t h e correctness
of t h e prior fa&, t h e judgment should be entered.'3
S i m i l a r l y , an amendment without l e a v e of court has b e e n m a d e
a f t e r defendant successfully filed a removal petition but did not
a n s w e r the complaint.'6

Although it is c l e a r that an amendment as of c o u r s e m a y b e
s e r v e d after a m o t i o n directed to the plead'mgs has been made, the
q u e s t i o n often arises whether the first s e n t e n c e of R u l e 15(a)
continues to be o p e r a t i v e once the motion to dismiss is granted.
Ideally, if it is at all possible that the party against w h o m the
dismissal is d i r e c t e d can correct the defect in the pleading or state
a claim f o r relief, the court should dismiss with l e a v e to amend.'"
Sea also
Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. National Elee Pmds. Corp., D.C.De1.1941, 38
F.Supp. 533, reversed on other
grounds C.k3d, 1942, 125 F.2d 1008,
certiorari denied 62 S.Ct. 1046 316
U.S. 676, 86 L.Ed. 1150.
12. Park-In Theatres case
D.C.De1.1949, 9 F.R.D. 261.
13. Rwponds t o nothing
9 F.R.D. at 268 (per Rodney. 53.
14. Amendment after removal

croup ~ t d . ".
pabricators, I ~ ~ ~.~.IV.y.1971,
..,
323
F.Supp. 521.

R.F.D.

with leave
to amend
Ballou v. Generat Elec. Co., C.A.lst,
1988
F2d
.
...
, 298
.
-.
.
.
- 398.

under Rdeh 8(a) and 8(e) and for mie
joinder of parties, the court of appeals
held that the remedy of dismissal for
pleading enors was viewed with disfavor and remanded the case for some
less final disposition at least pennitting plaintiff to amend. Nagler v.
Admird Corn., C.A.Zd, 1951,248 FZd
319.
When the district court dismissed a
complaint on a motion for judgment
on the pleadings. but recognized that
a claim for damages might exist r*
sulting from the fraud alleged in the
reply, it should have conditioned its
dismissal on the failure of plaintiff to
reframe his complaint to state a
claim for reliel. Domey v. Palmer,
C.A.2d. 1940. 114 F.2d 116.
See also

Breier v. Northern California Bowling
Proprietors' A d n , C.A.9th. 1963, 316
F.Zd 787.
Lone Star Motor Import, Ine v. Citroen
Cars Corp., CA.Sth. 1961, 288 F.2d
69.
When the district court granted a mc,
tion to dismiss for improper pleading

Willingham v. fieeland Indus., Inc.,
C.A.6th. 1969, 415 F.2d 755.
U.S. en =I. Atterbury v. Rsgen. C.A.
7th. 1956.237 F.2d 953, certiorari d e
nied 77 S.Ct. 1049, 353 U.S. 964, 1
L.Ed.2d 914.
Kuhn v. Paciiic Mut. Life Ins. Co.. D.C.
N.Y.1941, 37 F.Supp. 102.
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This will afford the party against whom the dismissal is granted
the option of amending the pleading or of having a judgment
entered against him and taking an appeal.'B Dismissing with
leave to amend is consistent with the mandate set forth in Rule
15(a) that amendments should be freely granted. In addition, it
puts the adverse party on notice that further proceedings in the
action are possible, whereas an order that does not specifically
include that right leaves the party who successfully moved to
dismiss the original pleading in doubt whether his opponent can
,end under Rule 15(a). Of course, if repleading could not
:sibly correct the defects in the party's claim, then the court
;uld dismiss the action without leave to replead.'"
In practice a distinction appears to have been drawn by the
courts. In general it has been held that a party may amend as of
course within a reasonable time after an order dismissing the
complaint has been entered, inasmuch as no responsive pleading
has been s e ~ e d . ' However,
~
if both an order dismissing the action
Neal v. Brockway, 1978,385 A,% 1069.
1070, 136 Vt. 119, citing Wright &
mer.

Compare
Although defendant violated the applf
cable mle by fding an amended counterelaim without leaveof court, the
violation did not warrant dismissal of
the
amended counterclaim
when defendant had since refiled the
eounterclairn with a motion to allow
. -- it filed as amended; under the cirw t a n c e s , the i s u e of noncomplithe rule was moot, some
ante
Ins. Co. v. Ballenger Carp., D.C.Ga.
1977, 74 F.R.D. 93.
16. Appeal waives
University Ciub v. City d New York,
C.A.2L 1988, 842 F.2d 37, 37, citing
wright & &filler (opportunity to
amend was waived when appeal taken).
17. No leave to replead
When the district court dismissed the
complaint and denied leave to f i e an
amended complaint, the court of appeals held that the htrict
not commit error when no amendment, repardless of its phrasing, could
be presented that would avoid the

doetrine of abstention. Sarfaty v. Nowak,CA.7th. 1966,369 F.2d 256, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 1691, 387 U.S.
909, 18 L.Ed.2d 627.
Smith v. California, C.A9th, 1964, 336
F,2d 530,
Fuhrer v. Fuhrer, C.A.7th. 1961, 292
F.2d 140.
Mosler v M/K Ventures Int'l Inc, D.C.
U1.1984, 103 F.R.D. 385, 387, citing
Wtight & MiIIer.
Amend after order
Smith v. California, C.A.gth, 1964, 336
F.2d 530.
Richardson v. US., C.A.gth, 1964, 336
F.2d 265.
Case v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co..
C.A.5th, 1961, 294 F,Zd 676,
Fuhrer v. Fuhrer, C.A.7th. 1961, 292
F.2d 140.
222 East Chestnut St. Corp. v.
Lakefront Realty Corp., C.A.7th.
1958. 256 F.2d 513, eenior& denied
79 s.c~.
~ 2 358
, U.S. 907, 3 ~.Ed..2d
228,
U.S. ex rel. Kelly v. Bibb, C.A.7th2 1958,
255 F.Zd 772.
In a suit by a penitentiary inmate
against the warden and others for
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and a f i a l judgment have been entered, or a substantial period of
time has elapsed since the dismissal, an amendment may be made
only by leave of court.1s As stated by one court:
damage and equitable relief because
of defendants' alleged conspiracy to
deprive plaintiff of his civil rights,
the district court dismissed the complaint became of want of prosrmtian
before the responsive pleading was
of appeals noted that
The
at the time of dismissal, plaintiff was
confined to prism, not represented by
counsel, and had no notice that the
w e would be called or any action
taken on the d a b of dhmissd,
con~ntion that
he was entitied to amend his corn.
if no
pkint as Of "ght after
responsive pleading was filed.
Peckham v. Scanloo, C.A.7th, 1957,
241 F.2d 761.
Peterson Steels, Inc. v. Seidmon. C.A.
7th, 1951, 188 F.Zd 193.
When the district court dismissed plaintiffs complaint with leave to amend
within 30 days and plaintiff b d e r e d
an amended complaint more than a
month late, the caul* of appeals held
that plaintiff could flle the amendment without leave of court inasmuch
as a responsive pleading had not been
filled. Ohio Cas. IN. Co. v. Farmers
Bank, C.A6th, 1949, 178 F.2d 570.
Keene Lumber Ca. v. Leventhal, C.A.
Ist, 1948, 165 F.2d 815.
Hagee v. City of Evanston. D.C.IlI.1982,
95 F.R.D. 344, 346, citing Wright &
Miller.
Martin ", Hunt, D,c~Mass,1961, Z9
F.R.D. 14.
See 8190
W e n v. Gensbm Hotel Co.. CA.Sth,

1958, 259 F.2d 78.
'

Czeremcha v. International Ass'n of
Machinists & Aerospace Workers,
A F W O , C.A.llth, 1984, 724 F.2d
1552, 1556, citing Wtight & NIilIer.

Euon Carp. v. Maryland Cas. Ca., C.A.
5 t h 1979, 599 F.2d 659, 662, citing
Wright & Miller.
Elfenbein v. ~ u l &
f W. Indus., lnc., C.A.
2d, 1978, 590 ~ . 2 d445.
United Steelworkers of America, AFLCIO V. Mesker Bros. Indus., Ine., C.A.
Sth, 1972. 457 F.2d 91.
Kauffman v. Moss, C.A.Bd, 1910, 420
F.Z~
1270, certiorari denied 91
93, p00 U.S. 846, 27 L . E ~ . z84.
~
When a judgment dismissing the arigirial complaint without leave to
had been ordered, but the clerk had
failed to enter the order as a final
judgment, the court held that the
clerk's failure to perform a ministerial function did not prevent the order
of dismkal from standing as a final
judgment, thus terminating the right
to amend as of course. Swan v.
Board of Higher Educ. of City of New
York, CA.2d, 1963, 319 F.Zd 56.
Clardy v. Dnke Univ., C.A.4th. 1962,
299 ~ . 2 d368.
Case11 Y . Micham, C.A.D.C.1956, 240
F,2d 406,
Kelly v. Delaware River Joint Cammh,
C.A.3d 1951, 187 F.2d 93, certiorari
denied 72 S.Ct. 25. 342 U.S. 812, 96
L.Ed. 614.
Feddersen Motors, Inc. v. Ward, C.A.
loth, 1950, 180 F . Z ~
519.
Markert v. Swift & Ca., C.A.Zd, 1949,
173 F.2d 517.

19. Amendment only with leave

amend a civil
The p-ner's
right
rights complaint as a matter of course
ended with the entry of a judgment of
dismissal. Feeronv. Henderson, C.A.
Zd, 1985, 756 F.2d 267.

Keene Lumber Co. v. Leventhal, C.A.
lst, 1948, 165 F.2d 815,
U.S. v. Newbury Mfg. Co., C.A.lst, 1941,
123 F.2d 453.
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Rule 15
plaintiff did not file an amendment
but, rather, filed new allegations in
a separate pleading, as no responsive pleading had been filed and

CH.

pleadings of pro se plaintiff would
be read broadly. Jackson v. Strayer
College, D.C.D.C.1996, 941 F.Supp.
192.

8 1483. Amendments as of Course-Termination of
the Right to Amend as of Course
n. 3. Amendment before answer
Golden Budha Corp. v. Canadian Land Co. of America, N.V.,
C.A.2d, 1991, 931 F.2d 196, 202,
citing Wright, lMiller & Kane.
Prisoner would be permitted to
unilaterally withdraw procedural
due process claim asserted in federal complaint and pursue claim in
state court, when federal action
which had been dismissed was being remanded for further action,
a
and defendants had vet to file
-.responsive pleading. street v. Fair,
C.A.lst, 1990, 918 F.2d 269.
n. 7. Motion not responsive
pleading
Doe v. U.S., C.A.gth, 1995, 58
F.3d 494.
Domino Sugar Corp. v. Sugar
Workers Local Union 392 of the
United Food & Commercial Workers int'l Union, C.A.4th, 1993, 10
F.3d 1064
~ o c k h a rv.
t Cedar Raplds Community School Dist., D.C.Iowa 1997,
968 F.Supp. 805.
Borowsld v. International Business Machines Corp., D.C.Vt.1996,
928 F.SUDD.424
Fox v . Sierra Devel. Co.,
D.C.Nev.1995, 876 F.Supp. 1169
(motion for more definite
statement)
..-.,.
Heritage Bank & Trust v.
Landon,
App.1989, 770 P.2d
1009, 1010, citing Wright, Miller
& Kane.
n. 9. After motion to dismiss
Plaintiff was free to amend his
complaint at any time prior to the
entry of judgment on defendant's
motion to dismiss when defendant
did not file an answer or any other
document that could be deemed a
pleading; and the approximately
one-year period that elapsed between the filing of the motion to
dismiss and the entry of judgment
afforded plaintiff ample opportunity
to do so. Stein v. Royal Bank of
Canada, C.A.lst, 2001, 239 F.3d
389, 392, citing Wright, Miller &

..

~~

Kane.
In a Title VII action against the
government, plaintiff employee
could amend his complaint as a
matter of right, even though the
distr~ctcourt had entered a final
judgment dismissing the complaint,
when the court of appeals had reversed and remanded and the government had filed only a motion to
dismiss or in the alternative for
summary judgment; the court of appeals reversal and remand effectively returned the case to the pre~udgmentstage a t which plaintiff
could amend once as a matter of
right before the government filed a
res onsive pleading. Bowden v.
u.J, C.A.D.C.1999, 176 F.3d 552.
Government's mot~on to dismiss petltion for writ of habeas
corpus was not "responsive pleading," and, therefore, prisoner's objection to motion could serve as
timely amendment to his initial
petition. Willis v. Collins, C.A.5th,
1993, 989 F.2d 187.
Motions to dismiss and for summary judgment do not qualify as
responsive pleadings for purposes
of determining whether nlaintiff
may amend the complaiAt as of
right. Adams v. Quattlebaum,
D.C.D.C.2004.219 F.R.D. 195
Petitioner seeking confirmation
of an arbitration award was entitled
to amend its petition without leave
of court when the res~ondentmoved
to dismiss and cross-moved to vacate the arbitration award, but did
not serve a responsive pleading. In
the Matter of Arbitration Between
Space Sys./Loral, Inc. v. Yuzhnoye
Design Office, D.C.N.Y.2001, 164
F.Supp.2d 397,400, citing Wright,
Miller & Kane.
Alexander v. Fujitsu Bus~ness
Communication Sys., Inc.,
D.C.N.H.1998,818 F.Supp. 462.
Bowers v. Robinson, 1993, 429
S.E.2d 799, 800, 311 S.C. 412, citi n g Wright, Miller & Kane.
n. 10. After motion to strike
Taj Mahal Enterprises, Ltd. v.

1

Trump, D.C.N.J.1990, 745 F.Supp.
240. 245, citing Wright, Miller
Kane.
n. 15. Dismissal with leave t o
amend
Int'l Gorp.,
Corp.,
Brever v. Rockwell InYl
CA.lOth.
CA.lOth, 1994.40
1994,40 F.3d 1119, 1131,
quoting
Wright, Miller & Kane.
quoting'wright,
Nordica USA, Inc. v. Deloitte &
Touche, D.C.Vt.1993, 839 F.Supp.
Touche.
ler
1082, 1093, citing Wright, Miller
& Kane.
n
19. Amendment only with
...
. leave
Even though plaintSs amendment as of right was not extinguished when the district court
dismissed as to some but not all
defendants, since the lsmissal was
not a final judgment, the district
court, which like plaintiff was under
the misimpression that a final order had issued, did not abuse its
discretion by denying plaintiffs
subsequent motion for leave to
amend, when plaintiff failed to attach the proposed amended complaint to its motion for reconsideration and failed to take the necessary
steps t o make the proposed amendment part of the record on appeal.
Crestview Village Apartments v.
U.S. Department of Housing & Urban Devel., C.A.7th, 2004,383 F.3d

---

3325.

Graue Mill Devel. Corp. v. GOlonial Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago,
C.A.7th, 1991, 927 F.2d 988.
In re Baseball Bat Antitrust
Litigation, D.C.Kan.1999, 75
F.Supp.2d 1189.
Right to amend complaint as of
right at any time before responsive
pleading is filed terminates once a

8 1484. Amendments With LI
General

If no prejudice is found, thc
g~anted.'~.'
A more restrictive attitude toy
proceed in the manner prescribe
fied if it becomes necessary t c
totally disregarding the requirer
13.'Lcave normally granted
Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers,
Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union
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JOHN F. MAGNUSON
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 2350
1250 Northwood Center Court, Suite A
Coeur d'Alene, ID 838 14
Phone: (208) 667-0100
Fax: (208) 667-0500
ISB #4270
Attorney for Intervenors
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAI-10, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
NEIGHBORS FOR RESPONSIBLE
GROWTH, a non-profit unincorporated
association; PRESERVE OUR RURAL
COMMUNITIES, a non-profit
unincorporated association; KOOTENAI
ENVIRONMENTAL ALLIANCE, INC.,
a non-profit corporation; NORBERT and
BEVERLY TWILLMANN; GREG and
JANET TORLINE; SUSAN MELKA;
MERLYN and JEAN NELSON.

KOOTENAI COUNTY, a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho acting
through the KOOTENAI COUNTY
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS; S.J.
"GUS" JOIHNSON, CHAIRMAN;
ELMER R. "RICK CURRIE and KATIE
BRODIE, COMMISSIONERS, in their
official capacities; and KATIE BRODIE,
personally and individually,

ORDER GRANTNG MOTION TO INTERVENE
(COELJR D'ALENE LAND COMPANY AND
H. F. MAGNUSON) -- PAGE 1

NO. CV-06-8574
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
INTERVENE (COEUR D'ALENE
LAND COMPANY AND H. F.
MAGNUSON)

and
POWDERHORN COMMUNITIES, LLC,
and HEARTLAND, LLC,
Intervenors/Responde~lts.

The Court, being fully advised in the premises, hereby orders and finds as follows:
(1)

Coetlr d'Alene Land Company and H. F. Magnuson moved the Court to intervene as

additional Defendants. Said t~fotioncame or1 for hearing before the Court on February 27,2007 at

(2)

No objection was interposed in response by Plaintiffs, Defendants, or Intervenors

Powderhorn Commtmities, LLC and Heartland, LLC
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion of Coeur d'Alene Land Compaliy and H. F.
Magnuson for permissive intervention be, and the same hereby is, granted
IT IS SO ORDERED
Dated this

-x

day of March, 2007.

,

CHAM FS W HOSACK
District Judge

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO INTERVENE
(COEUR D'ALENE LAND COMPANY AND
H. F. MAGNUSON) -- PAGE 2

I

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served upon the
day of March, 2007:
following, via facsimile this
Scott W. Reed
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box A
Coeilr d' Alene, ID 838 16
Fax: 208\765-5117

Mischelle Fulgham
Lukins & Annis, PS
1600 Washington Trust Financial Center
717 W. Sprague Avenue
Spolcane, WA 9920 1-0466
Fax: 509\747-2323

John A. Cafferty, Sr. Staff Attorney
Kootenai County Department of
Legal Services
45 1 Government Way
P.O. Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, ID 838 16-9000
Fax: 208\446-1621

John F. Magnuson
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 2350
Coeur d'Alene, ID 838 16
Fax: 2081667-0500

CDALAND WMORD MTERVENE.wpd

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO INTERVENE
(COEUR D'ALENE LAND COMPANY AND
H. F. MAGNUSON) -- PAGE 3

MISCXELLE R. FULGHAM
ISB #4623
PETER J. SMITH I V
ISB #6997
LUKTNS & ANNIS. P.S.
Ste. 102
250 Northwest Blvd.
Coeur dlAlene. a3 83814-2971
Televhone: 1208) 667-0517
Facsimile No.: (509) 363-2478
Attornevs for Intervenors Powderhorn Communities LLC and Heartland LLC

TN THE DISTRiCT COURT OF THE FTRST JUDICLAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE C O W Y OF KOOTENAl
NEIGHBORS FOR RESPONSUSLE
GROWTH, a non-profit unlcorporated
association; PRESERVE OUR RURAL
COMMUNITIES, a non-profit unicorporaled
association; KOOTENAT ENVIRONMENTAL
ALLIANCE, MC., a non-profit corporation;
NORBERT and BEVERLY T W I L L M m ;
GREG and JANET TORLINE; SUSAN
MELKA; MERLYN and JEAN NELSON,
Plaintiffs,

v.
KOOTENAI COUNTY, a political subdivis~on
of the STATE OF IDAHO acting through the
KOOTENAI COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, S.J. "GUS" JOHNSON,
CHAIRMAN; ELMER R. "RICK CUFWE
and KATIE BRODJE, COMMISSIONERS, in
their official capacities, and KATIE BRODIE,
personally and ~ndividually,
Defendants,
and
POWDERHORN COMMUNITIES LLC, and
HXARTLAND LLC

NOTICE OF HEARING: I

NO. CV-06-8574
NOTICE OF HEARING 6 . c

NOTICE IS kEREBY GIVEN that on Tuesday, June 5,2007, at the hour of 3:30 p.m.,
or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, in the Courtroom of the above entitled Court,
324 West Garden Avenue, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, before the Hoi~orableCharles W. Hosack,

intervenors Powderhom Communities LLC and Heartland LLC will call on for hearing their
Objection to Amended Petition for Judicial ReviewIMotion to Strike Amended Petition, filed

with the court on February 27,2007.
DATED this

a

day oEMaroh, 2007.

LUKXNS & ANNIS, P.S.

BY
PETER J. SMITH N

TSB #6997
Attorneys for lnteivenors Powderhom

Commuiities LLC and ndIeartland LLC

NOTICE OF HEARING: 2

.-

.- --..

--..a.

nra hmr nnc 1116107

CERTIFJCATEOF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the
correct copy of the foregoing
following:
Scott W. Reed
Attorney at Law
401 F& st
P. 0. Box A
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83816

day of March, 2007, I caused to be sewed a true and
the method indicated below, and addressed to the

0
@

D
iJ

John A. Cafferty
Kootenai County Legal Services
P. 0. Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816

Cl

John F. Magnuson
Altomey At Law
1250Northwood Center Ct Suite A
P. 0. Box 2350
Coeur dlAtene, ID 838 16

0

NOTICE OF I-TEARING: 3

U
0

O
0

Hand-delivered
First-class Mail
overnight Mail
Facsimile- 208-765-51 17
Band-delivered
First-Class Mail
Overnight Mail
Facsimile 208-446-1 62 1

-

Hand-delivered
First-class Mail
Overnight Mail
Facsimile 208-667-0500

-

STATE GF IDAJ-10
i'c!(!il;y
!'F EcOTEN,?,I

Kootenai County Department of Legal Services
John A. Cafferty, Senior Staff Attorney ISB # 5607
PO Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000
Phone: (208) 446-1620
Fax: (208) 446-1621
jcafferty@kcgov.us

Ti__i';.
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Attorney for Respondents

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
NEIGHBORS FOR RESPONSIBLE
GROWTH, a non-profit, unincorporated
association; PRESERVE OUR RURAL
COMMUNITIES, a non-profit
unincorporated association; KOOTENAI
ENVIRONMENTAL ALLIANCE, INC., a
non-profit corporation; NORBERT and
CASE NO. CV-06-8574
BEVERLY TWILLMANN; GREG and
JANET TORLINE; SUSAN MELKA;
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
MERLYN and JEAN NELSON,

vs.
KOOTENAl COUNTY, a political
subdivision of the STATE OF IDAHO
acting through the KOOTENAI COUNTY
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS; S.J.
"GUS" JOHNSON, CHAIRMAN; ELMER
R. "RICK CURRIE and KATIE BRODIE,,
COMMISSIONERS, in their official
capacities; and KATIE BRODIE,
personally and individually,

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF: 1
H:\Planning\Powderhorn\DistrklCourt\Respondents' Brief.DOC

I

and,
HEARTLAND LLC and POWDERHORN
COMMUNITIES, LLC, and COEUR
D'ALENE LAND COMPANY and H.F.
MAGNUSON,

COME NOW, the Respondents, Kootenai County and others, by and through
their attorney of record, Kootenai County Legal Services, John A. Cafferty, and hereby
respond to Petitioners' hereinafter "NEIGHBORS, brief filed on February 14, 2007

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Neighbors, in their opening brief, accurately lay out the procedural history of this
case. Respondents will not reiterate the history here but instead adopt by reference the
course of proceedings as articulated by Neighbors.
II. ISSUES PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT ON APPEAL

The only issues properly before this Court, sitting in its appellate capacity
pursuant to ldaho Code $67-5270 (the ldaho Administrative Procedures Act) and
I.R.C.P. 84, are the issues raised before the Board of County Commissioners. An
action for declaratory judgment is not properly joined with an appellate review of a cold
record.
[I.C.] Section 67-5277 states that, "judicial review of disputed issues
of fact must be confined to the agency record for judicial review as
defined in this chapter, supplemented by additional evidence taken
pursuant to $67-5276, ldaho Code.". . . The district judge thus
should not have permitted additional evidence or, assuming that
Urrutia and Reed had established good reasons for the evidentiary
failure before the agency, the district judge should have remanded
the matter to the Board for additional fact finding.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF: 2
H:\Pianning\Powderhorn\District Court\Respondents'Brief.DOC

Urrutia v. Blaine County Board of Cornrnissioners, 134 ldaho 353, 360, 2 P.3d 738,

It is not the role of the reviewing court to weigh the evidence. The
Court must defer to the agency's decisions that are supported by
substantial evidence in the record.
Davisco Foods International, Inc. v. Gooding County, 141 ldaho 784, 790,

Arguments raised for the first time on appeal are waived. See Roell v.
Boise City, 134 ldaho 214, 999 P.2d 251 (2000), and Whitehawk v. State, 119
ldaho 168, 804 P.2d 341 (Ct. App. 1991). Additionally, ldaho case law makes it
clear that constitutional issues not raised before a Board of Commissioners will
not be considered on appeal. See Butters v. Hauser, 125 ldaho 79,82,867 P.2d
953,956 (1993). See also Cowan v. Board of Commissioners of Frernont
County, 2006 WL 3422168 (2006) attached.

Ill. STANDARD OF REVIEW
"The ldaho Administrative Procedures Act [(I.A.P.A.)]
governs the review of local zoning decisions." Price V.
Payette County Bd. of County Corn'rs, 131 ldaho 426,429,
958 P.2d 583, 586 (1998) (citing Corner v. Counfy of Twin
Falls, 130 ldaho 433, 437,942 P.2d 557, 561 (1997)). In an
appeal from the decision of a district court acting in its
appellate capacity under the I.A.P.A., this Court reviews the
agency record independently of the district court's decision.
Id. (citations omitted); Howard v. Canyon Counfy Bd. of
Cornrn'rs, 128 ldaho 479,480, 915 P.2d 709,710 (1996)
(citation omitted). Interpretation of an ordinance, like
construction of a statute, is an issue of law and therefore an
appellate court exercises free review of the district court's
decision. See State v. Nelson, 119 ldaho 444, 446, 807 P.2d
1282, 1284 (Ct. App. 1991).
This Court, however, does not substitute its judgment
for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence
presented. I.C. 5 67- 5279(1). Rather, this Court defers to
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF: 3
H:\Planning\Powderhorn\DistrictCourt\RespondentsSBrietDOC
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the agency's findings of fact unless they are clearly
erroneous. Price, 131 ldaho at 429, 958 P.2d at 586 (citing
Castaneda v. Brighton Corp., 130 ldaho 923, 926, 950 P.2d
1262, 1265 (1998)) (citing South Fork Coalition v. Board of
Comm'rs of Bonneville County, 117 ldaho 857,860,792
P.2d 882, 885 (1990)). "In other words, the agency's factual
determinations are binding on the reviewing court, even
where there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so
long as the determinations are supported by substantial
competent evidence in the record." Id.
The Board's zoning decision may only be overturned
where its findings: (a) violate statutory or constitutional
provisions; (b) exceed the agency's statutory authority; (c)
are made upon unlawful procedure; (d) are not supported by
substantial evidence in the record; or (e) are arbitrary,
capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Id. (citing I.C. fj 675279(3)). The party attacking the Board's decision must first
show that the Board erred in a manner specified in ldaho
Code § 67-5279(3), and then it must show that its substantial
right has been prejudiced. Id. (citing Angstman v. City of
Boise, 128 ldaho 575, 578, 917 P.2d 409,412 (Ct. App.
1996)). Friends of Farm to Market v. Valley County, 137
ldaho 192,46 P.3d 9 (2002).
"Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of proof, but
less than a preponderance. It is relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion."
Brewer v. Lacrosse Health & Rehab, 138 ldaho 859,861,
862, 71 P.3d 458,460,461, (2003) citing Jensen v. City of
Pocatello, 135 ldaho 406, 412, 18 P.3d 21 1, 217 (2000),
citing Zapata v. J.R. Simplot Co., 132 ldaho 513, 515, 975
P.2d 1178, 1180 (1999).
IV. DISCUSSION

A. Due Process.
It is a well established principle that this Court will not pass on constitutional
issues unless absolutely necessary for determination of a case. See Posey v. Bunney,
98 ldaho 258, 561 P.2d 400 (1977); Curtis v. Child, 95 ldaho 63, 501 P.2d 1374 (1972);
Swensen v. Buildings, lnc., 93 ldaho 466, 463 P.2d 932 (1970); and Olsen v. J.A.
Freeman Company, 117 ldaho 706, 791 P.2d 1285 (1990).
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF: 4
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In Davisco Foods International, Inc. v. Gooding County, 141 ldaho 784, 118 P.3d'
116 (2005), the ldaho Supreme Court held that alleged ex parte contacts of a County
Commissioner were not grounds for remand and recusal, absent some'facts or
inferences to establish a bias. See Davisco v. Gooding County at 124, 792. The
Court's determination in Davisco is in staying with the logic found by the Supreme Court
in Evans v. Board of Commissioners of Cassia County, Idaho, 137 ldaho 428,50 P.3d
443 (2002), (a case where an alleged improper site visit occurred), wherein the Court
stated:

'

The record does not indicate that any factual disputes would
be resolved by sending this case back to the Board for a
decision to be made without the benefit of a viewing, or
based upon a viewing, at which interested parties are
present. The Board was not acting upon a cold appellate
record to make its decision, as was the case in Comer;
rather, it was the original deciding body. There was
substantial evidence presented at the hearing upon which
the Board could have based its decision, wholly
independently from the visit to the property. In our review of
the proceedings, we are to "consider the proceedings as a
whole, and to evaluate the adequacy of procedures and
resultant decisions in light of practical considerations with an
emphasis on fundamental fairness and the essentials of
reasoned decision-making." ldaho Code 967-6535, We find
that whatever knowledge the Board may have gained from
visiting the property was not necessary to form the basis of
its decision, as the hearing yielded substantially the same
evidence as could have been garnered during the visit.
Also, interested persons were provided a fair opportunity to
present and rebut evidence at the hearing. Consequently,
the appellants cannot show that a substantial right of theirs
has been prejudiced by the Board's visit to the site. Evans
at 433, 448.
The Commissioners' visit to the site should be treated as the Supreme

Court treated the Board of Commissioners of Cassia County in the Evans case
The facts in the record clearly support the decision reached by the Board, and
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF: 5
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the entire visit was tape recorded. Additionally, the record was reopened to
address the site visit issue. It cannot be argued that Neighbors were not afforded
their due process opportunity to rebut the issue at the public hearings.
In light of the ldaho Supreme Court's line of cases dealing with site visits,
the due process issue can, and properly should, be resolved without engaging in
constitutional debate,
Even if the Court takes-up Neighbors' constitutional arguments, Kootenai County
still prevails.
(0)ur Supreme Court held that a deprivation of due process
resulted from, (a) failure to give notice of a second meeting
of zoning authorities (after a public hearing), when a
rezoning request was considered and staff views were
discussed; (b) failure to keep a transcribable verbatim record
of the proceedings before the zoning authorities; and, (c)
failure to make specific written findings of fact and
conclusions of law, upon which the decision on the rezoning
request was based.
Cooper v. Board of County Commissioners of Ada County, 101 ldaho 407 at 41 1,614
P.2d 947 at 951 (1980).
The Court in Gay v. County Commissioners of Bonneville County, 103 ldaho 626,
651 P.2d 560 at 563 (Ct. App. 1982), went on to state the additional requisite factors in
affording due process, "we believe that all the factors mentioned in Cooper, together
with the opportunity to present and rebut evidence, meet the standards for due process
requirements under Matthews v. Eldridge." [424 U.S. 319, 96 S. Ct 893,47 L.Ed.2d
18(1976)]. ". . .[A]ccordingly, we hold that notice, opportunity to present and to rebut
evidence, preparation of specific Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and the
keeping of a transcribable record comprise a common core of procedural due process
requirements, constitutionally mandated in all cases where zoning authorities are
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF: 6
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requested to change the land use authorized for a particular parcel of property." Gay at'

In Aberdeen Springfield Canal Company v. Peiper, 133 ldaho 82, 982 P.2d 917
(1999), the ldaho Supreme Court laid out in greater detail the requirements for
procedural due process:
Procedural due process requires that "there must be some
process to ensure that the individual is not arbitrarily
deprived of his rights in violation of the State or Federal
Constitutions. This requirement is met when the defendant
is provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard."
State V. Rhoades, 121 ldaho 63,72,822 P.2d 960,969
(1991), (citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust
Company, 339 U.S. 306,313,70 S. Ct. 652,656,94 L. Ed.
865,872 (1950); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545,550, 85
S. Ct. 1187, 1190, 14 L. Ed. 2d 62,65(1965)). The
opportunity to be heard must occur "at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner" in order to satisfy the due
process requirement. Castaneda v. Brighton Corp., 130
ldaho 923, 927, 950 P.2d 1262, 1266 (1998), (quoting
Sweitzer v. Dean, 118 ldaho 568, 573, 798 P.2d 27,32
(1990)). Due process is not a concept to be applied rigidly in
every matter. Rather, it "is a flexible concept calling for such
procedural protections as are warranted by the particular
situation." City of Boise v. Industrial Cornmission, 129 ldaho
906,910,935 P.2d 169, 173 (1997), (quoting In Re Wilson,
128 ldaho 161, 167, 91 1 P.2d 754, 760 (1996)).
Finally, in Angstman v. City of Boise, the Court stated:
"Due process safeguards apply to quasi-judicial
proceedings, such as those conducted by zoning boards in
considering whether to grant a conditional use permit."
Chambers v. Kootenai County Board of Commissioners, 125
ldaho 115,118,867 P.2d 989,992 (1994). In such
situations, due process requires: (a) notice of the
proceedings, (b) a transcribable verbatim record of the
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H:\Planning\Powderhorn\D~strictCouMRespondents' Brief.DOC

proceedings, (c) specific, written findings of fact, and, (d) an
opportunity to be present and rebut evidence.
citing
Cooper v. Board of County Commissioners of Ada County,
101 ldaho 407,615 P.2d 947 (1980) and Gay v. County
Commissioners of Bonneville County, 103 ldaho 626, 651
P.2d 560 (Ct. App. 1982). Angstman does not claim that the
Council denied him any of these enumerated due process
requirements. Indeed, the record shows that he was given
notice of all relevant proceedings; verbatim records were
made available to him, as were specific written findings of
fact by the Planning & Zoning Commission and the Council;
and, Angstman was given an opportunity to present and
rebut evidence at each hearing.
Angstman v. City of Boise, 128 ldaho 575, at 578,917 P.2d 409, at 412 (Ct. App. 1996).
Neighbors were afforded notice and an opportunity to be heard. In addition to
the opportunity afforded to Neighbors to be present, present testimony and rebut
evidence, there was also a transcribable record prepared. These proceedings are part
of this record, as a transcribed verbatim record of all proceedings was created, and
specific written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were prepared as a result of
the Board of County Commissioners' hearing
The Evans v. Board of commissioners of Cassia County, Idaho, decision is
factually and legally on all fours with the present matter, and this Court should apply the
same reasoning, logic, and come to the same conclusions, to-wit: Neighbors were
afforded all due process that was necessary, and any error that occurred was harmless,
and therefore Neighbors did not suffer any reversible harm.
B. The Decision of the Board o f County Commissioners is
Supported by Substantial, though Conflicting Evidence.

As noted above "[slubstantial evidence is more than a scintilla of proof, but less
than a preponderance. It is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to
support a conclusion." Brewer v. Lacrosse Health & Rehab, supra, internal citations
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF: 8
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omitted.
The petitioners confuse the standard of review on substantial evidence. While
there is definitely conflicting evidence within the record, the Board of County
Commissioners, as the finders of fact, were the proper body to weigh that evidence and
determine credibility and what weight to give that evidence.
While the petitioner may not agree with the weight that the Board of County
Commissioners chose to give the testimony presented, it cannot say that there were not
facts in the record to support the decision made by the Board of County
Commissioners.
This Court, sitting in its appellate capacity, should not substitute itself for the
finder of fact. "The Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the
weight of the evidence on questions of fact." See I.C. $67-5279(1) (1989). Payeffe
River Property Owner's Association v. Board of Commissioners of Valley County, 132
ldaho 551,976 P.2d 477, at 544,480 (S. Ct. 1999).

CONCLUSION
A petition for Judicial Review (appeal) of the Board of County Commissioners'
Decision (governed by the IDAPA and the LLUPA) is not proper to join with an action for
Declaratory Judgment. Neighbors were afforded all of the due process required by
ldaho law. The decision reached by the Board of County Commissioners was
supported by the facts in the record
DATED this /'/'day

of March. 2007.
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Briefs and Other Related Documents
Cowan v. Board o f Com'rs o f Fremont
County idaho.2006.
Supreme Court o f ldaho,
ldaho Falls, October 2006 Term.
Robert G. COWAN, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross
Respondent,
v.
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF FREMONT
COUNTY, ldaho and the Individual Commissioners
Donald Trupp, as sticcessor to Glen Davis, William
Forbush and Gordon Smith, as successor to Richard
Baker, Defendants-Respondents-Cross Appellants.
No. 30061.
Nov. 29,2006
Background: Adjoining landowner petitioned for
review o f county board o f commissioner's approval
of preliminary and final plat for proposed
subdivisibn. The District Court o f the Seventh
Judicial District Court, Fremont County, Brent J ,
Moss, J., affirmed. Adjoinitig laiidowner appealed.

Holdings: The Supreme Court, Burdick, J., held
that:
( I ) Supreme Court lacked jurisdictioti to consider
whether fee increase for administrative appeals
violated due process;
(2) appeal o f board's decision on first application
was rendered moot by developer's second
application;
(3) adjoining landowner had standing:
(4)
and zoning commission was not
required to prepare written findings and conclusions;

( 5 : !indings and conciusions of board comp!ied with
Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA);

(6) procedural due process rights o f adjoining
landowner were not violated by zoning commission
limiting public comment at hearing on final plat:
(7) defective meeting notices did not prejudice
adjoining landowner's substantial rights; and

(8) wetlands protection provision in county
development code was not void for vagueness.

Affirmed.
West Headnotes
II I Zoning and Planning 414 -561
414 Zoning and Planning
414X Judicial Review or Relief
414X(A) In General
414k561 k. Review in General. Most
Cited Cases
For purposes of judicial review o f Local Land Use
Planning Act (LLUPA) decisions, a local agency
making a land use decision, such as a board of
commissioners, is treated as a government agency
under ldaho Administrative
Procedural Act
(IDAPA). West's I.C.A. $$ 67-5201 et seq.,
67-6521(1)(d).
121 Administrative L a w and Procedure 15A683
ISA Administrative Law and Procedure
15AV Judicial Review o f Administrative
Decisions
I5AV(A) I n General
15Ak681 Further Review
15Ak683 k. Scope. Most Cited Cases
In a sitbsequent appeal from a district court's
decision in which the district court was acting in its
appellate capacity under the Administrative
Procedure Act, the Supreme Coun reviews the
agency record intiependently (of the district coun's
decision. West's I.C.A. $ 67-5201 et seq.
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4 14 Zoning and Planning
4 l 4 X Judicial Review or Relief
4 14X(E) Further Review
4 14k745 Scope and Extent of Review
414k747
k. Questions o f Fact;
Findings. Most Cited Cases
As to weight o f evidence on questions o f tact
determined by a zoniiig agency, the Supreme Court,
in reviewing the agency decision, will noi substituie
its judgment for that o f the zoning agency. West's
I.C.A. 9 67-5279(1).

414X(C)3 Presumptions
414k671 k. Nature and Extent in
General. Most Cited Cases
Planning and zoning decisioiis are entitled to a
strong presumption o f validity; this includes the
board's application and interpretation o f its own
zoning ordinances.
17) Appeal and E r r o r 30 -756
30 Appeal an3 Crroi
30x11 Briefs
30k756 k. Form and Requisites in General.
Most Cited Cases

141 Zoning and Planning414 -745.1
Appeal and E r r o r 30 -761
414 Zoning and Planning
414X Judicial Review or Relief
4 14X(E) Further Review
4 14k745 Scope and Extent o f Review
414k745.1 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
The Supreme Court affirms the zoning ayency's
action unless finding that the agency's findings,
inferences, conclusions or decisions are: ( I ) in
violation .of constitutional or statutory provisions.
(2) in excess o f the statutory authority of the
agency, (3) made upon unlawful procedure, (4) not
supported by substantial evidence on the record as a
whole, and (5) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of
discretion.
151 Z o ~ i i n gand Planning 4 i 4 -625
414 Zoning and Planning
414X Judicial Review or Relief
414X(C) Scope o f Review
414X(C)I i n General
414k625 k . Harmless Error. Most Cited
Cases
The party attacking a zoning board's action iiii~st
first show error by the board and that a subsvdntial
right of the party has been prejudiced by the error.
161 Zoning and Planning 414 0 6 7 1
4!4 Zoning and Planning
414X Judicial Review or Relief
414X(C) Scope o f Review

30 Appeal and Error
3OXll Briefs
30k761 k. Points and Arguments. Most Cited
Cases
Supreme Couri does not consider issues raised on
appeal that are not supported by argument or
authority.
181 Zoning and Planning 414 -581
414 Zoning and Planning
414X Judicial Review or Relief
4 14X(B) Proceedings
4 14k58 1 k. I n General. Most Cited Cases
Adjoining landowner waived for appellate review
issues o f lhc chronology o f board o f commissioner's
decisioiis approving preliiiiinary and final plats for
proposed subdivision, and whether board's failure to
notify him o f which
wetlands protection
requirements applied to subdivision violated his due
process rights, given that landowner failed to
support issues with argument and authority.
191 Zoning and Planning 414 -570
414 Zoning and Planning
414X!udicial Review or Relief
414X(A) In General
414k570 k. Decisions Reviewable. Most
Cited Cases
Zoning and Ylannirig 414 -74i
:\aim to Ori:.
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4 14 Zoning and Planning
414X Judicial Review or Relief
414X(E) Further Review
414k741 k . In General Most Cited Cases
Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to consider
whether county fee increase for administrative
appeal from $80 to $550 violated due process rights
o f adjoining landowner who challenged plat
approval for proposed subdivision, ~ i v e n that
landowner's appeal sought judicial review o f board
o f commissioner's dccisioi~, and fee inciease was
legislative activity nor subject to sirch judicial
review.

1 j k l j k. Persons Entitled to Sue. Most Cited
Cases

92 Constiturional Law
92111 Distribution of Governmenti~lPowers and
Functions
921II(f3) Judicial Powers and Functions
92k68 Political Questions
92kSS(I: k. !n Genera!. Most Cited
Cases
Constitutior~alL a w 92 -69

1101 Counties 104 -23
104 Counties
10411 Government
10411(A) Organization and Powers in General
104k23 k. Judicial Supervision. Most
Cited Cases
Declaratory Judgment i i 8 A -209
I 18A Declaratory Judgment
1 l 8 A l l Subjects of Declaratory Relief
I ISAlI(i<) Public Officers and Agencies
l l8Ak209 k. Colrnties and Mlrnicipalities
and Their Officers. Most Cited Cases
Legislative activity by a county, whicli is subject to
collateral actions such as declaratory judgments, is
differentiated from quasi-judicial activity, which is
subject to judicial review, by the result; legislative
activity produces a rule or policy which has
application to an open class .illereas quasi-judicial
activity inipacts specific individuals, interests, or
situations.

1 l I ] Action 13 *6
13 Action
131 Grounds and Conditions l'recedenc
13k6 k. Moot, tlypothetical or
Questions, klost Cited Cases
Action 13 -13
13 Action
131 Grounds and Conditions Precedent

92 Constitutional Law
92111 Distribution of Governmental Powers and
Functions
92111(B) Judicial Powers and Functions
92k69 k . Advisory Opinions. Most Cited
Cases
Justiciability questions are generally divisible into
several sub-categories: advisory opinions, feigned
and collusive cases, sanding, ripeness, niootness,
political questions, and administrative questions.
1121 Zoning and Planning 414 *570
414 Zoning and Planning
414X Judicial Review or Relief
414X(A) In General
414k570 k. Decisions Reviewable. Most
Cited Cases
Adjoining landowner's appeal o f coiinty board o!
commissioner's action on first application tbr
approval of proposed subdivision was rendered
moot by applicant's withdrawal o f first application
and submission of second application, and fact that
neither applicant nor the board acted on first
application after second application was filed.
1131 Action 13 -6

Abstract
I 3 Action
I31 Grounds and Conditions Precedent
i3k6 k. Moot, tiypotheiicai ur Abstract
Questions. Most Cited Cases
A case is "moot" i f it presents no justiciable
controversy and a judicial determination w i l l have
I to
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no practical effect upon the outcome
1141 Zoning snd Planning 414 -571
414 Zoning and Planning
414X Judicial Review or Relief
4 14X(A) I n General
414k571 k . Right of Review. Most Cited
Cases
Adjoining landowner who alleged that approval of
proposed subdivision would adversely affect his
property rights and diminish his property value had
standing to seek judicial review o f county board of
conin>issioner's decision approving the subdivision
plat.
1151 Zoning and Planning414 -571
414 Zoning and Planning
414X Judicial Review or Relief
4 14X(A) I n General
414k571 k. Right o f Review. Most Cited
Cases
A party's standing in land use decisions depends on
whether his or her property will be adversely
affected by the land use decision.

92 Constitutioiial Law
92x11 Due Process o f Law
92k251.5 k. Procedural Due Process in
General. Most Cited Cases
Procedural due process requires that there must be
some process to ensure that tlie individual is not
arbitrarily deprived o f Ris rights in violation o f the
state
or
federal
constitutions
U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 14.

i IBi Coilsiiiuiional Law 92 C='278.2(Zj
92 Constitutional Law
92x11 Due Process of1.a~
92k278.2 Zoning, Building, and Pianning
Regulations
92k278.2(2) k . Proceedings and Review.
Most Cited Cases
In planning and zoning decisions, due process
requires: ( I ) notice o f the proceedings, (2) a
transcribable verbatim record of the proceedings,
(3) specific, written findings o f fact, and (4) an
opportuniry to present and iebut evidence.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend 14.
1191 Constitutional Law 92 -251.1

92 Constitutional Law
92x11 Due Process o f Law
92k278.2 Zoning, Building, and Planning
Regulations
92k278.2(1) k . In General, ivlost Cited
Cases

92 Constitutional Law
92x11 Due Process o f Law
92k25 1 .I k. Flexibility; Balancing Interests.
Most Cited Cases
Due process is not a concept to be applied rigidly in
every matter; ntlier, i t is a flexible concept calling
for sucil procedural protections as aie warranted by
the particular situation. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.

Z o ~ t i n gand I'lanning 414 -355

1201 Appeal aild Error 30 -84Z(l)

414 Zoning aiid Planning
4 14Vll Administration in General
414k353 Powers, Duties, and Liabilities
414k355 k. Legislative, Judicial, or
Quasi-Judicial Power. Most Cited Cases
Since decisions by zoning boards apply general
rules to specific individuals, interests or situations,
and are quasi-judicial in nature, they are siibjecr to
due process constraints. U.S.C.A.Const.P.mend. 14.

30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
3OXVI(A) Scope. Siandards, and Extent, in
General
3OkS38 Questions Constdered
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether
Questions Are o f Law or o f Fact
3OkS42(1) k. i n General. ?viost
Ci!ed Cases
Due process issues are generally questions o f law
over which the Supreme Court exercises free

1161 Constitutional L a w 92 -278.211)

1171 Constitutional L a w 92 @=725i.j

O 2007 Thomson/West. N o Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

Page 6 of 26

Page 5
143 ldaho 501, 148 P.3d 1247
(Cite as: 143 ldaho 501, 148 P.3d 1247)

review. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. I 4
1211 Zorrisg atid Planning 414 e 5 7 2
4 14 Zoning and Planning
414X Judicial Review or Relief
414X(A) I n General
414k572 k. Preservation Before Board or
Officer of Grounds o f Review. Most Cited Cases
Constitutional issues not raised below by adjoining
lai~dowiirr opposing approval
o f proposed
subdivision would not be considered on appeal.
1221 Zoning rind Planning 414 -361
414 Zoning and Planning
414VII Administration in General
4 14k358 Procedure
414k361 k. Findings and Record. Most
Cited Cases
For effective judicial review o f the quasi-judicial
actions of zoning boerds, there must be adequate
findings o f [act and conclusions o f law, and
conclusory statements are not sufficient; instead
what is needed is a clear statement o f what,
specifical!~, the decisionmaking body believes,
after hearing and considering all of the evidence, to
be the relevant and i~iiportantfacts upon which its
decision is based.
1231 Appenl and E r r o r 30 -842(1)
30 Appeal and Error
3 0 X V l iieview
;OXVl(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k838 Questions Considered
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether
Questions Are o f Law or o f Fact
30k842(1) k . In General. Most
Cited Cases
The interpretation o f a statute is a question of law
over which the Supreme Court exercises free review.

361 k180 Intention o f Legislature
361 k18 1 i n General
3 6 l k I X l ( l ) k . In General. Most
Cited Cases
The objective o f statutory construction is to derive
the intent ofthe legislature.
1251 Statutes 361 -188
361 Statutes
361 '41 Constiiiction and Operation
361 VI(A) General Rules o f Construction
361 k187 Meaning of Language
361k188 k . I n General. Most Cited
Cases
Statutes 361 -190
361 Statutes
36 1 VI Construction and Operation
361 VI(A) General Rules o f Construction
361 k187 Meaning of Language
3 6 l k l 9 0 k. Existence of Ambiguity.
Most Cited Cases
Where a statute is unambiguous, statutory
construction is unnecessary and courts are free to
apply the plain meaning.
1261 Zoning and Planning 414 -439
4 14 Zoning and Planning
414VIli Permits, Certificates and Approvals
414Vlll(C) Proceedings to Procure
4i4k436 tiearing and Determination
414k439 k. Findings, Conclilsions,
Minutes, or Records. Most Cited Cases
County planning and zoning commission was not
required by tlie Local Land Use Planning Act
and
(LLUPA) io prepare written findings
conclusions to support its recommendation to
approve preliminary and final plat of proposed
subdivision, given that it lacked authority to finally
approve or deny the application for ihe subdivision.
West's I.C.A. $3 67-6504,67-6535(b).

1241 Statutes 361 -181(1)
j271 Consiiiuiionoi L n w 92 -278.2(2)
361 Statutes
36 1 V I Construction and Operation
361 Vl(A) General Rules o f Construction

92 Constitutional Law
92x11 Due Process of Law
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92k278.2 Zoning, Building, and Planning
Regulations
92k278.2(2) k. Proceedings and Review.
Most Cited Cases
Zoning and Planning 414 -439
414 Zoning and Planning
414Vlll Permits, Certificates and Approvals
414Vlll(C) Proceedings to Procure
4i4k436 iiearing and Determination
414k439 k . Findings, Conclusions,
Minutes, or Records. Most Cited Cases
County board o f commissioners' written findings
and conclusions supporting its decision to approve
preliminary and final plat o f proposed subdivision
complied with requirements o f Local Land Use
Planning Act (LLUPA), and thus, did not violate
opponent's due process rights, given that board's
findings and conclusions included the criteria and
standards it considered relevant, provided detailed
facts, and explained its rationale for its decision.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; West's I.C.A.
67-6535(b).
1281 Con$tit~rtionalLaw 92 -251.6
92 Constitritional Law
92x11 Doe Process of Law
92k251.6 k. Notice and Hearing. Most Cited
Cases
Procedural due process requires some process to
ensure that the individual is not arbitrarily deprived
of his rights in violation o i ihr stare or federal
constitutions; such requiremetit is {net when the
defendant. is provided with notice and an
opportunity to be heard, which must occur at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
1291 Constitutional Law 92 *278.2(2)
92 Constitutional Law
92x11 Due Proccss o f Law
92k278.2 Zoning, Building, and Planning
Reeuiations
92k?78.?(2) k. Proceedings and Review.
Most Cited Cases

Zoning a l ~ dPlanning 414 "21436.1
414 Zoning and Planning
4 14VIII Permits, Certificates and Approvals
414VIll(C) Proceedings to Procure
414k436 Hearing and Determination
414k436.1 k. I n General. Most Cited
Cases
Procedural due process rights o f opponeni o f
proposed subdivision were not violated by county
planning and zoning commission limiting public
comments to a few minutes per speaker at liearing
on final plat; opponent's attorney spoke at length
and presen~ed evidence during preliminary plat
hearing and during appeals and opponent also had
opportunity to speak at preliminary plat hearing.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
130) Constitutional Law 92 -278.2(2)
92 Constitutional Law
92x11 Due Process o f Law
92k278.2 Zoning, Building, and Planning
Regulations
92k278.2(2) k. Proceedings and Review.
Most Cited Cases
Zoning and Planning 414 -434
414 Zoning and Planning
4 14VIll Permits, Certificates and Approvals
4 14VIII(C) Proceedings to Procure
414k434 k . Notice. Most Cited Cases
Defective
notices
for
county
board
of
commissioners' public meetings on proposed
subdivision did not prejudice substantial rights of
opponent o f subdivision, in violation of due
process, given that opponent had notice o f
meetings, anended meetings with counsel, and had
opportunity to speak against the subdivision
application. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14.
1311 Constitutional Law 92 -251.4
92 Constitutional Law
92x11 Due Process of Law
92k25l.4 k, vagueness or Overbreadth. Most
Cited Cases
Statutes that are found to be vague, indefinite or
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uncertain are in violation of the constitutional due
process provisions found in the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution or
Article I, section I 3 of the ldaho Constitution.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; West's I.C.A. Const.
Art. I, 5 13.
1321 Constitutional L a w 92 -251.4
92 Constitutional Law
JLA
Due
~Process
I
of Law
92k25 1.4 k. Vagueness or Overbreadth. Most
Cited Cases
Although most decisions invoking the "void for
vagueness" doctrine of due process deal with
criminal statutes and ordinances, the doctrine
applies equally well to civil ordinances; however,
greater tolerance is permitted when addressing a
civil or non-criminal statute as opposed to a
criminal statute under the doctrine. U.S.C.A.
Consl.Amend. 14; West's I.C.A. Const. Art. I, $ 13.
1331 Conslitutio~iali a w 92 -278.2(1)
92 Constitutional Law
92x11 D u e Process o f Law
92k278.2 Zoning, Building, and Planning
Regulations
92k278.2(1) k. I n General. Most Cited
Cases

92 Constiiuiionai Law
92x11 Due Process o f Law
92k251.6 k. Notice and Hearing. Most Cited
Cases
Although due process entitles a person to an
impartial and disinterested tribunal, there must be a
showing o f actual bias before disqualifying a
decision ~naker even when a litigant maintains a
decision maker has deprived the proceedings o f the
appearance o f fairness. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
1351 Zoning and Planning 414 -438
414 Zoning and Planning
4 14V 11 l Permits, Certificates and Approvals
414V111(C) Proceedings to Procure
414k436 Hearing and Determination
414k438
k.
Reference;
Recommendation or Report o f Officer or Board, in
General. Most Cited Cases
County board o f commissioners' decision allowing
applicant for subdivision approval to rely on zoning
administrator's report as evidence o f compliance
with county development code requirements was
not arbitrary and capricious, even though county
development code placed the burden o f proof on
applicant to show compliance with development
code and comprehensive plan, given that applicant
still had burden of persuasion.

1361 Zoning and Planning 414 -381.5
Zoning and Planning414 -86

4 1411 Validity of Zoning Regulatio~is
41411(B) Regulations as to Particular Matters
414k86 k. Permits and Certificates. Most
Cited Cases
Wetlalids
protection requirement
in county
development code that required all developments to
demonstrate compliance with "state and federal
wetlands protection requirements" was not "void
for vagueness" in violatio~io f due process; county
could not anticipate which state and federal
requirements might apply to a given development
until an application was submitted. U.S.C.A,
Const.Amend. 14; ?"iestUsI.C.4. Const. Art. I, S: !3.

4 14 Zoning and Planning
4 i 4 V i l i Perniiis, Ceriiticaies and Approvals
414Vlll(A) In General
414k378 Grounds for Grant or Denial
414k381.5 k. Maps, Plats, or Plans.
Conformity to Regulations. Most Cited Cases
Developer's failisre to provide a "master plan" for
developinent of contiguous lots did not require
county board o f commissioners to disapprove
applicatioli for subd~vision,given that board found
that the development area consisted o f two
contiguous, separately-owned parcels, and county
development county allowed, but did not mandate,
disapprovai o f subdivision for an applicant's Failure
to submit master development plan.

1341 Constitutional Law 92 -251.6

j37l Zoning and Planning 414 -382.6

4 14 Zoning and Planning
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provisiori ol' the Act. Federal Water
Control Act. $402, 33 U.S.C.A. $ 1342.

Pollution

1441 Z o n i n g and Planning 414 -381.5
414 Zoning and Planning
4l4V111 Permits, Certificates and Approvals
4 14VllI(A) I n Gerieral
4 l4k778 Grounds for Grant or Denial
414k381.5 k. Maps, Plats, or Plans,
Conforniirj to Regulations. Most Cited Cases
C o u ~ i t yboard o f commissioners' determination that
proposed
subdivision
had
positive
relative
performance standard values for slope protection,
wildlife habitat, and visually sensitive areas under
the county development code was supported by
substantial arid competent evidence, and thus,
supported board's approval o f final plat for
proposed subdivision, given that board was entitled
to rely on z o n i n g administrator's point awards,
development was not on natural resource inventory
map, and development area was not delineated by
U.S. Forest Service as visually sensitive area.
1451 Z o n i n g and P l a n r ~ i n g414 -729
414 Zoning and Planning
414X Judicial Review or Relief
4 14X(D) Determination
414k729 k. Cosu. Most Cited Cases
Opponent o f proposed subdivision did not prevail
on appeal o f final plat approval by county board o f
com~iiissioners.and tlius, vins not entitled to award
o f attorney fees and costs on appeal. 'J:est5s I.C.A. $
12-1 17.
1461 Costs 102 @"260(5)
102 Costs
102X O n Appeal or Error
10213259 Darnages
and
Penalties for
l'rivolous Appeal and Delay
102k260 Right and Grounds
102k260(5) k. Nature and Form of
Judgment, Action, or Proceedings for Review. Most
Ciied Cases
Opponen! o f proposed s~.lbdivirion did not act
entirely without reasonable basis i n fact or law in
appealing district court's affirmance o f county board

o f commissioners' approval o f final plat for
subdivision, and thus, board was not entitled to
award o f attorney fees and costs on appeal. West's
I.C.A. $9 12-117, 12-121.

* I 2 5 2 Hopkins, Roden, Crockett, Hansen &
Hoopes, ldaho Falls, for appellants. C. Timothy
flopkins argued.
Karl Harry Lewies, Fremont County Prosecuting
Attorney, St. Anthony, for respondent Knrl L'---*
Lewies argued.
B U R D I C K , Justice.
Appellant Robert Cowan (Cowan) appeals from a
district court decision affirming the Fremont County
Board o f Commissioners' (the Board) approval o f
the preliniinary and final plats for the proposed
Eagle's Nest Ranch subdivision (Eagle's Nest). We
affirm.
,tULai

I.F A C T U A L A N D PROCE1)URAL
BACKGROUND
This appeal involves several petitions for review, all
filed by Cowan, which the district court
consolidated. I t concerns two applications filed by
Dr. Dean Bawden (Bawden) to subdivide and
develop home sites on a parcel located adjacent to
Cowan's property and near Island Park Reservoir i n
Fremont County, Idaho.
Bawden purchased two separate parcels o f land in
2000 either personally o i throiigh liis family or
business entities. The land owned by Bawden o r
his family or business is rectangular and consists o f
147 acres. Bawden has retained the sixty-one acre
parcel for residential and agricultural use.
However, he proposed to develop the eighty-six
acre parcel into residential lots with road access.
Additionally, Bawden's son, Eric, owns a parcel
northwest o f the Eaglc's Nest development. This
parcel was separated from Eagle's Nest pursuant to
a Class Ipermit issued by the C ~ u n t y . ' : ~ '

F N ! . P. Class 1 permit allows applicants to
split
lots.
See
Fremonl
County
Development
Code
(FCDC)
Ch.
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2001, Bawden decided to not pursue the first
application any further.
A. The First Application

On April 24, 2000, Bawden tiled his f i r 3
application for a Class I f permit with Fremont
County, seeking to subdivide the eighty-six acre
parcel o f land into twenty-nine lots.FN2 The
Fremont County Planning and Zoning Commission
(P & Z) considered Bawden's application and
preliminary plat at a public hearing in June o f that
year. P & Z recommended approval o f the plat to
the Board and issued Bawden a permit. Cowan
appealed this decision to the Board. I n August
2000, the Board heard Cowan's appeal and later
held a closed work session to consider the matter.
This meeting, howevei, was incorrectly noticed as
an executive session. Later that same month, the
Board approved Bawden's application for a permit,
but remanded the matter to P & Z to consider the
issue o f whether the proposed development site
would eliminate historically existing access to
public lands.

EN2. A Class I1 permit is required for
silbdivisions under the FCDC. See FCDC
Ch. lIl(B)(3)(a).
Later, in September 2000. Cowan filed two separate
petitions for judicial review of the Board's decisioli
and filed a lawsuit alleging that the Board violated
Idaho's Open Meetings Act when i t held the
incorrectly noticed meeting to consider Bawden's
application. On May 21, 2001 the district court
determined that the Board had violated the Open
Meetings Act.
I n November 2000, P & Z lleld a public meeting lo
address the issue of whether the development would
eliminate historically existing access to public
lands. Bawden, at that meeting, declared his
intention to leave open access to the public. P & Z
then found the issue was moot. At that meeting P
& Z also considered and recommended approval of
Bawden's final plat for phases I and II o f the
drvelopmzn~.Cowan appealed this decision to the
Board; however, his appeal was postponed
indefinitely and never heard becausex1253 irr May,

Meanwhile, in January 2001, the Board held a
second meeting and once again approved Bawden's
preliminary plat.'N' Afrer the Board issued its
written findings o f fact, conclilsions o f law and
decision, Cowan filed a second petition for judicial
review. In May 2001, the district court issued its
decision in Cowan's first petition for judicial
review, declaring that the Board's incorrect notice
for its August 23, 2000, meeting voided its Augr~st
28, 2000 decision and ordered the Board to
schedule a new hearing. In the midst o f this,
Bawden sent letlers to the Board and Cowan
witIidrawiii$ this application. Since then the Board
has taken no action on the first applicalion.

F N 3 I t appears that the Board concedes
this meeting was held in an effort to cure
the defect in the prior notice. I n their
brief, the Respondents write: "A couple of
months later, in January 2001, recognizi~~g
rhat ;IS August work meeting hod likely
violared rhe open meering l a v , the Board
held a repeat work meeting ...." (Emphasis
added).

B. Tlie Second Application
On May 17, 2001, Bawden filed a new application
and preliminary plat with Fremont County; this
time he sought to subdivide and develop twenty
residential lots. The following month P & Z held a
lhearing to consider Bawden's second application
and plat and recommended that the application be
approved. Once again, Cowan appealed P & Z's
decision to the Board. Bawden then submitted his
final plat to P & Z for review. On July 16, 2001,
before the Board heard Cowan's appeal o f the
prelitninary plat. P & Z considered and
recommended Bawden's final plat to the Board for
i~pproval. Cowall then appealed that decision as
well.
Gn July 30; 2001. the Board held a hearing on
Cowan's appeal of the preliminary plat. Cowan's
attorney was present at this meeting and submitted a
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written brief objecting to the notice the Board had
provided for tlie meeting, indicating that the notice
failed to include several items the FCDC requires o f
all notices. After a work session in Arigust 2001,
the Board approved Bawden's preliminary plat and
issued a written decision on Septeniber 10, 2001
Cowan filed a petition for judicial review o f this
decision. O n September l I, 200 1, the Board lield
a hearing and considered and approved Bawden's
final plat conditioned on Bawden entering into a
development agreement as the FCGC required. O n
October 9, 2001 the Board issued a written decision
and on October 22, 2001 the Board and the
developer executed a development agreement.
Cowan once again filed a petition for review, and
because all four o f the petitions contained common
questions o f law and fact tlie district coun
consolidated the petitions.
O n August 19, 2003, the district court issued its
memorandum decision on Cowan's four petitions
for judicial review. The district court determined
that Cowan's arguments relating to the first
application were moot. As to his arguments
regarding the second application, i t affirmed the
Board's decision in part. but remanded to the Board
for a determination o f whether Bawden's application
complied with the FCDC's provisio~is coticerning
state and federal wetlands protection. The district
court also awarded Cowan attorney's fees because
although the district court found tliat Cowan had not
prevailed on the issues relating to the second
application, he liad prevailed "in forcing the County
to follow rhe law and its own ordinance-something
it should have done without Cowan's persistence."
Cowan then filed a notice o f appeal o f the district
court's decision and Fremont County liled a
cross-appeal. tlowever, on November IS. 2003,
this Court suspended Cowan's appeal.
Meanwhile, on remand from the district court, tlie
Board held a public hearing In January 2004, to
determine whether Bawden's second application
complied with the state and federal wetlands
protection provisions adopted by the FCDC. After
hearing testimony and taking evidence the Board
took the matter under advisernetit pending briefing
by the parties. O n March 22, 2004, the Board
issued written findings and conclrisions and found

that the proposed subdivision complied with the
FCDC's wetlands protection provision. Cowan
then filed his fifth petition for jridicial review. O n
June 16. * I 2 5 4 2005, the district court issued its
memorandum decision on this petition for judicial
review, affirming the Board's decision. Cowan
then proceeded with the instant appeal.

II. S T A N D A R D OF R E V I E W
[l][2][3]1J][S][6]
The L.ocal Land Use Planning
Act (LLUI'A) allows an affected person to seek
judicial review o f an approval or denial o f a land
use application, as provided for in the ldaho
Administrative Procedural Act (IDAPA). ldaho
Code $ 67-652 1 (l)(d); Evans v. Telon Cotmly, 139
ldaho 71, 74, 73 P.3d 84, 87 (2003). For purposes
o f judicial review o f L L U P A decisions, a local
agency making a land use decision, sklch as the
Board o f Commissioners, is treated as a government
agency under I D A P A . U r r u ~ i av. Blaine Cozm~y,
134 ldaho 353, 357, 2 P.3d 738, 742 (2000).
In a subsequent appeal from a district court's
decision in which the district court was acting i n its
appellate capacity under the Administrative
Procedure Act ..., the Supreme Court reviews the
agency record independently o f the district court's
decision. As to the weight of the evidence on
questions o f fact, this Court w i l l not substitute its
judginent for that o f the zoning agency.
The Court shall affirm the zoning agency's action
unless the Court finds that the agency's finding!,
inferences, conclusions or decisions are: "(a)
it1
violatioti o f colistitutional or statutory provisions;
(b) in excess of' the statutory authority o f the
agency; (c) made upon unlawful procedure; (d) not
supported by substantial evidence on the record as a
whole; and (e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse o i
discretion." The party attacking a zoning board's
action must first illustrate that tlie board erred in a
manner specified therein arid niust then show tliat a
substantial right o f the paity has been prejudiced.
Eacrel 1., Bonner Coun~y,I 3 9 ldaho 780, 784, 86
P.3d 494, 498 (2004j (internal citations omitted).
Finally, planning and zoning decisions are entitled
to a strong presumption of validity; this includes
the board's application and interpretation o f their
Claim to O r i t . U:S. Covt. Works
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o w n zoning ordinances. Sanders Orchard v. G e ~ n
o
I 3 7 ldaho 695, 698, 52 P.3d 840, 843
(2002).

111. A N A L Y S I S

[7][8] As a preliminary matter, Cowan identifies
twenty-four separate issues in his brief to the Court.
Nonetheless, not all o f these issues are supported
by argument andior authority. As such, we will not
address those issues because this Court does not
consider issires not supported by argument or
authority. K E B En~erprises. I*. P v. S~nedley, 140
ldaho 746, 754, 101 P.3d 690, 698 (2004) (citing
Hei v. Nolzer, I 3 9 ldaho 81, 73 P.3d 94 (2003)). FN"

FN4. Under this standard, we w i l l not
consider Cowan's arguments relating the
chronological order. o f the Board's
decisions or his argument that the Board's
failure l o inform h i m o f which wetlands
protection requirements applied to Eagle's
Nest violated his due process.
Cowan
addresses many
issues surrounding
Bawden's application which can be divided into
three types. o f arguments: ( I ) due process
violations. (2) arbitrary and capricious actions by
the Board, and (3) decisions by the Board not
supported by the evidence. Additionally, Cowan
assens that the Board's appeals fee increase violated
his due process rights. For each error Cowan
asserts, he argues that his substantive rights have
been prejudiced; therefore, he concludes, this Court
must reverse the Board's decisions approving
Eegle's Nest and remand with instructions ro deny
the application.
We w i l l first address Cowan's arguments relating to
the increased appeals fee and then address the
Board's
contention
that
this
appeal
is
non-justiciable. We will then turn to Cowan's
arguments relating to the approval o f Bawden's
i~nnIicali~,n.
. ~ r r. - . . -

A. Increased Appeals Fee
A t the outset o f this litigation, Fre~nont County
charged an $80 fee for an administrative appeal, but
it increased this fee to $550.00 in M a y 2001. This
increase applied to Cowan's appeals filed afrer M a y
2001. Cowan argues, therefore, that this increase
represents an "excessive appeal fee" tliat prevents
parties from seeking review o f planning and zoning
decisions and thus violates due process. The Board
contends that C o w a n t i i 5 S litcks titi: sianriii~g i o
make his argument and that the argument is moot
because he did not properly appeal this legislative
action taken by the County.
[9][10] While such a large fee increase could
implicate due process concerns if i t were
unreasonable or were used to discourage appeals,
this Court lacks jurisdiction to examine the County's
fee increase by direct judicial review. T o begin,
the decision to raise the appeals fee was a
legislative act. "Legislative
activity ... is
differentiated from quasi-judicial activity by the
result-legislative activity produces a rule or policy
which has application to an open class whereas
quasi-judicial activity impacts specific individuals,
interests or situations." BUI-I v. Ciry of ldaho Falls,
105 ldaho 65, 67, 665 P.2d 1075, 1077 (1983).
While legislative actions by counties are subject to
collateral actions such as declaratory judgments,
they cannot he attacked by a petition for judicial
review. Scorl v. Gooding Counry. 137 idaho 206,
208, 46 P.5d 23, 25 (2002). Therefore, because
Cowan attacks a legislative action in his petition Tor
review, this Court lacks jurisdiction to decide the
issue under the procedural posture o f Cowan's
instant appeal.

B. Justiciability
[ I I] Generally, justiciability questions are divisible
into several sub-categories: advisory o p i ~ ~ i o n s ,
feigned and collusive cascs, standing, ripeness,
mootness, political questions and administrative
questions. See Miies v. Idaho Power Co., 116
Idaho 635, 639, 778 P.2d 757, 761 (1989). The
Board contends tliat Cowan's claims r e i a t i n i t o the
first application are moot, and that Cowan lacks
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standing to pursue this appeal. We turn first to
mootness and then to standing.

Cowan argues that certain actions by the Board
relating to the first application violate due process
standards and Idaho statutes. The Board contends
all the issues raised by Cowan relating to the first
application are tnoot because Bawdell indicated by
letter that he was withdrawing his first application
and because the Board concluded that since the
F C D C does not allow for multiple simultaneous
applications Bawden's firs! application was revoked.
[ l 2 ] [ l 3 ] "A case is moot if it presents no justiciable
controversy and a judicial determination w i l l have
no practical effect upon the outcome." Goodson v
Ner Perce B d of C o t m y Comm'rs, 133 ldaho 85 1,
853. 993 P.2d 614, 616 (2000) (citation omitted).
Here, the record shows that Bawden wrote to both
Cowan and the Board expressing his decision to file
a second application rather than continuing to
pursue his first application and that he later wrote
the Board another letter stating that he would not
act upon his first application. Moreover, neither he
nor the Board has acted upon the first application
since Bawden filed his second application more
than five years ago. Therefore, there is no live
controversy, and Cowan's arguments relating to the
first application are moot.

[ I 4 1 The Board argues that Cowan has failed to
allege a distiiict palpable injury or particularized
harm he has suffered, but has instead only alleged
generalized grievances. Therefore, the Board
concludes Cowan lacks standing to pursue this
appeal. In response, Cowaii poinls out thai he has
demonstrated his land w i l l be adversely affected
and presented evidence that the proposed
developmeni would adversely impact his property
rights and diminish his propeny value. This, he
argues, is enough to demonstrate standing pursuant
to Evans e. Teron Couniy, 139 ldaho 71, 73 P.3d 84
(2003).

[ I 5 1 Cowarl has standing. I n Evans this Court
determined that in land use decisions, a parry's
standing depends on whether his or her propeny
w i l l be adversely affected by the land use decision.
See E v ~ m s , 139 ldaho at 75, 73 P.3d at 88. This
Court held "[tlhe existence o f real or potential harm
is sufficient to challenge a land use decision." Id at
76, 73 P.3d at 89. Like the appellants in Evans
whosc rural homes might be adversely affected by
the development o f a large resort development
adjacent to their propei?ies, Cowan's p r o y e l q m i g l i i
be adversely affected by the construction o f Eagle's
Nest adjacent * I 2 5 6 to his property. Therefore,
Cowan has standing to pursue his claims.

C. Due Process
Cowail argues the County violated his due process
by: ( I ) P & Z failing to prepare written findings
and conclusions and the Board issuing conclusory
findings and conclusions; (2) limiting public
comment; (3) issuing conrusing notices; (4) railing
to inform the public o f which state or federal
wetlands protectio~i requirements apply to the
development prior to the hearing; and (5) violating
the
"appearance
of
fairness
doctrine."
Additionally, Cowan argues that the FCDC's section
on wetlands protections is void for vagueness. For
every violation, Cowan seeks to have this Court
reverse the Board's determination.
[16][17][i8][19][20] Since decisions by zoning
boards apply general rules to "specific individuals,
interests or situations," and are "quasi-judicial in
nature" they are subject to doe process constraints.
Chambers i~.
Koolenai Couniy B d of Comm'rs. 125
ldaho 115, 118, 867 P.2d 989, 992 (1994). "
Procedural due process requires that there must be
some process to ensure that the individual is not
arbitrarily deprived o f his rights in violation o f the
siaie
or
federal
constitutions."
Aberdeen-Springj?ield Canal Co. v. Priper. 133
ldaho 82. 91. 982 P.2d 917, 926 (1999) (internal
quotations omitted). I n planning and zoning
decisions, due process requires: (a) notice o f the
proceedings, (b) a transcribable verbatim record o f
the proceedings, (c) specific, written findings o f
fact, and (d) an opportunity to presenr and rebut
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FN5. Cowan also argues that the Board
violated this section by failing to make a
transcribable recording o f its work session
held on Jariiiary 25, 2001. However, this
arguinent is moot as it relates to the first
application.
1221 For "effective judicial review o f the
quasi-jirdicial actions o f zoning boards, there must
be ... adequate findings o f Fact and conclusions of
I"...>.
I',
_., P'71lii;j. I'kliip Y . Ciry o,f Twiri
law.
rrurn,nurr
fail,^. 104 ldaho 32, 36, 655 P.2d 926, 930 (1982).
Conclusory statements are not sufficient; instead "
[wlhat is needed for adequate judicial review is a
clear
statement o f what,
specifically,
the
decisionmaking body believes, after hearing and
considering all o f the evidence, to be the relevant
and important facts upon which its decision is based.
" i d at 37, 655 P.2d at 93 l (quoting S. o/
Sunnysicle Neighborhood League v. Bd of Comm'rs,
280 Or. 3, 21-22, 569 P.2d 1063, 1076-77 (1977)).
However, a board o f commissioners may adopt a
planrii~lg and zoning commission's findings and
conclusions because I.C. $ 67-6535 requires only
that findings and conclusions be made. Evans, 139
ldaho at 8.0, 73 P.3d at 93.

law, as required by I.C. 67-6535." F C D C
Ch. IIl(R). I t also provides that the
administrator's report "shall be presented
in a form that can serve as a basis for jP &
Z's] findings o f fact" and that the "
completed performance standards checklist
shall be considered to constitute the
conclusions o f law." id
[26] ldaho Code
67-6535(b) requires that the
approval or denial o f any application, among other
things, be in writing. However, I.C.
67-6504
reserves the authority to approve or deny land
subdivisions to the board o f coiinty commissioners.
'N7 Therefore, LLUPA*1258 by its very terms
applies the requirements o f I.C. 6 67-6535(b) only
to
governing
boards. These
requirements,
therefore, do not apply to I' & Z because it lacks the
authority to finally approve or deny an application
for a subdivision under I.C. $ 67-6504. As such, P
& Z did not violate I.C. 5 67-6535(b).

F N 7 ldaho Code $ 67-6504 provides in
pertinent part: "If a governing board 'does
not elect to exercise the powers conferred
by this chapter, it shall establish ... a
planning and zoning commission ..., which
[nay act with the full authority o f the
governing board, e x c l ~ ~ d i nthe
g authority ...
to finally approve land subdivisions."

[23][24][25] The Board is correct in its argument
that I.C. 5 67-6535(b) does not apply to the
decisioris by P & LFN6
Tlie interpretation o f a
statute is a question o f law over which this Coufl
exercises free review. See, e,g., MIarrin 11. Stale
Furnr 1b1iit. Auto. ins. Co., 138 ldaho 244. 246, 61
P.3d 601, 603 (2002). The objective o f statutory
construction is to derive the intent o f the legislature.
Kriso R lnrin, P.A. v. Stale ins. F'imc!, 134 Idaho
130. 134. 997 P.2d 591. 595 (2000). Statutory
construction begins with the literal language o f the
statute. D & M Colmay Estnles Homeowners Ass'n
v. Rotnriell, 138 ldaho 160, 165, 59 P.3d 965, 970
(2002). Where a statute is unambiguous, statutory
construction is unnecessary and coirns are free to
apply the plain meaning, Mlartin, 138 ldaho at 246.
6 1 P.3d at 603.

[27] We turn now to Cowan's argument that the
Board issued conclusory findings and conclusions.
Idaho Code 5 67-6535(b) also reqirires that written
findings be
accompanied by a reasoned statement that explains
the criteria and standards considered relevant, states
the relevant contested facts relied upon, and
explains the rationale for the decision based on the
applicable provisions o f tlie comprehensive plan,
relevant ordinance and statutory provisions,
pertinent constitutional principles and factual
information contained in the record.

CN6. ?'he FCDC requires that all decisions
by P & Z and the Board be "reported in the
form o f findings of fact and conclusions o f

However, Cowan does not argue that the Board
failed to include any o f this required information,
rather he provides examples or suggestions o f

O 2007 ThomsonilVest. N O Claim to Orig. U S . Covt. Works.

Page 17 of 26

Page 16
143 ldaho 501, 148 P.3d 1247
(Cite as: 143 ldaho 501,148 P.3d 1247)

conclusory findings all related to tlie Board's
determination that Bawden had met his burden o f
proof. A review o f the various wrinen findings and
conclusions reveals that the Board complied with
the requirements o f I.C. S 67-6535(b) because i t
included the criteria and standards i t considered
relevant, provided detailed facts, and explained its
rationale for its decisions. Therefore, we liold that
tlie Board's wrinen findings and conclusions did not
violate Cowan's due process rights. We need not,
,cab
--h the second step o f the znalysis to
determine if Cowan's substantial rights were
violated because lie has failed to demonstrate error
in this instance.

due process rights. Even assuming argztendo that P
& Z's request to limit public comments to a few
minutes per speaker prevented other citizens from
presenting evidence and rebutting arguments, it
afforded Cowan an opportunity to be lieard at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. The
record reveals that Cowan's attorney spoke at length
and presented evidence during the hearing on the
preliminary plat and during the appeals hearings
before the Board. Cowan also spoke. A s such his
due process rights were no: violated during the
hearing on tlie preliminary plat or during the
appeals hearings. However, although we hold that
Cowan's due process rights were not violated,
limiting public comment ro rwo minutes is not
consistent with affording an individual a meaningful
opportunity to be heard.

Cowan also argues P & Z violated his due process
rights by ( I ) refusing to take public comments when
considering the final plat and (2) by "unreasonably"
limiting public comment to a "few minutes" for
each speaker at hearings to considcr the preliminary
plat. The Board points out that Cowan had
numerous opportunities to provide comment.
Moreover, i t argues, the F C D C does not require
taking public comment when considering final plats
and also allows for limiting public comments so that
P & Z w i l l be able to finish their agenda. In
addition, tlie Board argues, even if the limits on
public comments were "unreasonable," Cowan's
comments were not restricted.

Moreover, neither the L L U P A nor the ldaho
subdivision statutes specifies requirements for
notice and hearing on subdivision application
approval. See I.C.
67-6513; $9 50-1301 to
50-1334. The FCDC provides for notice and
hearing when P & Z considers preliminary plats, but
provides that "[njo public notice or hearing is
required for final *I259 plats ...." FCDC Ch.
ill(l)(lO)(b). However, this is not a constitutional
violation because due process requires only an
opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time and
in a meaningful manner." Cusru~ieda,130 ldaho at
927, 950 P.2d at 1266 (quoting Sweirrer v. Dean,
118 ldaho 568, 573, 798 P.2d 27, 32 (1990)).
Here, Cowan was given the opportunity to be heard
at :hc most mcaninghl time-at :he public hearing on
the preliminary plat-and therefore his due process
rights were not violated. See id. Therefore, we
liold that P & 2's actions did not violate Cowan's
due process rights.

-

-

[28] Procedural due process requires:
solne process to ensure that the individual is not
arbitrarily deprived o f his rights in violation o f the
state or federal constitutions. This requirement is
met when the defendant is provided with notice and
an opportunity to be heard. The opportunity to be
heard must occur at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner in order to satisfy the due
process requirement.
Aberdeen-Springpld Canal Co.. 133 ldalio at 9 I,
982 P.2d at 926 (internal quotations and citations
omitted); see o l ~ oCos/u~.rrduv. Brighion Corp.,
130 ldaho 923,926,950 P.2d 1262, 1267 (1998).
[29] tlere. P & 2's actions did not violate Cowan's

4. Noricefior cerruin Board Meerings
Cowan asserts that the notices given for the July 30,
2001. August 23, 2001 and September I I. 2001
Hoard iiieetings were defective. The FCDC
requires tliat notices for subdivision permit hearings
provide the name and address o f the developer, the
address and a legal description o f the development
site, tlie present and proposed land use o f the
Claim to O r i g U.S. Govt. Works
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because the "current language is so vague that
effectively no notice is given regarding the wetlands
requirements." Statutes that are found to be vague.
indefinite or uncertain are in violation o f the
constitutional provisions found in the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution or
Article I, section 13 o f the Idaho Constitutio~~.
Olsen v. J.A. Freetncrw Co., 117 ldaho 706, 71 5,
791 P.2d 1285, 1294 (1990).
I t is a general principle o f statutory law that a
statute miist be definite to be valid. It has been
recognized that a statute is so vague as to violate the
due process clause o f the United States Constitution
... where its language is such that men o f common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.

development site, the proposed number o f lots and
the average size o f lots. FCDC Ch. III(K), I t also
requires notice that the application material is
available for public review and that public comment
is encouraged. Id
[30] 1-lere, the Board concedes that both notices
were defective. Nonetheless. Cowan has failed to
demonstrate that. his subsiantial rights were
prejudiced by either defective notice. First,
Cowan's counsel anended the July 30, 2001 hearing
and submined a brief objecting to the notice.
Moreover, Cowan spoke against the application at
that hearing. Therefore, even if the notice were
defective, Cowan has failed to demonstrate how this
defect prejudiced Iris substantial rights since he
clearly had notice o f the meeting.

I d (quoting 16A Am.Jur.2d. Consriri~~ionol
Lnw
8 18, p. 988).

Second, once the Board recognized that its notice
for the August 23, 2001 meeting was defective it
canceled the meeting and then scheduled a properly
noticed meeting for September l I, 2001. Cowan
argues that because the notice for the August
meeting was defective, the notice for the September
meeting is also defective because i t creates "general
c o n f u s i o ~ ' and
~
"leaves the public bewildered.''
Judge Moss aptly analyzed this claim:
This theory is not even remotely persuasive. Even
i f the public was left bewildered (which has not
been shown). a bewildered public-though an
unfortunate situation-is not the standard by which
courts determine whether notices are adequate.
Idaho law and [the FCDC] prescribe the
requiiements for notices o f public meetings and
hearings and the notice for the September l l
hearing complied with these requirements.

S

[32] Although most decisions invoking the "void
for vagueness" doctrine deal with criminal statutes
and ordinances, the doctrine applies equally well to
civil ordinances. I d at 716, 791 P.2d at 1295. "
However, greater tolerance is permined when
addressing a civil or non-criminal statute as
opposed to a criminal statute under the void for
*I260 vagueness doctrine." Id (citing Ci7aimer.s v.
Ciry ofLos A17geles. 762 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1985)).
[33] The wetlands protection requirement o f the
FCDC is not unconstitutionally vague. The F C D C
provides: " A l l developments shall demonstrate
compliance with state and federal wetlands
protection requirements." FCDC Cli. \iliI(D)(i).
A person o f ordinary intelligence would not have to
guess at its meaning. This section o f the F C D C
clearly
delineates
the
subject
of
its
protection-wetlands-and identifies that a developer
must comply with all state and federal protection
requirements. The fact that a developer would then
need to determine which o f these numerous
protections might be applicable does not make the
ordinance constitutionally infirm. Since many o f
the federal wetlands protection requirements depend
upon what type o f development or construction is
taking place near a wetland, the county could not
anticipate specifically which reql~irements apply
until a development application is submitted.
Additionally. the core meaning o f the ordinance is

Therefore, Cowan has failed to demonstrate that the
Board erred by holding the defectively noticed July
30, 2001 meeting, cancelling the August 23, 2001
meeting or holding the properly noticed September
meeting.

5. Wrli~ztidsordinance
[ j l ] Cowan argues that the FCDC's wetlands
protection requirement is void for vagueness
8
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clear on its face. See Olset~. 1 17 ldaho at 71 5, 791
P.2d at 1294 (citing Corron Siaies Mvr. Ins. C o v.
Anderson, 749 F.2d 663 (11th Cir.1984)). FNS
Therefore,
tlie
FCDC's wetlands
protection
requirement is not void for vagueness and does not
violate the United States or ldaho constitutions.

FN8. Additionally, as discussed i ~ f i a , the
F C D C places the burden o f proof o n the
developer. As such, the deveioper has the
burden o f demonstrating compliance with
all applicable state and federal wetlands
protection requirements.
6. Appearance of/airness docrrine
Finally, based on a line o f cases from Washington,
Cowan argues that because this was a zoning
decision, the decisionmakers and hearings o n the
matter needed to not only be fair and impartial, but
also appear fair and impartial. He contends that
comments made by a Commissioner and a
consultant, as well as the Board's actions, which
allegedly violated his due process, all indicate an
indifference to the appearance o f hirness. H e
urges this Court to adopt this doctrine and reverse
the Board's decision because o f its indifference to
the appearance o f fairness and impanialily.
In the early 1970's tlie Supreme Court o f
Washington issued its decision in Cl~robuck iJ.
Sno1701nish Covnry, 78 Wash.2d 858, 480 P.2d 489
(1971). There, Atlantic Richheld Company sought
to re-zone land embracing beach frontage on Puget
Sound.
After
the
county
changed
the
comprehensive plan and granted the company's
petition, Chrobuck sought judicial review o f the
Commissioner's action. The Court determined that
Chrobuck's due process rights had been violated,
despite a lack o f evidence o f any dishonest or
self-serving conduct by the Commissioners, by "an
unfortunate combination o f circumstances ... and
the cumulativi. impact thereof [which] inescapably
cast an aura o f improper influence, partiality and
prejudgment over the proceedings." I d at 870, 480
?.2d at 496. Eased on an earlier case, the
Washington Supreme Court found that under that
state's law a hearing must be fair in both appearance

and substance. Id
[34] This Court has never adopted the appearance
o f fairness doctrine o f our westeriy neighbor.
Rather, we recognize that due process "entitles a
person to an iinpanial and disinterested tribunal[,]"
but we require a showing o f actual bias before
disqualifying a decision inaker even when a litigant
maintains a decision maker has deprived the
proceedings o f the appearance o f fairness. Davisco
Foorls itti': /tic., 14 i ldaho at 79 1, 1 18 P.3d at 123.
Additionally, the Washington Supreme Court has
stepped back froln this doctrine. See W.T.
Watterson, Whar Ever Happened 10 [he Appearance
of Fairness Docirine:' Local Land Use Decisions
in an Age oJSrarztro~yProcess, 21 Seattle U.L.Rev.
653 9 9 8 ) We therefore decline to adopt this
doctrine and refrain from reaching the substance o f
Cowan's argument that certain statements and
actions violated the appearance o f fairness doctrine.

D. Arbitrary a n d Capricious Actions
Cowan next argues the approval o f Eagle's Nest
should be reversed because the Board acted
arbitrarily and capriciously i n interpretingx1261
the burden o f proof requirement o f the FCDC, by
failing to enter into a development agreement w i t h
Bawden prior to approving the final plat, and by
failing to correctly apply section 402 o f the Clean
Water Act, He also asserts that the Board abused
its discretion by not rcquiring Bawden to show a
inaster plan for all of liis propei?ies.
The Board's actions may be reversed if this Court
finds the Board acted arbitrarily, capriciously o r
abused its discretion. Eacrer, 139 ldaho at 784, 86
P.3d at 498. However, planning and zoning
decisions are entitled to a strong presumption o f
validity, including the board's application and
i~iterpretat~ono f their o w n zoning ordinances.
Sanders Orchard. 137 ldaho at 698.52 P.3d at 843

I.Burden ojproof

Cowan asserts that Bawden failed to meet the
burden o f proof required by the FCDC. The
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FCDC,
Cowan
continues,
implements
the
Comprehensive Plan and also requires Bawden, the
developer, to "affirmatively prove" that Eagle's
Nest has complied with all o f the provisions o f both
the F C D C and the Comprehensive Plan.
Chapter I o f tlie FCDC provides that "[tlhe burden
o f proof shall, in all proceedings pursLlant to this
ordinance, rest with the developer." FCDC Ch.
l ( i ) . Noticeably, this section does not define the
,..-A
e
n o f proof. i n interpreting this c o n the
Boilrd concluded that tliis section does not require a
developer to "personally and independently prove
compliance with each code requirement at each
stage o f the permit procedure." instead, the
developer "is
entitled to rely upon the
administrator's report, and tlie checklist submitted
by the administrator in meeting hislher burden of
proot"
Here, the problem lies with the imprecise term ''
burden o f proof." "Burden o f proof, encompasses
both the burden o f production and ilie burden o f
persuasion. lniermounlain Health Care, /nc. v. Bd.
of County Com~n'rs of Blaine Counry, 107 ldaho
248, 25!, 688 P.2d 260, 263 (Ct.App.1984)
(quoting E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence 357
(3d ed.1984)); see also Sinirh v. Angrll. 122 ldaho
25, 31, 830 P.2d 1163, 1169 (1992) (Bistline, J.,
concurring) (citing Cole-Collister Fire Pro1 Dist v ,
City ojBoise. 93 ldaho 558, 569, 468 P.2d 290, 301
(1970); Harman v. Northrvestern Mur. Lfe Ins. Co.,
91 ldaho 719, 721, 429 P.2d 849, SSI (1967); G.
Beii, iiandbook o f Evide~icefor tlie ldaliu iawyei.
215 (2d ed.1972); McCormick on Evidence $ 336
(2d ed.1982); Thayer, The Burden o f Proof, 4
Harv. [..Rev. 45 (1890)); Black's Law Dictionary
209 (8th ed.2004). The Board's interpretation
keeps the burden o f persuasion on Bawden, but
allows the burden o f production to be satisfied by
relying on evidence not introduced by Bawden.
Tlie issue becomes, tlien, wlietlier tlie Board's
interpretation allowing Bawden to rely on evidence
already before the Board is arbitrary or capricious.

j j 5 j W e cannor find that the Board's inlerpreraiion
is arbitrary or capricious. First, the FCDC creates
a
structure
which
anticipates
using
the
administrator's report as evidence. The FCDC

grants the administrator the dury and power to issue
certificates o f compliance and the ability to arrange
for professional review o f Class I1 permit
applicationsfN9 As such, the developer presents
evidence to the administrator or professional
reviewer who, in turn, analyzes the evidence and
compiles a report. The cost o f this review is
covered by the application fee. FCDC Ch.
111(1)(4). Once the administrator receives the
professional review report, he or she must provide a
copy LO tlie developer and make a copy available for
public review. I d F N i 0Second, the Board never
removed the burden o f persuasioii from Bawden.
At all times Bawden was required to persuade the
fact finder (P & Z or the Board) that Eagle's Nest
complied with the F C D C and the Comprehensive
Plan. Therefore, there is nothing arbitrary or
capricious about the Board allowing"l262 Bawden
to rely on this evidence (which he originally
provided) while continuing to have h i m carry the
burden o f versuasion.

FN9. The FCDC creates a Zoning
Administrator and allows him or her to "
arrange
for
professional
review
of
applications for Class II permits" and to "
issue certificates o f compliance, based on
site inspections ..." FCDC Ch. ll(D)(4)-(5).
F N 10. This procedural safeguard o f having
the administrator's report made available
for public review avoids the problems seen
in Fischer v City of Kerchi~m. 141 ldaho
349, 109 P.3d I091 (2005).
2. Mnsrer Plan
Cowan contends Bawden failed to show a master
plan for his entire property because the plat does
not show his plan ibr developing the five-acre
parcel northwest o f Eagle's Nest or the s i x y - t w o
acres east o f Eagle's Nest. The failure to comply
with this "absolute requirement" to show overall
planning, Cowan argues, is a basis to disapprove
Bawden's application.
[36] tiere, the Board did not err. First, while the
FCDC requires master planning, it does not require
Claim to 0ri.e. U.S. Govt. Works.
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between the County and the developer and gives the
developer vested rights in the plat. FCDC Ch. X l l l
(E)(2)(li). Therefore, an approved plat must be in
place before the County grants the developer vested
rights i n such a plat. Moreover, when examining a
similar county ordinance providing that a wrinen
agreement may be required, tliis Coun determined
that tlie decision to enter into a developmeiit
agreement is discretionary. Price v. Payerie C o ~ i n l l i
Bd of C o w ~ r yColntn'rs, 13 1 Idaho 426, 43 1 , 958
7.2:
583, 588 (1998). Aliliough entering a
development agreement is mandatory under the
FCDC, it follows from Price that tlie decision as to
when to enter the agreement is discretionary. Thus.
we hold P & Z did not err by conditioning its
approval on the acceptance o f a development
agreement.

denial o f an application for failure to meet tliis
requirement. Rather, i t provides: "Any application
for a Class II permit for a subdivision (nay be
disapproved solely on the basis that it fails to show
an overall plan for the development o f the entire
contiguous holdings o f the developer andlor owner."
FCDC Ch. XI1 (D) (emphasis added). Therefore,
the F C D C does not require tlie Board to deny
Bawden's application. Second, tlie decision not to
deny the application based on this section of the
F C D C is co~~sistentwith the Boarii's factual
findings. A s discussed infia, the Board found that
the entire 147 acres were not one development site,
but rather two contiguous, separately-owned
parcels. Therefore, following this logic, because
Bawden provided a plan for the larger parcel,
Bawden provided an overall plan for the entire
development; the possibility o f denial based on
F C D C Ch. XI1 (D) never arose.

[38] After the first appeal, the district judge
~reinaiidedtlie case to tlie Board to decide only one
narrow issue: whether' the proposed development
complied with the FCDC's wetlands protection
r e q ~ i r e m e n t . ' ~ " The Board then held a hearing,
took both *I263 oral and written comments, and
issued its findings and concliisions relating to this
issue. Cowan first contends Bawden failed Lo
adequately address section 402 o f the Clean Water
Act during the hearing on remand and failed to
demonstrate tliat Bawden's application complied
with that section's requirements as required by the
FCDC. He then argues that the Board misapplied
section 402. Therefore, Cowan continues. tlie
Board erred in approving Bawden's application.

Cowan argues that since Bawden proposed to
develop Eagle's Nest in phases, the F C D C requires
Bawden .lo enter into a development agreement
before any Final Plat o f any proposed phase can be
reviewed or approved. In response, the Board
contends that P & Z acted properly by
recommending approval subject to the execution o f
a development agreement because only the Board
has the authority to enter into a development
agreement.
[37] Cowan's argument lacks suppon in both the
F C D C and the idalio Code. 'The FCDC allows
developers to offer pliases in developments
pursuant to a development agreement which
contains certain specific provisions. FCDC Ch.
X I I l (E). However, I.C.
67-6512(a) provides: "
A special use permit may be granted to an applicant
if the proposed use is conditio~iallyperniitted by tlie
terms o f the ordinance ..." In turn, the FCDC
provides that "[c]onditions may be imposed on the
approval o f any permit or variance ...." FCDC Ch.
lil(J). I t is iogicai, [hen, to condition approval o f a
plat on the acceptance o f a development agreement.

F N I I . The FCDC requires that all
developments
demonstrate
compliance
with state and federal wetlands protection
requirements. FCDC Cli. VIII(D). There
are
approximately
three
acres
of
established wetlands on the norihsrnmost
portion o f the proposed development in
Bawden's second application.
Cowan's first argument fails. Bawdeii presented
evidence at the hearing reiating to section 402 and

Additionally, a development agreement is a contracr
t
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provided analysis as to his compliance with section
402 i n his subsequent briefs. Moreover, it would
be illogical to find that Bawden could not respond
to an argomelit raised at the hearing by Cowan.
Such a conclusion would require every developer to
anticipate every possible argument raised and
address those arguments prior to knowing exactly
what they are. A search o f case law finds no
support for Cowan's implicit contention that a
developer must address an issue at a hearing rather
than thioiigh biie:<ng. Likewise, there is simply no
reason that the Board cannot accept Bawden's
arguments that tlie requirements o f section 402 do
not apply-to act as fact finder is tlie function o f the
Board. As such, we find no error and decline to
reverse the Board's decision on this ground.
[39] Next, Cowan's argument that the Board
misapplied section 402 also fails. Cowan
strenuously asserts that Eagle's Nest is subject to the
requirements o f section 402
because the
development w i l l disturb more than one acre o f land
near wetlands. However, in addition to this
requirement, Section 402 also has more particular
requirements. Section 402 o f the Clean Water Act,
33 U.S.C.
1342, requires permits for any
discharge of pollutants from a point source.
iVarz1ra1 Res. Def Cuuncil, inc, v. Unired Srares
E17vrl. Proi. Agency. 966 F.2d 1292, 1295 (9th
Cir.1992). "A 'point source' is 'any discernible,
confined and discrete conveyance, including but not
limited to any pipe, ditch, channel ... from which
pollutants are or may be discharged.' " Id.
(quoting 33 U.S.C.
i362(14)). I t follow^,
therefore, that if a development w i l l not discharge
pollutants from a point source, it is not subject to
the requirements o f Section 402. Thus, since the
Board found that there would be no discharge into
the wetlands near Eagle's Nest, and such a
conclusion is supported by the record, see infra, the
Board reasonably applied section 402. Once again,
we find no error and decline to reverse the Board's
decision on this ground.

E. Substantial and Compcienl Evidence
Cowan asserts that the Board erred because certain
o r ics decisions lack support in the record. Cowan

argues that Bawden failed to address certain federal
wetlands requirements at the hearing before the
Board, so it erred by determining that the
development complied with the FCDC. Cowan
also contends that the Board's decision that Bawden
had not illegally split his lot is unsupported by the
record. Finally, Cowan argues that the Board erred
when it determined that the development complied
with the FCDC's requirements regarding public
access to public lands, protection o f slopes.
piotection o f .wildlife habitat, and visually sensiti.ve
areas.
[40][41][42] The Board's factual determinations are
binding on this Court, "even where there is
conflicting evidence before the [Board], so long as
the determi~iations are supported by substantial
competent evidence ...." Fischer v. Ciiy of Kerchum.
141 ldaho 349, 351, 109 P.3d 1091, 1094 (2005)
(quoting Evans, 137 ldaho at 430, 50 P.3d at 445).
Substantial and competent evidence is less than a
preponderance o f evidence, but more than a mere
scintilla. Evatzs v. Hara's, lnc., 123 Idaho 473, 478,
849 P.2d 934, 939 (1993). Substantial and
competent evidence need not be uncontradicted, nor
does it need to necessarily lead to a certain
conclusion; i t need only be o f such sufficient
quantity and probative value that reasonable minds
could reach the same conclusion as the fact finder.
See Mann e. Saferva)~S~ores,inc., 95 ldaho 732,
736,518 P.2d 1194, 1198(1974).

[43] Cowan continues his arguments surrounding
the FCDC wetlands protection requirements by
asserting that Bawden failed * I 2 6 4 to prove that
Eagle's Nest complied with this portion o f the
FCDC. However, tlie Board's decision that Section
402 does not apply and that Bawden has complied
with the FCDC is supported by substa~itial and
competent evidence. T w o separate, qualified
witnesses testified that Eagle's Nest did not need
any permits under Section 402; another witness
presented evidence that Eagle's Nest complied with
the FCDC's \vetlands protection req~irements.~"'
Therefore, the Board's decision is supported by
substantial and competent evidence.
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F N 12. As the district court noted:
The Board received testimony from Ray
Kagel o f Lone Goose Environmental,
LLC. M r . Icagel, after reciting why he
was qualified to speak on the matter,
testified that he delineated the wetland
boundary and that the Army Corp o f
Engineers approved said delineation. M r .
Kagel further testified that tliere was no
need for any federal or state permits
because thcrc is no: a discharge in:o a
wetland or stream. M r . Richard Byrem, a
surveyor who has worked on the proposed
develop~nent, testified, "... there's no need
for permits to be issued." Also, the
planning and zoning administrator, Karen
Lords, reported to the Board via written
and oral presentation as to how the
development complied with the [FCDC].

Cowan maintains that the entire 148 acres owned by
Bawden is one lot because Bawden intends to
develop it all. Cowan argues the Board should not
have approved the final plat on Bawden's second
application because Bawden twice split his "lot"
illegally. First, Cowan argues, Bawden split o f f the
five-acre parcel now owned by his son and then "
split" the smaller parcel, which Bawden intends to
personally occupy, from the development.FNi'

F N l 3 . There is some indication in the
record that Bawden purchased the two lots
separately and that the lots are actually
owned by two different entities. However.
the Board does not argue that Bawden
does not personally own both lots so he
cannot, therefore, have "split"
them
illegally. Thus, this section w i l l deal only
with the arguments raised and argued by
the parties.
After holding a hearing on the final plat for
Bawden's second application, the Board determined
that Bawden had not split Ihis lots. The Board
found no evidence that the entire 148-acre parcel
was one development site and no evidence that

Bawden had split the smaller parcel he retains from
the larger parcel that is the site o f Eagle's Nest.
The Board then determined neither the law nor the
evidence supported that separately-purchased but
contiguous parcels are a single lot for purposes of
the FCDC.
Here, the Board determined that Bawdell had not
illegally split his lot. The F C D C provides: "Lot is
used both as a generic term for a development site,
and to refer to any parcel o f land created and
described by a record survey or plat." FCDC Ch.
X I V ( K K ) . A l l o f the evidence in the record
indicates that Bawden separately purchased two
parcels o f land either personally or through his
family or business entity and now proposes to
develop only one o f those parcels. Cowan, has
never contradicted this evidence, offering only
argument that these two parcels should be
considered one lot or one development site.
Additionally, the lot now owned by Eric Bawden
was split o f f pursuani to a Class I permit, and this
was not an illegal lot split. Therefore, the Board's
determination is supported by substantial and
competent evidence.

3 . Performance srandards
When determining whether to approve or deny a
Class I1 permit application, the F C D C sets out
performance standards for P & Z and the Board to
consider. F C D C Ch. V. The F C D C requires full
compliance with certain standards, "absolute
performance standards," and mandates rejection o f
an application if one o f these standards is not met.
FCDC Ch. V(B). The FCDC also creates "relative
performance standards." FCDC Ch. V(D). For
each o f these standards the proposed project earns
or loses points based on the extent to which the
proposed project complies with the standard.
FCDC Ch. V(D)(2). Once the standard is scored,
that score is then multiplied by that standard's "
importance factor" to achieve a final score. FCDC
Ch. V(J)(3). If the sum o f all the scores for relative
performance standards is zero or greater, assuming
the project otherwise complies, the application will
be approved. FCDC Ch. V(J)(4). If the sum is
less than zero, the application w i l l be denied.
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*I265 First, Cowan argues that the Board erred in
determining that Bawden's application met the
absolute performance standard for public access.
Second, Cowan argues the Board erred in assigning
Eagle's Nest a positive score for certain relative
performance standards. We w i l l address each of
these standards in turii.

The FCDC encourages developers to provide open
space on slopes between fifteen and thirty percent.
The Administrator awarded Eagle's Nest a score o f
+ I 2 because the use o f building envelopes, areas
where land owners cannot build, would protect
slopes. Cowan argues the Board should have
accepted his expert's score o f zero, but this request
is nothing more than asking this Court to review a
factual finding.

a. Absolule performance slandard-public access

Cowan argues the Board erred in approving the
Development because tlie FCDC requires that
historic public access to public lands not be
eliminated, and the plat iailed to show all
currently-used, existing roads across "the property."
Therefore, he continues, Bawden failed to comply
with this absolute standard.
The F C D C provides: "No development shall
eliminate existing public access through private
lands to trailheads on public lands." FCDC Ch.
V I I I ( M M ) ( I ) , I n turn, it uses development "as a
generic term covering any and all activities for
which a permit is required'' by the FCDC. FCDC
Ch. X I V (V).
Once again, the Board's decision that the road at
issue did not cross the development site is
supponed by substantial and competent evidence,
and therefore it did not err. As discussed
previously, Eagle's Nest is a development on one
parcel o f land. While Bawden owns the
r~eighborirlp parcel i o the easi, these t w o parct.ls
remain separate, as the Board concluded based on
the evidence before it. While there is some
indication that tlie road crosses tlie parcel o f land
Bawden retains for his personal use, there is simply
no evidence that it crosses the Eagle's Nest
development and w i l l be eliminated by the
development. As such, this development has not
violated tlie FCDC's prohibition on eliminating
existing public access.

h. ReYarive perj>rmoi?ce standards
i. Slopes

[44] Aticr thc hcaiing on the !;rial plat, and
considering both the Administrator's score and the
testimony o f Cowan's expert, tlie Board found that
the final plat included slope information and
determined that the project proposed building
envelopes which prevented the development from
disturbing slopes. Since n o slopes would be
disturbed, the Board concluded, the score given by
the Administrator was appropriate.
Here, the Board heard and considered conflicting
evidence, It chose to rely on the evidence
presented by the Administrator, and such evidence
is both substantial and competent. That i t chose to
rely on evidence other than the testimony o f
Cowan's expert is not error.

ii. Wildlife habitat
Cowan argues that the score o f zero for wildlife
habitat was error, His expert testified that Eagle's
Nest is in critical wildlife habitat. Cowan concedes
that the development is not included at all on thc
natural resource inventory map, but argues that this
is because at the time the rnap was prepared the
land was part o f a National Forest and only private
land was mapped. This, he contends, should have
led the Board to conclude that the land was critical
wildlife habitat because had tile land been privately
owned when the map was prepared i t would have
been includcd as critical wildlife habitat.
The FCDC defines critical wildlife habitat as "[ajny
area that provides the environmental factors
required fur the survival o f a pariicuiar species o f
wildlife. Critical wildlife habitat includes all
important habitat areas shown on the natural
resource invento~yliiaps prepared for the county, or
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other areas so identified by the ldaho Fish and
Game Department." FCDC Ch. X I V (DDDD)
(emphasis removed).
After holding a hearing on the final plat for the
second application, the Board determined that
Eagle's Nest was not included on * I 2 6 6 the map
when the natural resources inventory maps were
prepared and for that reason the development was
not scored.
It then determined
that
the
developmeni *as not in a critical wildlife area.
Once again, the Board's decision is supported by
substantial and competent evidence. Neither the
existing maps nor letters from the Fish and Game
Department place the development in critical
wildlife habitat. While Cowan's expert opined
differently, it was not error for the Board to rely on
the existing maps and letters from the Fish and
Game Department when making its determination
that the development was not i n critical wildlife
habitat. FN'4

FN14. Indeed, ldaho law is "well
established that an applicant's rights are
determined by the ordinance in existence
at the time o f tiling an application for the
permit." Pqvelle River Prop. O~i'ners
Ass'n v B d of Cornm'rs o/ Yc~/!ry Cozmp,
I32 ldaho 551, 555, 976 P.2d 477, 481
( I 999);
see
aiso
Canul/iVorcres1/Col1111~6~1s
/ I c ~ i u n Cotnm.
v. Ci+ of Boise, 136 ldaho 666, 669, 39
?.id 606.609 (2001).

iii. Visually sensitive areas
Finally, Cowan argues that the proposed
development w i l l diminish the visual appeal o f the
Shotgun Valley. Rather than the zero awarded by
the Administrator on this standard, Cowan contends
Eagle's Nest should have received a negative score
because Bawden did not propose clustered
develooment as the FCDC encouraees
" and because
the de;elopment violates the policy contained in the
Comprehensive Plan to direct development away
from visually sensitive areas. The FCDC defines
visually sensitive areas as those areas containing

certain designations and "broadly delineated . . by
the U.S. Forest Service." This delineation is based
"on the view from major public roads and bodies o f
water." FCDC Ch. X I V ( A A A A ) . The Board
determined that because the development was not
included on the forest service maps showing
visually sensitive areas, the standard was not
relevant and accepted the Administrator's score.
As before. Cowan is simply displeased with the
Bozird's decision and asks this Coiirt to review a
factual finding However, the Board's decision is
supported by substantial and competent evidence.
'There was conflicting evidence presented as to
whether the area would be visually sensitive i f the
maps were redrawn. Moreover, i t was not error for
the Board to rely on the maps as they existed at the
time Bawden filed his application.
The Board did not err in approving Bawden's
application based on the scores given for relative
performance standards. Each of its decisions is
supported by substantial and competent evidence.
Therefore, this Court is bound by the Board's
factual findings and we affirm the Board's decisions
relating to relative performance standards. Since
we affirm each individual score, we need not reach
Cowan's argument relating to the overall relative
score.

I;. Attorney's Fees o n Appeal

i45jj46J Both parties seek attorney's fees under I.C.
$ 12-1 17, which provides for the award o f attorney's
fees to the prevailing party if the other party acted
without a reasonable basis in fact or law. Since
Cowan has not prevailed on appeal, he is not
entitled to attorney's fees. However, Cowan did
not act entirely without a reasonable basis in fact or
law, so we do not award the Board attorney's fees
pursuant to I.C. $ 12-1 17.
The Board also seeks attorney's fees pursuant to I.C.
12.121 An award under this statute is
appropriate i f the Court is lefl with the abiding
belief that the appeal was brought or defended
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.
iVul'l Union Fire ins. Co, of Pilrsburgh. P A . v.
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Dixon, 141 Idaho 537. 542, 112 P.3d 825, 830
(2005). This appeal was not brought frivolously,
unreasonably or without foundation; therefore we
refrain from awarding the Board attorney's fees
under I.C. $ 12-121.
IV. CONCLUSION

We affirm the Board's approval of the application
for a Class 11 permit. Cowari !has eithcr fzilcd :O
show that the Board erred or failed to demonstrate
that the Board's errors violated his substantial
rights. Neither party*1267 is awarded atzorney's
fees on appeal. Costs to Kespondent.
Chief Justice SCHKOEDER and Justices TROUT,
EISMANN and JONES concur.
ldaho,2006.
Cowan v Board of Com'rs of Fremont County
143 ldaho 501. 148 P.3d I247
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In the alternative. in the event that the Court determines that the Amended
Petition for Review adding a Fourth Cause of Action for Declaratory Judgment
should not have been filed, plaintiffs/petitioners move pursuant to Rule 15 (a)
1.R.Civ.P. for leave of the Court to file the identical Amended Petition for Review.
The motion is supported by the Points and Authorities filed herewith.

Scott W. ~ e e d L
Attorney for PetitionersRlaintiffs
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)
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)
)
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)
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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES OF
PLAINTIFFS/PETITIONERS IN SUPPORT
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1
)
)

1
KOOTENAI COUNTY,
a political
subdivision of the STATE OF IDAHO
acting through the KOOTENAI COUNTY
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS; S.J.
"GUS" JOHNSON, CRADRMAN, ELMER
R., "RICK" CURRIE and KATIE
BRODIE, COMMISSIONERS, in their
official capacities; and KATIE BRODIE,
personally and individually,
DefendantdRespondents,
and

POWDERHORN COMMUNITIES, LLC,
and HEARTLAND, LLC, and COEUR
D'ALENE LAND COMPANY and H. F.
MAGNUSON,

)
)

1
1
)

1
)
)

1
)
)
)
)

)

1
)

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES OF PLAINTIFFS/
PETITIONERS IN SWPORT OF MOTION TO AMEND

PlaintiffsIPetitioners present the following points and authorities in support
of their Motion to Amend by adding a Fourth Cause of Action in Declaratory
Judgment.

The dual purposes of Rule 15 (a) are to allow claims to be determined
on the merits rather than technicalities and to make pleadings serve the
limited role of providing notice of the nature of the claim and the facts
that are at issue. Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866,
871, 993 P.2d 1197, 1202 (1999) (citation omitted.) A court may
consider whether the allegations sought to be added to the complaint
state a valid claim in determining whether to grant leave to amend the
complaint. Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Onc. v. Idaho First National
Bank, N.A., 119 Idaho 171, 175, 804 P.2d 900, 904 (1991). A court,
however, may not consider the sufficiency of evidence supporting the
claim sought to be added in determining leave to amend because that is
more properly determined a t the summary judgment stage, Christensen
Family Trust, 133 Idaho at 872, 993 P.2d a t 1203.

Thomas v. Medical Center Physicians, P. A., 138 Idaho 200, 210, 61 P.3d
557 (2062).

I.R.C.P. 15 (a) provides that amendment to pleading may be made only
by leave of the court or by agreement of the parties, but that "leave
shall be freely given when justice so requires." This Court has held that
"courts should favor liberal grants of leave to amend." Wickstrom v.
North Idaho College, 111Idaho 450,453,725 P.2d 155,158 (1986). This
Court explained Rule 15 (a) as follows:

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES OF PLAINTIFFS1
PETITIONERS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO AMEND

"Rule 15 (a) declares that leave to amend 'shall be freely given where
justice so requires; this mandate is to be heeded. [Citation omitted.] If
the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be
proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test
his claim on the merits. I n the absence of any apparent or declared
reason-- such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part
of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments
previously allowed, undue prejudices to the opposing party by virtue of
the allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc. - the leave
sought should, as the rules require, "be freely given." Of course, the
grant or denial of an opportunity to amend is within the discretion of
the District Court, but outright refusal to grant the leave without any
justifying reason appearing for the denial is not an exercise of
discretion; it is merely abuse of that discretion and inconsistent with the
spirit of the Federal Rules.

Clark v. Olsen, 110 Idaho 323, 326, 715 P.2d 993, 996 (1986), quoting
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct 227, 230, 9 L.Ed.2d 222
(1962).
Idaho Schools for Equal Education Opportltnity v. Idaho State Board of
Edzication, 128 Idaho 276, 284, 912 P.2d 644, 652 (1996).

We also recognize that this Court has determined that a trial court
properly refuses permission to amend a complaint when the record
contains no allegations that, if proven, would entitle the party to the
relief claimed. Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat'l
Bank, 119 Idaho 171, 804 P.2d 900 (1991). Nonetheless, as this Court
indicated in Wickstrom v. North Idaho College, 111 Idaho 450,725 P.2d
155 (1986), in the interest of justice, district courts should favor liberal
grants of leave to amend a complaint.

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES OF PLAINTIFFS/
PETITIONERS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO AMEND

Hines v. Hines, 129 Idaho 847, 853, 934 P.2d 20,
Dated this 6th day of April, 2007.

-(1997).
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In the alternative, in the event that the Court determines that the Amended
Petition for Review adding a Fourth Cause of Action for Declaratory Judgment
should not have been filed, plaintiffsfpetitioners move pursuant to Rule 15 (a)
1.R.Civ.P. for leave of the Court to file the identical Amended Petition for Review.
The motion is supported by the Points and Authorities filed herewith.
Dated this 6th day of April, 2007.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
NEIGHBORS FOR RESPONSIBLE
GROWTH, a non-profit unicorporated
association; PRESERVE OUR RURAL
COMMUNITIES, a non-profit unicorporated
association; KOOTENAI ENVIRONMENTAI
ALLIANCE, INC., a non-profit corporation;
NORBERT and BEVERLY TWILLMANN;
GREG and JANET TORLINE; SUSAN
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NO. CV-06-8574
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO STRIKE

Plaintiffs,
KOOTENAI COUNTY. a nolitical subdivision /
of the STATE OF 1 ~ ~ ~ 0 ' a cthrough
t i n ~the
KOOTENAI COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS; S.J. "GUS" JOHNSON,
CHAIRMAN: ELMER R. "RICK" CURRIE
and KATIE BRODIE. COMMISSIONERS. in /
their official capacities; and KATIE BRODIE,
personally and individually,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE: 1

K:\F\FOXXO24912\000DS\PLDO\POWDERHORN
MEMO TO STRIKE(MGS).DOC4127107

COMES NOW Applicants Powderhom Communities, LLC and Heartland LLC,
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 84. Intervenors submit the following memorandum supporting their
motion to this Court to strike the following:
1.

Appendix A, B, and C attached to Petitioners' Opening Brief as they are outside

the record and Petitioners did not properly moved to supplement the record per Rule 84.
2.

Appendix A to Brief of Petitioners in Opposition to Intervenors' Motion to

Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction as it is outside the record.

3.

Exhibit A and B to Petitioners' Amended Petition for Judicial Review as

Petitioners failed to comply with Rule 84 and did not timely move to supplement the record,
nor did Petitioners show good cause why the materials were not presented in the public
hearings below.

DATED this z?44day of April, 2007
LUKINS & ANNIS, P.S.

BY

MICHAEL G. SCHMIDT, ISB # 691 1
MISCHELLE R. FULGHAM, ISB #4623
Attorneys for Applicant Powderhorn
Communities LLC
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MEMO TO STRIKE(MGS).DOC 4/27/07
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Scott W. Reed
Attornev at Law
First-class Mail
U
Overnight Mail
P. 0. Box A
Facsimile - 208-765-5 117
U
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83816
John A. Cafferty
Kootenai County Legal Services
P. 0. Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816

E4

John F. Magnuson
Attornev At Law
1250 ~ o r t h w o o dCenter Ct., Suite A
P. 0 . Box 2350
Coeur dlAlene, ID 838 16

E4

U
El

U
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Hand-delivered
First-class Mail
Overnight Mail
Facsimile - 208-446- 1621
Hand-delivered
First-class Mail
Overnight Mail
Facsimile - 208-667-0500
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250 Northwest Blvd.. Ste 102
Coeur d'Alene. ID 83814-2971
Televhone: (208) 667-05 17
Facsimile No.: (509) 363-2478
Attornevs for Intervenors Powderhorn Communities LLC and Heartland LLC
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INTERVENORS POWDERHORN COMMUNITIES LLC and HEARTLAND LLC
(hereinafter "Powderhorn") file this opposition memorandum seeking dismissal of the Petition
for Judicial Review filed with this Court on November 15, 2006. and dismissal of the Amended
Petition for Judicial Review filed with this Court on February 5,2007. To the extent the Court
considers the third attempt by these PlaintiffIPetitioners to file an even more untimely appeal,
submitted in the form of an "Alternative Motion for Leave to File Amended Petition" filed with
the Court on April 6,2007, Powderhom also seeks dismissal thereof. To be clear, the entire
case, that is each of the various "Petitions" filed by Petitioners should be denied and dismissed
with prejudice.

GROUNDS FOR DENIAL OF PETITION
Powderhorn seeks dismissal of all of these various Petitions because:

1.

From the inception of this matter, the Court has been without jurisdiction;

2.

Legislative matters, such as this Comprehensive Plan Amendment, are not

subject to Petitions for Judicial Review;
3.

LLUPA has specific time deadlines and Petitioners failed to timely appeal the

final order in this matter issued by Kootenai County on November 16,2006;
4.

The November 15, 2006, Petition was premature in that it did not appeal a final

order and it was rendered moot by the November 16,2006, Amended Petition;
5.

Petitioners' First Cause of Action fails under I.C. 67-5279(3), because "(c ) no

unlawful procedure deprived Petitioners af their due process rights; (d) substantial evidence on
the record as a whole supported the decision; and (e) the Commissioners' decision was not
arbitrary, capricious, or the result of an abuse of discretion." Even if Petitioners established a

,
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violation of subsections (c), (d), or (e) (which they have not), their appeal must be denied
because Petitioners failed to allege or establish that a substantial right of the claimant has been
prejudiced;
6.

Petitioners' Second Cause of Action entitled "Unlawhl Ex Parte

Communication" fails to state a legally cognizable claim;
7.

Petitioners' Third Cause of Action entitled "Wichman Conflict of Interest" fails

to state a legally cognizable claim;

8.

Petitioners' Fourth Cause of Action fails because Declaratory Relief claims

cannot properly be joined with this LLUPA appeal and because Petitioners waived this claim
by failing to raise it before the Commissioners; and,
9.

Petitioners seek to tortuously interfere with the business relations and business

expectancy of Rand Wichman Planning Services LLC.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On December 16,2005, Powderhorn filed a Request for an Amendment to the Kootenai
County Comprehensive Plan for the general geographic area known as the Powderhorn
Peninsula.' R. Vol. 2, p. 310; R. Vol. 2, pp. 299-309; and R. Vol. I, p. 57. In order to amend
the Comprehensive Plan, Powderhorn had to establish "what error was made in the original

I Powderhorn's Comprehensive Plan Amendment as submitted and approved by the Board of County
Commissioners deals with a broad geographic area, including approximately 3,000 acres of land. The land is
owned by fifty some different entities (nearly ail of whom did not participate in the Application) and is comprised
of over a hundred different parcels. No actual or specific legal descriptions exist of the Comp. Plan property
involved, nor is there a listing of all owners anywhere in the Record. These precise details are not necessary for a
Comp. Plan ameiidment which is legislative and of general application.
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Plan OR what substantial change has occurred in the actual conditions in the area that justifies
an amendment." R. Vol. 2, p. 310 (Comprehensive Plan ~ ~ ~ l i c a t i o n ) . ~
The Powderhom Amendment sought three general Comp. Plan revisions, all based upon
substantial changes. First, the Amendment sought to update the County's Comprehensive Plan
Future Land Use Map designation3 from an Agricultural designation to a Rural Residential
designation. R. Vol. 1, p. 57. This revision was warranted because conditions in the area had
changed substantially and the Powderhorn Peninsula had ceased viable agricultural production

R. VoI. 2, pp.388-393; R. Vol. 2, pp. 240-248. Next, the Powderhorn Application sought to
change a Timber category to a Rural Residential category because the land no longer sustained
any viable timber operations. R. Vol. 1, p. 57; R. Vol. 2, pp. 248-255. Lastly, the Powderhom
Application sought to include an overlay designation of Rural Residential in the Federal Lands
category. R. Vol. 1, p. 57. The Comp. Plan Rural Residential overlay category would apply to
the Federal Lands designation in the event ownership of these lands later became private.

On April 19,2006, the Kootenai County Planning Department prepared its Staff Report
evaluating the Powderhorn Application. R. Vol. 1, p. 130. In its report, Kootenai County
admitted and confirmed this Comp. Plan Amendment was a purely legislative matter.
R. Vol. 1, p. 131. County Planner Mark Mussman wrote: "The request involves numerous
pieces of property. Because this is a legislative matter, specific property owner authorization is
not required." R. Vol. 1, p. 1314. If the Application was not a legislative matter, then it would

Kootenai County Resolution No. 95-03 provides for amendment of the Comprehensive Plan "to correct errors in
the original plan or to recognize substantial changes in the actual conditions in the area."
It is critically important to note Comprehensive Plan Future Land Use maps are not zoning maps. The two
concepts are factually and legally distinct. Unlike zoning designations, Comp. Plan designations do not convey
any legal rights, permits, or uses. Cooper v. BoardofCounty Comm'rs, 101 Idaho 407,412 (Idaho 1980). This
Map Amendment did not and could not seek a zoning designation, nor could it obtain any zoning rights.
"ounty
Attorney John Cafferty likewise stated that Comp. Plan amendments were "legislative" matters.
Tr. Vol. 1, p. 114.
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be a quasi-judicial matter and the property owners must be identified and consent to the
Application involving their real property. Kootenai County determined this Application was
legislative. R. Vol. I , p. 131. As a result, no legal descriptions exist, the real property owners
were not notified, and the real property owners were not required to consent to the County's
approval of the Comp. Plan redesignation of their lands.
In the April 19,2006, Staff Report, County Planner Mussman confirmed either a Rural
Residential or a Rural designation would be appropriate for the Powderhorn Application.
R. Vol. 1, p. 21 and R. Vol. 1, p. 137. Mussman wrote:
It does appear that the Applicant has done a reasonable job of arguing that the
conditions in the area have changed sufficiently to merit a different future land
designation. However, it is questionable because of the location and the access
issues, whether a Rural Residential designation is the most appropriate.. .The
subject property is in close proximity to Rural designation on the west side of
Coeur d'Alene Lake. Perhaps a Rural Designation could be appropriate in this
location as well.
R.Vol. 1,p.21 andR.Vol. 1,p. 137.
On April 27,2006, the Kootenai County Planning Commission held a public hearing.
Supp. Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 1-89, The Planning Commission did not deliberate at the close of their
public hearing but waited to rule until after considering another pending Comp. Plan
Amendment. The Planning Commission waited because Comp. Plans "can only be addressed
every six months" and they "had another one before them" to consider. Supp. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 88.
On May 25, 2006, the Planning Commission deliberated on the two legal standards
necessary for a Comp. Plan Amendment, namely I) was there an error in the original Comp.
Plan, or 2) has a substantial change occurred in the actual conditions of the area that justifies an
amendment. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 16, Ins. 1-7. Despite the changes in use, the Planning Commission
recommended denial of the Application because it wanted to wait for the entire Countywide .
Comp. Plan rewrite. Tr. Vol. I, pp. 1- 17.
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On August 14, 2006, Powderhom requested a material and substantive revision to its
Application. R. Vol. 1, pp.20-28. Based upon input from County staff, Planning Commission
members, and the public at large: Powderhorn revised its Comp. Plan Application by seeking a
Rural designation instead of Rural Residential. R. Vol. I , p. 20, Tr. Vol. 1, p. 31, ins. 18-25
and p. 32, Ins. 1-9. Citing and specifically quoting the language of Mark Mussman in his Staff
Report, i.e., "Perhaps a Rural Designation could be appropriate in this area as well,"
Powderhom changed its Application to a Rural designation. This responsive approach by
Powderhom demonstrated a willingness to respond to public concerns by seeking a more
conservative and less intense designation of Rural, instead of Rural Residential. R. Vol. 1,
pp. 20-28; R. Vol. 3, p. 593; and R. Vol. 4, p. 827. Similarly, the public requested an ultimate
density consistent with a Rural Comp. Plan designation in their "Petition Regarding Changes in
the Existing Comprehensive Plan for Kootenai County, Idaho." R. Vol. 1, pp. 226-228. The
revised Comp. Plan Application incorporates this request from the public citizen's "Petition."
R. Vol. I , pp. 226-228. Kootenai County accepted the revised request to Rural.
On the evening of September 14,2006, and into the very early morning hours of
September 15,2006, the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners conducted a public
hearing. Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 19-104. The Commissioners did not deliberate at that time as the
hearing had gone past midnight.
On September 25, 2006, the Commissioners conducted a site visit to the general area of
the Powderhorn Peninsula. Tr. Vol. I , p. 106-201. The Peninsula covers nearly 3,000 acres, so
the Commissioners did not walk around or view the entire site.

' Powderhorn undertook and performed a vast public outreach program, holding 15 Town Hall workshops,
meeting with groups of neighbors, individuals, school district representatives, sheriffs department representatives,

EMS service providers, Kootenai County Assessor's office staff, City of Harrison officials, business groups, Jobs
Plus, the Harrison Gem committee, Coeur d'Alene Chamber of Commerce, and NIBCA. R. Vol. 1, p. 21.
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On September 26, 2006, Petitioners objected to conduct observed during the site visit.
R. Vol. 2, pp. 367 and 374. Petitioners accused Commissioner Brodie of improper contact with
Powderhorn representatives. Mrs. Twillman objected to Commissioner Brodie participating in
hrther deliberations on the case due to Brodie's alleged improper discussions with Powderhorn
representatives during the site visit. Petitioners lodged their complaint against Commissioner
Brodie with County Attorney John Cafferty.
On September 28,2006, the Commissioners were scheduled to hold Deliberations, but
in order to cure any alleged defects regarding the site visit, the Commissioners instead
reopened public testimony and asked that a new public hearing, limited to the site visit, be set
for October 4, 2006. Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 204-209. Commissioner Brodie disclosed on the record
that due to the objections raised by Petitioner Bev Twillman, Commissioner Brodie wanted the
opportunity to speak with the public about those issues and to gather additional public
testimony. Commissioner Brodie stated:
COMMISSIONER BRODIE: I have no questions, just a statement. And I offer
to everyone in this room my humble apology first off. I need to start with that.
For taking you away from your busy schedules, I know you have other exciting
things to do...at this time I would like to move to reopen the public hearing
to give the Board the opportunity to address issues that arose during the
site visit.
First, I would like to move that the testimony be limited to those persons that
were present on the site for that visit namely Bev Twillman, Janet Torline,
Susan Melka, Jim Moore, Rand Wichman, Steve Walker and Jim Foxx and to
also include all of the County staff.
Further, I would like to move that to the extent that there's no additional written
testimony germane to the site visit that be allowed into the record as well. And I
believe there, the County has received a number of e-mails that I have not been
privy to that I would like to make a part of the record as, kind of like to peruse
them. See what's going on.
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Finally, as part of the motion I would move that the matter be brought back
before this Board on Wednesday, October 4,2006 at 9 a.m. in Meeting Room 1
and that any additional written testimony be submitted to the Planning
Department no later than one - one o'clock on the 31d. Deliberations likely to
take place on October 5.
T. Vol. 1, pp. 206-208 (emphasis added).
Commissioner Brodie further explained the parameters of her disclosure and motion to
reopen the record for testimony at a new public hearing, stating,
And the only testimony that we want is testimony that is germane to that site
visit for the twenty minutes we were there.
T. Vol. 1. p. 208, Ins. 11-13.
On October 4,2006, pursuant to Commissioner Brodie's statement and her successful
motion to reopen the record, the Commissioners held a pubic hearing to cure any allegeddeficiencies with the site visit. Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 21 1-227. Chairman Johnson explained the
purpose of the reopened public hearing, stating, "We are here.. .we are going to reopen the

'

public hearing dealing with this issue because of some concerns of some of residents."
Tr. Vol. 1, p. 212, Ins. 7-9. "We're going to open the public meeting. Uh, what this is going to
deal with is a site visit the Commissioners at the Powderhom site. All testimony today will be
specific to that, there will he no new information besides what happened during the site visit."
[sic]Tr.Vol. l,p.212,ln.23-p.213,1n.2.
The record was reopened without time or submittal limits on Petitioners'
representatives. Mrs. Torline, Mrs. Twillman, and Mr. Moore testified freely and at length
about the site visit, their objections, and the alleged exparte communications of Commissioner
Brodie. They were allowed to submit whatever written materials they wanted into the Record.
Tr. Vol. 1 pp. 214-220, R. Vol. 3, pp. 643-668.
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Janet Torline testified,

I observed Commissioner Brodie speaking with Mr. Wichman from the Heartland
group, I moved closer to hear what was being said. I had understood it was Mr.
Mussman's role to answer any questions from the Commissioners. A few
minutes later, I heard Mr. Walker from the Heartland Group giving inaccurate
information regarding how recently the surrounding land had been farmed and the
state of its agricultural status and viability.
Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 214-215.
Mrs. Torline failed to offer any testimony as to how or why she claimed the agricultural
viability information was in error. Mrs. Torline requested and was granted leave to submit
additional written evidence in Exhibit 2000. R. Vol. 3, p. 643.
Next, Petitioner Bev Twillman testified regarding her objections to the site visit. She
complained that Heartland Representative Steve Walker was inaccurate when he said some
Peninsula land was not viable farm land. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 216, ins. 20-23. Mrs. Twillman
testified at length and without any time limitations. She explained her understanding of the.
CRP program. She requested and was granted leave to file nearly twenty pages of new
exhibits, Exhibit 2001. Tr. Vol. I, pp. 215-220 and R. Vol. 3, pp. 644-662.
During her testimony and in her submittals, Mrs. Twillman did @mention or complain
about any alleged exparte conversations between Commissioner Brodie and Rand Wichman.

If fact, during her testimony, it appeared that Mrs. Twillman was satisfied with the process of
the curative hearing, and she did not seek any further review or disqualification.
Mrs. Twillman failed to mention the need for any further curative measures and conceded that
she had been allowed to submit all the evidence she had.
BEV TWILLMAN: I appreciate that and I appreciate you people voting to
allow us to come back and to talk about trying to keep the process going
smoothly. That's all we're trying is to stay responsible to the process. So I
appreciate your time and I insert all of my information.
Tr. Vol. 1, p. 217, Ins. 15-19 (emphasis added).
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Thereafter, James Moore spoke regarding the site visit. Tr. Vol. I , p. 220. He
corroborated Commissioner Brodie's comment that no discussion of the CRP program occurred
on site. Mr. Moore described the site visit comments he heard, stating:
What I heard at the meeting, I was not in my car, I was walking listening to the
people talking, I heard the comment that the farm has not been farmed for years
and could not be farmed for profit. That's what I heard. . I heard no reference
to CRP...."
Tr. Vol. 1, p. 220, Ins. 11-13.
Mr. Moore went on to explain that he was a farmer from Florida and he knew farming.
He felt the Peninsula land was "fertile and could grow crops." Tr. Vol. I, p. 220, In. 18.
Mr. Moore submitted his additional written exhibits into the Record as Exhibit B-2002.
Tr. Vol. 1, p. 221, In. 1 and R. Vo!. 3, pp. 663-668. At the conclusion of his comments, it
appeared Mr. Moore was satisfied that he had been fully allowed the opportunity to address the
site visit as he closed his comments to the Commissioners with, "That's all I gotta say."

'

Tr. Vol. 1, p. 220, Ins. 22-23 (emphasis added).
Susan Melka, a Petitioner in this action, was among the people present for the site visit,
and she was specifically included in Commissioner Brodie's Motion to reopen the public
hearing. Mrs. Melka failed to appear or attend the hearing. Mrs. Melka was allowed and did in
fact submit additional written information to the Commissioners in lieu of personal testimony
at the curative hearing. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 222, Ins. 2-4.

In a key disclosure curing any potential conflicts, Commissioner Brodie divulged her
site visit comments on the Record at the public hearing and she included a general description
of the communications.
COMMISSIONER BRODIE: ...I did ask Mr. Walker at the car how long in
fact has this property, how long has it been since this property has been
farmed.
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STEVE WALKER: That's correct. That's when we were talking about Stan
Parks' property. And Stan had stopped farming that about ten years ago.
COMMISSIONER BRODIE: And your answer was sometime between seven
and eleven years ago.
STEVE WALKER: For Stan's property.
COMMISSIONER BRODIE: Correct.
COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Thank you very much.
STEVE WALKER: Okay.
Tr. Vol. 1, p. 222, Ins. 13-25 (emphasis added).
The Chairman also questioned Rand Wichman about his conversations with
Commissioner Brodie at the site:
CHAIRMAN JOHNSON:
site?

...Mr. Wichman. What questions were you asked on

RAND WICHMAN: Commissioner Brodie asked me at the site, asked where
we were on the map. At the time, we were in the vicinity of the firehouse. She
also asked about what the, because the Commissioners had a smaller version of
this map, asked me what the yellow line represented. I indicated that was the
property that was under the control of the Applicant although the entire
peninsula was the subject of the Application. It was the question I asked there
and then of course after the site visit was completed, you know we were down at
the Harrison Bridge, because there was something blocking the bridge, one of
the Commissioners, we all got out of our, we all got out of our cars, I recall
Commissioner Brodie asking legal counsel if it was okay to talk to me about
a completely unrelated matter and that was when Commissioner Brodie
asked about my availability for talking to a potential candidate for
Planning Director position and we talked a little about that, and that
conversation ended with Commissioner Brodie saying okay, well I'll call
you. And there was, that was the extent of our conversation as I recall it.
Tr. Vol. 1,p. 221, In. 14-p. 222, In. 10.
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Before closing public testimony, each of the Commissioners made a statement on the Record
and during the public hearing about Commissioner Brodie's conversations with Rand
Wichman.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: ...one thing that I will add before we close the
record. I want to have Commissioner Brodie put something on the record. For
my part of the conversations up there, the only one that I was privy to was the
one that we had with Mr. Wichman at the bridge. I did not hear the question. I
had walked up the road when all that transpired. The conversation that was at
the bridge in Harrison I had heard, I heard the conversation but as Commissioner
Brodie and Commissioner Currie know, unless I am standing right there, my
hearing is pretty lousy. I did hear you say you'd call him later, I asked you in
the van, I think or shortly thereafter, what that was about and you talked about
and at the public hearing if you remember at the end of the public hearing that
we had on this, I asked everyone not to speak to the Commissioners on this but
if it dealt with issues that were not about either Powderhorn or Rickel Ranch that
did not mean they could, we could not talk to anyone we wish to talk to. Just
don't talk about the applications. The conversation that Commissioner
Brodie had with Mr. Wichman dealt with a totally outside the scope of what
we were doing issue. [sic] And I will, 1 want to put that on the record.
Commissioner Currie, did you have anything before I gave Commissioner
Brodie her opportunity.
COMMISSIONER CURRIE: No, I just echo exactly what you said there,
COMMISSIONER BRODIE: I have not much to add other than once again I
would like to apologize to anybody for the inconvenience, we all have busy
schedules and probably more exciting things to do than come and listen to why I
asked Rand to call me or let him know that I would call him later. There
certainly was no intent of wrong doing on my part. I was trying to gain
information. As it turns out, all the questions I asked were also part of the
record currently. So, again, my apologies to one and all and we will move
forward.
Tr. Vol. 1, p. 225-226 (emphasis added).
At the conclusion of this curative hearing, Chairman Johnson repeated it was
completely acceptable to talk to the Commissioners about unrelated matters while the
Powderhorn Application was pending.
CHAIRMAN JOHHNSON: ...This will be deliberated tomorrow, ten o'clock, I
believe right here. Uh, again I will ask you not to speak to the Commissioners
INTERVENORS POWDERHORN COMMUNITIES AND
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dealing with either one of the applications that are in front of us but if you want
to talk about hunting with Mr. Currie, Commissioner Currie, or with old cars
with me or want to talk about uh ....
COMMISSIONER BRODIE: Not anything.
CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: You are more than welcome. Meeting adjourned.
Tr. Vol. 1, p. 227, Ins. 4-1 1.
Petitioners raised no further objections regarding Commissioner Brodie, Rand Wichman, or the
site visit.
On October 5,2006, the Commissioners held Deliberations on the Powderhorn
Application. R. Vol. 3, p. 618; Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 229-234. Under the standards of Kootenai
County Resolution No. 95-03~,the Commissioners found no error existed with the original
Comp. Plan designations but that significant changes had occurred to the Comp. Plan
designation over the past decade. Commissioner Brodie and Chairman Johnson determined
that the land is not being farmed nor has it been for several years. As a result, the land is not
agricultural anymore. R. Vol. 3, p. 61 8; Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 232 and 233 - 234. The Commissioners
properly deliberated, weighed the evidence in the Record, and determined as follows:
COMMISSIONER BRODIE: ...we are asked for a comp plan change, an
amendment. So, was there a mistake made in 1994. No, I believe that ground
was ag ground and used as such. So the second question, has there been
significant changes and circumstances since the 1994 comp plan to warrant
a change and I believe there have been. Fact, the ground is not currently
being farmed nor has it been for any number of years I believe there has
been significant change in circumstances since 1994 to warrant a change in
the rural designation and I would so move in Case No. CP-080-05.

....

Tr. Vol. 1, p. 231, In. 25 - p. 232, In. 17 (emphasis added).

' Kootenai County's Resolution No. 95-03, citing Idaho Code 67-6509, provides for amendment of the Comp.
Plan "to correct errors in the original plan or to recognize substantial changes in the actual conditions in the area."
The County's Comprehensive Plan states "The purpose of this designation (Agriculture) is to preserve existing
productive agricultural lands."
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COMMISSIONER CURRIE: ...This was not about a subdivision. It's not
about traffic. It's not about what, what was planned there. It is about a comp
plan amendment ...and the significant changes. I look at the map and I look at
the peninsula and it is sort of an island out there. Uh, everything else around it
has been, has been changed except for that, that one, point. And that obviously
weighed heavily.. .but.. .I couldn't bring myself to uh to say that that area, the
way it sits today, now it might change tomorrow but the way it sits today, uh,
I'm not going to support the change.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: ...looking at this one, looking at the area, going by
the charge that we have, has there been, was the comp plan wrong or was there a
significant change to the area and in my opinion, this one there is a significant
change to the area. This area is not agricultural anymore; we would all like
to think that that's agricultural but in my opinion that is not agricultural
area any more. That is, again, rural Idaho.. ..I do agree the prop-I will agree
with Commissioner Currie on the point that we are not to look at what might be,
this process is set up to change the comp plan but there will be many more bites
at the apple as far as what those subdivisions, what the land, what the developers
are going to do to that property. All those issues will be handled at a future
date ....but for my two cents, that's not ag any more. I think it is, that to me is
rural, that's rural. And so, Commissioner Brodie, if you want to go ahead and
restate your motion at this time.
Tr. Vol. 1, p. 233, in. 17 - p. 234, In. 13 (emphasis added).
COMMISSIONER BRODIE: Case Number CP-080-05, I would move there
has been a significant change to the comp plan designation and that that be
changed to rural.
Tr. Vol. 1, p. 234, Ins. 14-16.
Commissioner Brodie and Chairman Johnson voted to approve the Comp. Plan
designation to Rural. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 234, Ins. 17-23. Although Commissioner Currie stated he
agreed that "everything around this area had already changed.. .significant changes," he voted
against the Amendment. R. Vol. 1, p. 233, Ins. 3-6 and R. Vol. 1, p. 234, In. 21.
On November 9,2006, the Commissioners signed an Order of Decision changing the
Comprehensive Plan Future Land Use Map designation for the Powderhorn Peninsula from
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Agricultural to Rural. R. Vol. 3, pp. 604-614; Tr. Vol. 1, p. 238. Because this was a legislative
matter, the Board passed a Resolution adopting the new Comp. Plan designation and provided
general notice the citizens of Kootenai County by publishing a Legal Notice of the new
Countywide legislation. R. Vol. 1, pp. 100- 104. The Board's November 9,2006, Order is the
only Decision Petitioners timely appealed to this Court.
On November 15,2006, Petitioners filed their first Petition for Judicial Review of the
November 9,2006, Decision. R. Vol. 2, pp.334-358. Scott Reed, attorney for Petitioners,
expressly limited his appeal to the November 9, 2006, Order of Decision. R. Vol. 2, p. 358.
Petitioners did not serve or give notice of this appeal to Powderhorn.
On November 16,2006, the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners issued new
findings, conclusions, and signed an Amended Order of Decision. R. Vol. 3, pp. 591-600.
Tr. Vol. 1, p. 244. This November 16, 2006, Amended Order, constitutes the Commissioners'
final order. It has not been timely appealed.
On December 8,2006, again without notice to Powderhorn or to any of the actual
property owners who submitted zone change applications, Petitioners asked the Court to stay
all matters including the upcoming public hearings set in the following five zone change
applications:
1.

Kootenai County Planning Case No. 2-787-06, In Re: Powderhorn Zone Change

Application;

2.

Kootenai County Planning Case No. 2-788-06, In Re: Charles R. Blakley Zone

Change Application;
3.

Kootenai County Planning Case No. 2-789-06, In Re: H.F. Magnuson and

Coeur d'Alene Land Company Zone Change Application;
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4.

Kootenai County Planning Case No. 2-890-06, In Re: East Point Farms Zone

Change Application; and,

5.

Kootenai County Planning Case No. 2-791-06, In Re: Bla Bar Inc. Zone Change

Application.
None of these five zone change applications are part of this case. The zone change applications
are separate applications, contained in separate files, unrelated to the Comp. Plan Amendment
and not part of the pending Petition for Judicial Review appeal in any way. The zone change
requests do not involve the same real properties as the Comp. Plan Amendment. The five zone
change applications were for properties of a different and much more limited and specific
ownership.
Again, without notice to Powderhorn and without notice to any of the five landowners
whom had pending zone change cases, the Court granted Petitioners a hearing, set for
December 18,2006, on their motion to stay all proceedings in Kootenai County Case
Nos. 2-787-06, In Re: Powderhorn Zone Change Application; 2-788-06, In Re: Charles R.
Blakley Zone Change Application; 2-789-06, In Re: H.F. Magnuson and Coeur d'Alene Land
Company Zone Change Application; 2-890-06, In Re: East Point Farms Zone Change
Application; and, 2-791-06, In Re: Bla Bar Inc. Zone Change Application.
On December 12,2006, just seven days before the hearing on the stay, Powderhorn
casually and informally learned of the Motion to Stay from Kootenai County Legal Counsel
John Cafferty. Neither the Petitioner nor the Court had provided Powderhorn or the land
owners notice that the five zone change hearings could be stayed.
On December 14,2006, in response to Mr. Cafferty's informal notification of the
upcoming stay hearing, Powderhorn moved to intervene. Petitioners opposed Powderhorn's
intervention in the case.
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On December 15,2006, without waiting for permission to intervene as there was no
time to do so, Powderhorn filed its opposition to the stay of its zone change hearing.
On December 18,2006, the Court granted Powderhorn leave to intervene, but the Court
immediately imposed a stay barring Powderhorn (and all of the other landowners) from
proceeding with the pending zone change cases, which zone change Applications were
unrelated and not part of the issues raised in this Appeal. The Court refused to impose any
terms or bond when staying the separate zone change applications for the duration of this
Appeal.
On January 29,2007, Powderhorn moved to dismiss the Petition for lack ofjurisdiction,
in part because Petitioners failed to timely appeal the final order of November 16,2006.
On February 5,2007, Petitioners responded to Powderhorn's Motion to Dismiss by
attempting to correct their failure to timely file an appeal of the November 16,2006, final
order. Petitioners filed a purported Amended Petition for Judicial Review. Because this is a
legislative decision, the new Petition sought to add a Declaratory Relief action to their Petition.
More than 28 days had passed since the order being appealed was issued, so the Amended
Petition, including the Declaratory Relief claim, was therefore untimely.
On February 14, 2006, Petitioners filed their Opening Brief. Petitioners attached
Appendixes A, B, and C comprising nearly 50 pages of documents outside the Record on
appeal. Petitioners failed to object or move to supplement the Record before the Court on
appeal pursuant to I.R.C.P. 846) and (I). The time for objecting to the Record (14 days) or
augmenting the Record, (21 days) has long since expired. I.R.C.P. 846) and (1). These
materials are outside the Record and cannot be considered on appeal.
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On February 16,2007, Coeur d'Alene Land Company and H.F. Magnuson moved to
intervene in order to protect their interests in the Comp. Plan approval. Petitioners did not
oppose the intervention.
On February 27,2007, Powderhorn objected to and moved to strike the improperly filed
Amended Petition as it failed to comply with I.R.C.P. 15. The Court has not ruled on this
Motion to Strike. It is set for hearing on June 6, 2007.
On February 27,2007, the Court denied Powderhorn's Motion to Dismiss. No written
order bas been entered.
On March 6,2007, the Court granted Coeur d'Alene Land Company and

H.F. Magnuson's motion to intervene. The Court strongly cautioned against any of the other
landowners seeking to intervene or participate in this case despite these landowners being
deprived of their zone change hearings due to the stay imposed by the Court for the duration of
this appeal.
On March 14, 2007, Kootenai County filed its Respondents' Brief.
On April 6,2007, Petitioners filed their Opposition to Powderhorn's Motion to Strike.
Also on April 6, 2007, Petitioners attempted to file yet a third Petition, attaching it to a pleading
entitled "Alternative Motion for Leave to Amend."
Herein, Powderhorn submits its Intervenor's Opposition Brief. Powderhorn
simultaneously filed an objection and motion to strike the following documents which are
outside the Record and not part of this Appeal:
1.

Petitioners' Opening Brief Appendixes A-C;

2.

Petitioners' Amended Petition Appendixes A-C; and,

3.

Petitioner's Alternative Motion for Leave to Amend, attached Petition,

and Appendixes A-C.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA) allows an affected person to seek judicial
review of an approval or denial of a land use application, as provided for in the Idaho
Administrative Procedural Act (APA). I.C.

5 67-6521(1)(d); Evans v.

Teton County, 139 Idaho

7l,74, 73 P.3d 84, 87 (2003). For purposes of judicial review of LLUPA decisions, a local
agency making a land use decision is treated as a government agency under the APA. Evans,

The Court shall affirm the zoning agency's action unless the Court finds that the
agency's findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are: "(a) in violation of
constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) in excess of the statutory authority of
the agency; (c) made upon unlawful procedure; (d) not supported by substantial
evidence on the record as a whole; and (e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of
discretion." I.C. 5 67-5279(3). The party attacking a zoning board's action must
first illustrate that the board erred in a manner specified therein and must then
show that a substantial right of the party has been prejudiced.

Eacret v. Bonner County, 139 Idaho 780,784, 86 P.3d 494,498 (2004) (internal citations
omitted). Petitioners herein only seek review pursuant to subsections (c ), (d), and (e) of Idaho
Code 67-5279(3).
Local government planning actions are entitled to a strong presumption of validity; this
includes the governing body's application and interpretation of its own ordinances. Sanders

Orchard v. Gem County, 137 Idaho 695,698, 52 P.3d 840, 843 (2002). It is not the role of the
reviewing court to weigh the evidence. This Court must defer to the agency's decisions that are
supported by substantial evidence in the record. Davisco Foods International, Inc. v. Gooding

County, 141 Idaho 784,790, 1 18 P.3d 1 16, 122 (2005).
Powderhorn responds to Petitioners' arguments in the general order raised in the
Opening Brief.
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LEGAL ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

A.

The Court Must Dismiss Petitioners,' Second and Third Causes of Action for
fail in^ to State a Leeallv C o ~ n i z a b l eClaim. As a Matter of Law, No "Unlawfuf
Ex Parte Communication" Claim Exists and No "Conflict of Interest" Claim
Exists. None of the A l l e ~ e dViolations Allow o r Reauire a Judicial Remand of the
Approval.
Petitioners' lead argument claims their Second and Third Causes of Action are

interrelated and dispositive of this case. Powderhorn agrees these two issues are interrelated
and dispositive, however, the unavoidable outcome is dismissal. Both Causes of Action fail to
state any legally cognizable claim and must be summarily dismissed as a matter of law.
Petitioners' case focuses on allegedly improper comments and conduct involving
Commissioner Brodie and Powderhorn representatives. Specifically, Petitioners cite and rely
on alleged exparte comments of Commissioner Brodie during a site visit and the employment
of Rand Wichman as a private consultant as their primary grounds to set aside the Comp. Plan
Amendment. Even taking Petitioners' unsupported factual allegations and their exaggerated
descriptions as true for purposes of legal argument, no legal claims exist. Based upon clearly
established Idaho law, nothing illegal or unlawful occurred or is alleged. As a result, no legal
basis exists for this Court to remand the Powderhorn approval, and the Petition should be
dismissed.
In their Second Cause of Action, Petitioners complain that during a site visit on
September 24,2006, Commissioner Katie Brodie had improper exparfe communications. See
Petition, p. 15, para. 42 - 45. As a result of these alleged exparfe conversations by
Commissioner Brodie, Petitioners argue the Powderhorn Comp. Plan amendment "should be
declared null and void, ...and remanded back to the Board of County Commissioners." See
Petition, p. 15, para. 45.
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1.

No Ex Parte Communications Invalidated the Powderhorn Approval.

Petitioners' "Ex Parte Communication" Claim completely ignores the curative remedy
expressly set out in Idaho Code 67-5253 and more fully described and applied by the Idaho
Supreme Court in Eacret v. Bonner County, 130 Idaho 780,786,86 P.3d 494,501 (2004) and
in Idaho Historic Preservation Council v. City Council of City ofBoise, I34 Idaho 65 1 , 8 P.3d
646 (2000).
Idaho Code 3 67-5253, entitled "Ex parte communications" provides:
Unless required for the disposition of ex parte matters specifically authorized by
statute, a presiding- officer serving- in a contested case shall not communicate,
directly or indirectly, regarding any substantive issue in the proceeding, with
any party, except uDon notice and opportunity for all parties to participate
in the communication.
Idaho Code 67-5253 (emphasis added).
Even assuming the Powderhorn Application was a "contested case," i.e., a quasi-

,

judicial7 matter (which it was not), the Commissioners cured any due process defects arising
from the site visit by giving "notice and opportunity for all parties to participate in the
communication." 1.C. 67-5253. By disclosing and discussing the site visit communications on
the Record during the October 4,2006, public hearing, the Commissioners provided notice and
the opportunity to participate, thereby curing any due process defect. Id.
In describing the curative means of correcting due process violations, the Supreme
Court in Eacret v. Bonner County, held:

' EXpane comments are not prohibited in legislative matters, only in contested or quasi-judicial matters.
I.C. 67-5252; Idaho Historic Pres. Council v. City Council of Boise, 134 Idaho 651; 654,s P.3d 646,659 (2000)
The Powderhorn Application was a legislative matter, and therefore the alleged exparte comments are of no legal
significance. However, even under a quasi-judicial standard of review applicable to contested decisions such as
variances or special use permits, the Commissioners acted properly in disclosing and describing the site visit
comments. The Kootenai Commissioners properly and legally went out of their way to cure any perceived issues
by reopening the public testimony to those who attended the site visit.
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C. Exparte communications and impermissible view. The second question
raised by Harris's argument on appeal is whether Commissioner Mueller's
decision was based, as the district court found, on evidence that was beyond the
record. At issue are the exparte communications between Mueller and Harris
and the impermissible view of the subject boathouse site.
When exparte contacts are present in the context of quasi-judicial zoning
decisions, such as variances and special use permits, courts will be more
receptive to challenges to decisions on grounds of zoning bias." McPherson
Landjll, Inc., supra, 49 P.3d at 533, quoting 32 Proof of Facts 53 1, 5 16. Idaho
Code, Section 67-5253 addresses ex parte communications in contested
administrative cases:
Unless required for the disposition of exparte matters specifically authorized by
statute, a presiding officer serving in a contested case shall not communicate,
directly or indirectly, regarding any substantive issue in the proceeding, with
any party, except upon notice and opportunity for all parties to participate in the
communication.
A quasi-judicial officer must confine his or her decision to the record produced
at the public hearing. Idaho Historic Preservation Council v. City Council of
City ofBoise, 134 Idaho 651,s P.3d 646 (2000). Any exparte communication
must be disclosed at the public hearing, including a "general description of
the communication." Id. at 656,8 P.3d at 651. The pnrpose.of the disclosure
reauirement is to afford opposine parties with an opportunity to rebut the
substance of any ex oarte communications. In a similar vein, the opportunity
to be present at a view provides opposing parties the opportunity to rebut facts
derived from the visit that may come to hear on the ultimate decision and create
an appearance of bias.

Eacret, 130 Idaho at 786 (emphasis added).
A similar curative remedy was adopted and applied by the Idaho Supreme Court in

Idaho Historic Pres. Council v. City Council of Boise, 134 Idaho at 655-656, 8 P.3d at 650-651
(2000), holding:
Even if this Court were persuaded that Tierney and Neuburger express the better
~ l ethe
, requirements of procedural due process under Cooper and Chambers,
supra, were not met. The members of the City Council who accepted phone
calls failed to disclose the name and other identifvin~information of the
callers, and also failed to reveal the nature of the conversation, making it
impossible for the Commission to effectively respond to the arguments that the
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callers may have advanced. See Tierney, 536 P.2d at 443. While the district
court found that it "[did] not appear that any of these telephone contacts
improperly influenced any ultimate opinion given by the individual [City]
Council members," there was no evidence to support this conclusion because of
the City Council's failure to sufficiently identify the callers and provide a
general description of what they said in favor of o r in opposition to the
destruction of the Foster Building. We hold, therefore, that the receipt of
phone calls in this case, without more specific disclosure, violated
procedural due process.
C. Whether The City Council Is Held To A Standard Of Judicial
Disinterestedness In A Quasi-Judicial Proceeding.
This decision does not hold the City Council to a standard ofjudicial
disinterestedness. As explained above, members of the City Council are free
to take phone calls from concerned citizens and listen to their opinions and
arguments prior to a quasi-judicial proceeding. In order to satisfy due
process, however, the identity of the callers must be disclosed, as well as a
general description of what each caller said.

- - - - - - - - - - - ---Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2 Other relevant identifying information might include the caller's employment
or affiliation with a business or organization with a stake in the matter before the
governing body.

Idaho Historic Preservation Council v. City Council of City of Boise, 134 Idaho at 655656, 8 P.3d at 650-651 (2000).
Herein, the Kootenai County Commissioners, unlike the Bonner County Commissioners
in Eacret and unlike the Boise City Council members in Idaho Historic, properly "disclosed the
ex parte communications at a public hearing and disclosed a general description of what was
said." Id. As a rcsult, no due process violation occurred. Any error brought about by the
alleged exparte contact was cured because Petitioners were given "notice and the opportunity
to participate in the discussion." Id.; see also I.C. 67-5253.
A review of Janet Torline's comments, Bev Twillman's comments, and James Moore's

comments, along with their Exhibits submitted during the curative October 4,2006, hearing,
indicates they were provided "notice and the opportunity to participate in the discussion."
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Torline, Twillman, and Moore (and Susan Melka if she had attended) were allowed to say all
they wanted about the site visit comments and were allowed to submit all the evidence they
wanted to submit. No further curative measures were necessary and no violation remained.
Their own comments confirm they had notice and the opportunity to respond.
Because Comp. Plan amendments are legislative and not quasi-judicial, Kootenai
County generally allows exparte communications in Comp. Plan Amendments. See Tr. Vol. 1,
p. 1 14, Ins. 10-14. During the ride to the Powderhom site visit, Commissioner Brodie asked
about the Comp. Plan amendment process occurring as part of the Countywide "Meeting in a
Box" campaign. Id. Pursuant to the "Meeting in a Box" process, local neighborhood groups
hold Comp. Plan meetings in their local grange halls, garages, living rooms, or wherever to
discuss proposed amendments to the Comp. Plan. No public notices are required for these
"Meetings in a Box," and the County provides the Comp. Plan meeting materials, which
include a bag of microwave popcorn. Because Comp. Plan amendments are legislative,
Commissioner Brodie was told by two County representatives (Planner Mark Mussman and
Legal Counsel John Cafferty) that the Commissioners could properly receive Comp. Plan
amendment comments outside the

hearing during a local Comp. Plan "Meeting in a

Box." Id.
COMMISSIONER BRODIE: ...the hearings, the Comp Plan Meetings in a
Box ...

***
COMMISSIONER BRODIE: Are we allowed to go to those, or not?
MARK MUSSMAN: I don't see why you wouldn't be allowed.
COMMISSIONER BRODIE: Okay.
Tr. Vol. I, p. l l I, Ins. 3-15.
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COMMISSIONER BRODIE: ...So, anyway, the answer of, can the Commissioners
attend any of the Meetings in a Box, the answer at this time is yes.
MARK MUSSMAN: Yeah.
JOHN CAFFERTY: It is a legislative issue.
MARK MUSSMAN: Yeah, and its just fact finding ...
Tr. Vol. 1, p. 114, Ins. 10-15 (emphasis added).
As Mr. Cafferty indicates, Comp. Plan amendments are legislative matters. As both
Mr. Mussman and Mr. Cafferty advised Commissioner Brodie, with Comp. Plan amendments,
comments to the Commissioners outside the public hearing, i.e., exparte comments, are
allowed.

2.

No Violation of Appearance of Fairness Occurred or Exists under Idaho
Law.

Petitioners' Third Cause of Action entitled "Wichman Conflict of Interest" contends a
legal claim for "conflict of interest" exists regarding Rand Wichman. Petitioners assert this
"conflict of interest" theory requires the Court to remand Powderhorn's approval back to the
Board of County Commissioners. See Petition for Judicial Review, pp. 16-18. Petitioners'
"conflict of interest" cause of action claims that based upon his previous position as Planning
Director, Rand Wichman's subsequent work as a private consultant for Powderhorn renders the
Commissioners' approval "ethically and legally void." See Petition, p. 17, para. 54. Petitioners
complain about an "unfair advantage to the applicants" as a result of hiring Wichman. See
Petition, p. 17, para. 53. Petitioners further assert that by having or allowing Wichman to
participate at public hearings, even though no objections were raised at the time, the County
violated the "appearance of fairness" doctrine. See Petition, p. 17, para. 55.
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In their Opening Brief as their primary legal theory, Petitioners argue:
It is generally recognized that it is an ethical violation for a public employee
upon leaving public employment to participate in any manner in any proceeding
which was going on at the time of his or her departure.
Petitioners Opening Brief, p. 12.
Although this "appearance of fairness" theory is key to Petitioners' case, no legal authority is
cited or exists to support their argument. Instead, what Petitioners apparently recognize8 but
intentionally ignore is the legal reality that Idaho law does not preclude the activity of which
they complain. Even if Petitioners' exaggerated allegations about Commissioner Brodie's
conversations and past working relationship with Rand Wichman are true, no "appearance of
fairness" violation exists as a matter of law. Cowan v. Board of County Commissioners of
Freemont County, -Idaho __ 148 P. 3d 1247, 1260 (2006).

In Cowan, the Idaho Supreme Court considered and rejected this Petitioners' argument.
In a unanimous decision, Justice Burdick wrote:
Finally, based on a line of cases from Washington, Cowan argues that because
this was a zoning decision, the decision makers and hearings on the matter
needed to not only be fair and impartial, but also appear fair and impartial. He
contends that comments made by a Commissioner and a consultant, as well
as the Board's actions, which allegedly violated his due process, all indicate
an indifference to the appearance of fairness. He urges this Court to adopt
this doctrine and reverse the Board's decision because of its indifference to the
appearance of fairness and impartiality.
In the early 1970's the Supreme Court of Washington issued its decision in
Chrobuck v. Snohomish Counfy, 78 Wn.2d 858,480 P.2d 489 (Wash. 197 1).
There, Atlantic Richfield Company sought to re-zone land embracing beach
frontage on Puget Sound. After the county changed the comprehensive plan and
granted the company's petition, Chrobuck sought judicial review of the
Commissioner's action. The Court determined that Chrobuck's due process
rights had been violated, despite a lack of evidence of any dishonest or selfserving conduct by the Commissioners, by "an unfortunate combination of
Petitioners expressly concede that "the federal statutes and city codes submitted earlier have no comparable
match in Idaho.. .." See Opening Brief, p. 13.
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circumstances . . . and the cumulative impact thereof [which]inescapably cast
an aura o f improper influence, partiality and prejudgment over the proceedings."
Id. at 496. Based on an earlier case, the Washington Supreme Court found that
under that state's law a hearing must be fair in both appearance and substance.
Id.
This Court has never adopted the appearance of fairness doctrine of our
westerly neighbor. Rather, we recognize that due process "entitles a person
to an impartial and disinterested tribunal[,]" hut we require a showing of
actual bias before disqualifying a decision maker even when a litigant
maintains a decision maker has deprived the proceedings of the appearance
of fairness. Davisco Foods Int'l, Inc., 141 Idaho at 791, 118 P.3d at 123.
Additionally, the Washington Supreme Court has stepped back from this
doctrine. See W.T. Watterson, What Ever Happened to the Appearance of
Fairness Doctrine? Local Land Use Decisions in an Age of Statutory Process,
21 SeattleU. L. Rev. 653 (1998).We therefore decline to adopt this doctrine
and refrain from reaching the substance of Cowan's argument that certain
statements and actions violated the appearance of fairness doctrine.

Cowan, 148 P.3d at 1260. (emphasis added.)

The Supreme Court then refused to set aside the Freemont County Commissioners' land use
decision despite exparte statements and alleged bias. Id.
A similar result must follow in this action. As was the case in Cowan, the alleged
exparte communications between Commissioner Brodie and Rand Wichman do not establish

any basis to invalidate the decision because they were cured. Likewise, the fact that Wichman
previously worked for the County does not give rise to a reversal or remand. No statewide
restrictions prohibit this employment, and no County restrictions prohibit this employment.
Actual bias must be shown, and no such allegation or evidence exists. Petitioners' Second and
Third Causes o f Action fail and must be dismissed.
3.

No Actual Bias Shown o r Alleged.

Petitioners continue this theme by complaining that because Commissioner Brodie
worked well with Planning Director Wichman for fourteen years, it necessarily follows that she
is incapable o f fairly deciding this Application. Nothing in the Record support Petitioners'
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argument. So, lacking any legitimate evidence, Petitioners attempt to create some evidence by
improperly attaching materials outside the Record on Appeal to their Petition. Powderhom
moved to strike these improper materials, but to the extent the Court considers the comments,
Powderhom hereby preserves its argument that such comments do not demonstrate bias
sufficient to overturn this Comp. Plan approval.
Petitioners rely upon Commissioner Brodie's statement from an unrelated case several
yeas ago:
I have worked with our Planning Director for fourteen years. And, most of
those have been great warn, wonderful exchanges. And I know Rand gives this
job and his responsibility the utmost of, I mean, none of it is taken lightly. Um,
I feel that 1 need to uphold Rand's decision ....

See Petition, p. 9.
In a wild leap of logic lacking any factual or legal support, Petitioners contend because
Brodie and Wichman worked well in the past when he was Planning Director, it necessarily
follows that the Commissioners' Powderhom decision is legally invalid. Idaho Courts have
repeatedly rejected such claims of bias, even where the facts show more egregious conduct.

Davisco Foods IntY, Inc. v. Gooding County Commissioners, 141 Idaho 784, 791, 118 P.3d
1 16, 123, (2005). In Davisco, prior to issuing a decision and outside the public hearing context,

Gooding County Commissioner Sauer made statements to the local media that he was opposed
to the Petitioner's cheese operation waste disposal proposal. He then voted to deny Petitioner's
application following a public hearing. In response to complaints of bias seeking to set aside
the denial, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected the arguments of bias against Commissioner
Sauer. Id.
In the same case, Davisco, the Court also rejected the Petitioners' claim that ex parte
communications required the recussal of Commissioner Elexpunt. Petitioner Jerome Cheese
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argued that Commissioner Elexpuru relied on information gained from improper exparte
contacts outside the public hearing context. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's
dismissal of the exparte claim for remand and expressly held that Commissioner Elexpuru, like
Commissioner Sauer, was not impermissibly biased. Id., 141 Idaho at 792, 118 P.3d at 124.
In Eacret v. Bonner County Commissioners, 139 Idaho 780,86 P.3d 494, (2004),
Commissioner Mueller made statements indicating he had predetermined the outcome of the
public hearing and that he had engaged in exparte communications which would cause him to
vote in favor of a variance, even before hearing any evidence at any public hearing. Id. In
setting new law on actual bias standards necessary to set aside an approval and remand, the
Idaho Supreme Court held:

A decision maker is not disqualified simply because he has taken a position,
even in public, on a policy issue related to the dispute, in the absence of a
showing that the decision maker is "not capable of judging a particular
controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances." Horfonville Joint
School Distr. No. 1 v. Hortonville Education Ass'n, 426 U.S. 482,493,49 L. Ed.
2d l , 9 6 S. Ct. 2308 (1941). Prehearing statements by a decision maker are not
fatal to the validity of the zoning determination as long as the statement does not
preclude the finding that the decision maker maintained an open mind and
continued to listen to all the evidence presented before making the final
decision. See generally McPherson LandJill, Inc, v. Board of Commrs of
Shawnee County, 274 Kan. 303,49 P.3d 522,531 (Kan. 2002). By way of
explanation then, prehearing statements by a decision maker are fatal to the
validity of the zoning determination if the statements show that the decision
maker: (a) has made up his or her mind regarding the facts and will not listen to
the evidence with an open mind, or (b) will not apply the existing law, or (c) has
already made up his or her mind regarding the outcome of the hearing.
Eacret, 139 Idaho at 785,86 P.3d at 499,
Commissioner Brodie's prehearing statements in another case, involving different
parties occurring years earlier that she has enjoyed many "great warm, wonderful exchanges
with Wichman," in no way showed she "was incapable of judging this case on the basis of its
own circumstances." Nor do her comments demonstrate she "(a) has made up her mind
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garding the facts of this case and would not listen to the evidence with an open mind, (b) she
ould not apply the existing law, or (c) she had already made up her mind regarding the
utcome of the hearing." Id. None of the necessary elements are met, and Petitioners failed to
ulfill the prima facie elements of a bias claim against Commissioner Brodie. As a matter of
law, no basis exists to remand the Powderhorn approval, and Petitioners' claim must be
dismissed.
4.

No Prohibition Against Ex Parte Communications Exists in Legislative
Matters.

Even if the exparte contacts were not remedied by the curative hearing, the
Commissioners are not legally precluded trom obtaining ex parte information when dealing
with a legislative matter. Only quasi-judicial matters require strict adherence to due process
requirements. That is, only when deciding quasi-judicial matters, and not when crafiing a
legislative Comp. Plan Amendment, are the Commissioners limited to information contained
in the Record.
The test for determining whether a local governing body sits in a quasi-judicial
capacity was expressed in Cooper v. Board ofCounty Commissioners ofAda
County, 101 Idaho 407, 614 P.2d 947 (1980). In that case, this Court stated:
Basically, this test involves the determination of whether action produces a
general rule or policy which is applicable to an open class of individuals, interest
(sic), or situations, or whether it entails the application of a general rule or
policy to specific individuals, interests, or situations. If the fonner determination
is satisfied, there is legislative action; if the latter determination is satisfied, the
action is judicial.

Id. at 41 0,614 P.2d at 950 (quoting Fasano v. Boardof County Comm'rs, 264
Ore. 574,507 P.2d 23,27 (Or. 1973)). Since S-Sixteen's appeal of the
Commission's decision to deny the certificate of appropriateness required the
City Council to apply a general rule to specific parties and interests, the City
Council was sitting in a quasi-judicial capacity.
This Court has held that when a governing body sits in a quasi-judicial capacity,
it must confine its decision to the record produced at the public hearing, and that
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failing to do so violates procedural due process of law. See Chambers, 125
Idaho at 118, 867 P.2d at 992 (citing Cooper, 101 Idaho at 41 1,614 P.2d at 951;
Gay v. Board of County Comm'rs of Bonneville County, 103 Idaho 626,629,65 1
P.2d 560,563 (Ct. App. 1982)).

ldaho Historic Pres. Council v. City Council of Boise, 134 ldaho 651 655,8 P.3 646,
648 (2000).
Unlike a quasi-judicial matter, this Comp. Plan Amendment merely "produced a general
rule or policy which is applicable to an open class of individuals, interest (sic), or situations."

Id. That is why none of the property owners had to be notified or consent to the Application.
The general Comp. Plan designation would be applied generally to an open class of individuals
and situations. Had it been a quasi-judicial matter, which evidence and testimony must be
confined to the record, then the property owners would have been required to consent because
as a quasi-judicial matter, it would have "entailed the application of a general rule or policy to
specific individuals, interests, or situations." Id. During the ride to the site visit, Kootenai.
County Legal Counsel John Cafferty and Planner Mark Mussman agreed and expressly stated
that the Commissioners were allowed to hear exparte comments (i.e., from the Comp. Plan
"Meeting in a Box") when dealing with legislative matters. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 114, Ins. 10-14.
B.

Petitioners' First Cause of Action Should be Disn~issedbecause Any Alleged
Defects with the Site Visit \#'ere Cured and No \'iolations of Due Process or
"Unlawful Procedure" under ldaho Code 67-5279(3)(c)Occurred.

Because any alleged defect with the site visit was cured and because no legal standard
or legal authority precluded Rand Wichman's involvement, no "unlawful procedure" occurred
in approving the Powderhorn Application. Pursuant to Idaho Code 67-5279(3)(c), Petitioners'
claim fails. The Court should dismiss Petitioners' First Cause of Action which cites and relies
upon I.C. 67-5279(3)(d) "unlawful procedure" as Petitioners have failed to meet this standard.
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C.

Petitioners First Cause of Action Should Also be Dismissed pursuant tu Idaho
Code 67-5279(3)(d) and (e). Substantial Evidence in the Record as a M'hole
Supports the Commissioners' Decision. As the Commissioners Properly Applied
the Correct Leeal Standards, Their Decision was not Arbitrary. Capricious, or an
Abuse of Discretion.
The Comp. Plan amendment was proper because substantial evidence in the record as a

whole supports the Commissioners' determination that no viable farming is occurring on the
subject lands and the area is unsuitable for timber production. R. Vol. 2, pp. 388-389;

R. Vol. 2, pp. 394-395; R. Vol. 2, pp. 240-248; and, R. Vol. 2, pp. 249-255. Regarding the lack
of any viable agricultural production, the record shows without any credible contradiction that
area farmers were unable to make a living off these lands. R. Vol. 2, pp. 240-248; R. Vol. 2,
pp. 394-395; and, R. Vol. 2, pp. 388-389.
Mr. Charles R. Blakley wrote to the Commissioners and explained the lack of any
viable farming on the Peninsula:

I want to set the record straight, as land on the Powderhom Peninsula is not
viable farmland any longer.
I was the last major landowner on the Peninsula who tried to make a living
farming the land and know for a fact that you cannot make a living farming this
land. My land included 658 acres of which 270 acres were tillable farm land
and the last several years I farmed it, I was only able to break even with direct
farming expenses. I didn't make any money, couldn't have paid a mortgage on
the land, and could not provide for my family by farming it.
Although parts of the Peninsula were historically considered productive land for
raising livestock and harvesting small cereal grains, for the past decade, the
farming activity has totally stopped because of the lack of economic feasibility
for its landowners. The last other major farm on the Peninsula, East Point
Farms, ceased operations about eleven years ago. I pretty much stopped farming
my land seven years ago and did no farming on any of the land for the last five
years. When the railroad and the Harrison elevator and dump stations closed
about 12 years ago, the producers in the area were forced to either haul their
crops to the Worley elevators located 55 miles away, or invest in silos and store
them on the farm until the crop could be shipped. Also, repair parts, seed,
chemicals and fertilizer stopped being available in the immediate area and this
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required the farmers to have these items trucked in from Worley, Post Falls and
the Spokane area. The increased costs of production and shipping and a low
crop yield (wheat yield of 49 bushels to the acre on the Peninsula versus 70 to
100 bushels per acre in the Worley and Plummer area) produces a net return that
basically only covered the cost of farming and left nothing to pay the carrying
cost of the land or income to the farmer. The economics simply made it
impractical to continue farming on the Peninsula.
For example, the yield for an acre of wheat was $1 50. However, the cost for
fertilizer, seed, and chemicals was $1 18.50. This left a net gain of $31.50 per
acre or a total of $7,087 for the year on a 225-acre crop of wheat. After also
deducting the expenses of property taxes, equipment costs and repairs, fuel,
freight on the fertilizer, seed, and chemicals, and outside labor, this left very
little to cover living expenses or my own labor costs.

R. Vol. 2, pp. 394-395.
Stan Parks, who attempted to farm the East Point Farms property up until ten years ago,
similarly wrote of his inability to make money farming on the Powderhorn Peninsula.

R. Vol. 2, pp. 388-389.
I farmed the land on the peninsula that is referred to as East Point Farms. The
total property consists of approximately 600 acres of which 400 were
farmable ....During my five years of farming the land, 1 grew wheat, barley and
alfalfa ...I stopped farming the land over ten years ago. I stopped farming it
because I could not make any money farming it. Frankly, I had to take money
from my other businesses to pay for the cost I incurred to farm it. Not a very
smart way to do business.
R. Vol. 2, pp. 388-389.
The Agriculture Viability Analysis of Powderhorn Peninsula performed by Chad
Goldsmith, an expert from Washington State University with a degree in Crop and Soil
Science, (R. Vol. I , pp. 240-248) also concluded "traditional crops that have been grown on the
Powderhorn Peninsula are no longer viable." R. Vol. 2, p. 246. Mr. Goldsmith also analyzed
the viability of some alternative crops for future production such as alfalfa hay, canola
seedlrapeseed, Kentucky bluegrass seed, and lentilstpeas but concluded these crops were not a
realistic option for the Powderhorn Peninsula. He wrote as follows:
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Alfalfa Hay
Not an option because of "more cost involved to raise quality to compete in
regional markets. Also distance to regional markets would consume all increased
pricing potential." R. Vol. 2, p. 246.
CanolaIRapeseed
Would not be successful because "Not very profitable to grow in major
agricultural areas. The distance for crop inputs and end delivery point are a
concern." R. Vol. 2, p. 246.
Kentucky Bluegrass Seed
"Not a viable option with the weeds and the current state of the land. It would be
cost prohibitive to make the ground suitable for meaningful bluegrass production.
There is also a potential issue with burning harvest residue in the future."
R. Vol. 2, p. 246.
Lentils and Peas
"Not very profitable to grow in major agricultural areas and the distance for crop
inputs and end delivery point are a concern." R. Vol. 2, p. 246.
CRP program
Mr. Goldsmith reported that CRP is "an option and some Powderhorn land is in
the CRP Program; however this is not profitable for the area as most payments
would not cover property taxes." R. Vol. 2, p. 246.
Nothing in the record refutes or contradicts the above evidence that farming is no longer
viable on the Peninsula. The Commissioners were correct, and their Decision that land uses on
the Peninsula are no longer agricultural is substantially supported by substantive, competent
evidence in the Record.
The same result follows for timber. It is no longer a viable crop on the Peninsula.
R. Vol. 2, pp. 249-255. Lany Eisenburg, a forestry expert with Synergistic Solutions, Inc.,
performed a Timber Analysis of the Powderborn Peninsula and reported as follows:
The Powderhorn Peninsula is not a suitable site for commercially viable timber
production because of the combination of shallow soils and previous logging.
The physical evidence of the poor timber capacity on the Peninsula is obvious
when one examines the remaining trees. A healthy tree is characterized by a
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pointed, vigorously growing crown, pushed upward by the leader in the very
top, known as the apical meristem. It is in the apical meristem that the tree's
growth hormones are created, allowing thetree in a natural state, to grow in
height and effectively compete with adjacent trees for sunlight.. .Most of the
remaining trees on the Peninsula have instead, either poor leaders or flat tops,
which means they are neither healthy, nor rapidly growing. From a practical
standpoint, the area is better suited to shallow plants such as grasses, bushes and
smaller trees than it is for deeper rooted plants such as trees suitable for
commercial harvesting. Even though young trees will regenerate, they will
struggle to grow and will not mature into commercially valuable trees within
any economically acceptable time frame.

Based upon substantial evidence in the record, the Commissioners' decision was
correct. Pursuant to Idaho Code 67-5279(3)(d), the granting of the Amendment, "was
supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole." The Court should dismiss
Petitioners' First Cause of Action which cites and relies upon I.C. 67-5279(3)(d).
Next, pursuant to Idaho Code 67-5279(3)(e), the Court should dismiss Petitioners'
claim that the Commissioners' decision was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion.
The Commissioners properly considered and applied the correct legal standards, specifically
that the Comp. Plan can only be amended "to correct errors in the original plan or to recognize
substantial changes in the actual conditions in the area.. .." See Kootenai County Resolution
95-03. The overwhelming evidence showed the actual conditions on the Peninsula had
changed such that agriculture and timber were no longer viable uses.
Additionally, the proper standards are set out in the Comp. Plan land use descriptions
for Agricultural Areas and Timber Areas. The Kootenai County Comp. Plan, Part 1, p. 17,
states as follows:

Agricultural Areas
The purpose of this designation is to preserve existing productive
agricultural lands. Agricultural lands are defined as areas where the
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primary use is agricultural with dwellings incidental to the primary use.
Generally, agriculture is defined as the growing o r raising of agricultural
commodities. This includes livestock, dairy, poultry, fruit, and
fur-bearing animals. Incidental processing of agricultural products is
contemplated. Mining may be construed as a compatible use in this
designation.

Agricultural production from existing viable farm lands is a significant
part of the County's economy. Continued viability requires that these areas
remain in relatively large land units and that agricultural lands be
buffered and protected from encroachment by incompatible land uses.
Services and infrastructure are not expected to be improved in these areas.
Subdivision development is discouraged.
Comp. Plan, Part 1, p. 17 (emphasis added).
Timber Areas
The purpose of this designation is to preserve and protect existing
productive timber lands. Timber lands a r e defined as areas where the
primary use is timber production with dwellings incidental to the primary
use. Generally, timber production is defined as the growing and harvesting
of trees of a marketable species.

Similar to agriculture, timber production and processing also represents a
significant part of the County's economy. Uses allowed in areas designated for
timber production should be consistent with a goal of long term, sustainable
harvest. services and infrastructure are not expected to be improved in these
areas. Subdivision development is discouraged.
Comp. Plan, Part 1, p. 17 (emphasis added).
Based upon these Comp. Plan definitions, the Commissioners properly applied the legal
standards of Resolution 95-03 and found the Powderhorn Peninsula land no longer fit the
Comp. Plan categories and amended them to Rural. As a result, the Commissioners' Decision
is not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. This Court should dismiss Petitioners'
First Cause of Action which cites and relies upon Idaho Code 67-5279(3)(e). The
Commissioners applied the proper standards of review, adequate evidence supports it, and their
Decision should be upheld.
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D.

Petitioners Indirectly Seek an Unlawful Remedy; Tortiuus Interference with
M'ichman's Prospective Economic Advantage and L'nconsfitutional lnterference
with Wichman's Liberty Interest.

Without naming Wichman directly and without bringing him in as a party so he can
defend himself, Petitioners indirectly seek to put Wichman out of business. Petitioners are
demanding the Court overturn this Decision based upon Wichman's involvement, which they
contend is improper. However, nothing-that

is no contract, no covenant limiting future

employment, no Idaho statute, and no Idaho case law precludes Wichman from doing exactly
what he did. Yet, if Petitioners are successful in getting Powderhom's approval sent back, then
they have interfered with Wichman's private land use consulting business. If successful in this
Appeal, Petitioners could be liable to Wichman for intentional interference with a prospective
economic advantage.
The elements of the tort of intentional interference with a prospective economic
advantage are as follows: I ) The existence of a valid economic expectancy; 2)
knowledge of the expectancy on the part of the interferer; (3) intentional
interference inducing termination of the expectancy; (4) the interference was
wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the interference itself (i.e. that the
defendant interfered for an improper purpose or improper means) and (5)
resulting damage to the plaintiff whose expectancy has been disrupted.

Highland Enters. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 338,986 P.2d 996, 1004 (1999),
As we discussed in Bliss Valley Foods, in order to recover for the tort of
intentional interference with a prospective economic advantage, a plaintiff must
establish that the intentional interference by the defendant resulting in injury
was wrongful. This may be shown by proof that either: (1) the defendant had an
improper motive to harm the plaintifg or (2) the defendant used a wrongful
means to cause injury to the prospective advantage. Id. at 286, 824 P.2d at 861.
To be actionable, the means used to cause injury must be wrongful by reason of
a statute, regulation, recognized common law rule, or an established standard of
a trade or profession. Downey Clinic v. Nampo Resfaurant Corp., 127 idaho
283,286,900 P.2d 191, 194 ( I 995) (citing Top Sew. Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate,
283 Ore. 201,582 P.2d 1365, 1371 (Or. 1978)). What may be wrongful for an
unprivileged defendant in a given situation, however, may not be so when the
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defendant is acting under a recognized privilege. Bliss Valley Foods, 121 Idaho
at 286, 824 P.2d at 861.
Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins, Co., 129 Idaho 171, 178,923 P.3 416,424 (1996).
On a constitutional level, Petitioners are asking Kootenai County to violate its former
employee's liberty interest in earning a living in his chosen occupation.
Idaho has primarily relied on the Supreme Court's holding in Bd ofRegents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564,33 L. Ed. 2d 548,92 S. Ct. 2701 (1972) to describe the
amount of process due where there is a deprivation of a liberty interest
associated with employment. See Olson, 125 Idaho at 180, 868 P.2d 508. Roth
determined that due process was required where "a person's good name,
reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is
doing . . ." Roth, 408 U.S. at 573.
Huyett v. Idaho State Univ.,
140 Idaho 904,952, 140 Idaho 904,911 (2004).

E.

The Amended Petition and the Alternative Amended Petition were Not Filed
within 28 Davs of the Order Appealed. As a Result, this Court Lacks Jurisdiction
to Consider a LLUPA Appeal of the November 16,2006, Amended Order.
Powderhorn seeks dismissal of the Amended Petition and the Alternative Amended

Petition as being untimely filed. Absent a timely filed appeal of a final decision, this Court
lacks jurisdiction to consider land use decisions issued by a local governmental agency.9
Section 67-6521(1)(d) authorizes a person aggrieved by a local government's final action to
seek judicial review by filing within 28 days.
(d) An affected person aggrieved by a decision may within twenty-eight (28)
days after all remedies have been exhausted under local ordinances seek judicial
review as provided by Chapter 52, Title 67, Idaho code."
Section 67-6521(1)(d).
The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act, Chapter 52, Title 67, Idaho Code (IDAPA)
also governs judicial review of local administrative decisions." A person aggrieved by a "final

ldaho Code 5 67-6521 (2006).
ldaho Code 5 67-6521(l)(d).
" Stevenson v. Blab?e Cty., 137 Idaho 756,759.9 P.3d 1222 (2000)
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order" or "final agency action" must comply with the timely filing requirements of Idaho Code
$567-5271-67-5278." A person must wait until all administrative remedies are exhausted
before filing an appeal of a final order or final agency action.I3 Any appeal filed before a final
order or final agency action is premature and does not vest the Court with jurisdiction to review
a non-final order.I4 Only after the exhaustion of remedies provided under the Act [the Local
Planning Act of 19751 and under local ordinances may an unsuccessful applicant or an affected
person seek judicial review." Id.
Petitioners herein failed to comply with Idaho Code 967-6521(1)(d) and Idaho Code
$§67-5271 - 67-5278. The Board's November 9,2006, Order was not a final order; it was
replaced by the Board's subsequent Amended Order issued one week later on November 16,
2006. Thus, Petitioners sought judicial review of an agency decision that was not a final order
or a final agency decision in violation of I.C. 5 67-5271. Petitioners subsequent and repeated
attempts at appeal-the

Amended Petition filed February 5,2007, and the Alternative

Amended Petition filed April 6, 2007-are
comply with I.C.

extremely untimely in that Petitioners failed to

5 67-6521(1)(d) in failing to file within 28 days of the November

16,2006,

Amended Order of Decision, of which they seek judicial review. Petitioners' failure to file
within 28 days of the Board's final order deprives this Court of jurisdiction and mandates
dismissal of the Petition for Judicial ~ e v i e w . "
The 28-day period for filing an appeal of the Commissioners' final order began running
on November 16, 2006, when the Board issued their "written findings, conclusions, and

l2

Idaho Code $67-5270(2)-(3).

'' Idaho Code 67-5271(1).

"Jerome County by Board of Comm'rs v. Holloway, 118 Idaho 681,685, 799 P.2d 969,974 (1990); Palmer v.
Board ofcounty Com'rs, I 1 7 Idaho 562,565,790 P.2d 343,346 (1990).
I s Arthur v. Shoshone County, 133 Idaho 854,993 P.2d 617 (Ct. App. 2000); Enright v. Blaine County, 127 Idaho
498,903 P.2d 87 (1995).
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order."I6 Thus, a timely filed and served notice of appeal was due no later than December 14,
2006. Petitioners have not timely appealed the Commissioners' November 16,2006, "final
order" by filing in February and April. It is simply too late. If Petitioners are allowed to
disregard the 28-day deadline and have their February and April Petitions considered by this
Court, then one wonders why even have a 28-day filing deadline.

F.

There is No "Proiect" and No "Zoning Decision" as Part of the Powderhorn
Application to Amend the Como. Plan's Future Land Use Map Desi~nation.
Comprehensive Plan Future Land Use designations are not zoning determinations, nor

do Future Land Use designations determine any specific project standards. See Kootenai
County Comp. Plan, Part. 1, p. 16, entitled "Land Use Designations." The concept of a Future
Land Use designation is completely factually and legally distinct from any zoning rights or
standards and is completely factually and legally distinct from any project-related design
standards. Unlike zoning designations or project approvals, Comp. Plan designations do nat
convey any legal rights, permits, or uses. Seegenerally Cooper v. Board ofCounty Comm'rs,
101 Idaho 407,412 (Idaho 1980). The Powderhorn Future Land Use Map Amendment did not
and could not seek a zoning designation, nor could it obtain any zoning or project rights. The
Comp. Plan sets out the following description for Future Land Use Designations, expressly
excluding any specific project rights or standards, stating:
The Future Land Use component of the Comprehensive Plan broadly addresses
the general direction and type of development within the County. It is not
intended to specify exact standards that must be met (e.g. minimum lot sizes,
specific allowed uses, setbacks, etc.) Ordinances address the precise standards
and regulations to guide development in the direction outlined in the
Comprehensive Plan.
Kootenai County Comp. Plan, Part. 1, p. 16, entitled "Land Use Designations."

''

ln the context of local land use planning decisions pursuant to the LLUPA, Idaho Code 5 67-6501, el seq., Idaho
Courts have previously held the date on which the decision is made corresponds to the date of the written findings,
conclusions and order, which starts the time for filing an appeal. See While v. Bannock County Comm'rs, 139
ldaho 396.80 P.3d 332 (2003); Fischer v. City ofKetchum, 141 ldaho 349,355 (Idaho 2005).
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Petitioners throughout their Opening Brief repeatedly and erroneously refer to the
'owderhom Application as involving a "project" and "zoning." There is no "project" as part of
he Comp. Plan Future Land Use designation, nor is there any "zoning." Instead, this
Application and the Commissioners' decision properly and correctly dealt with "the Future
Land Use component of the Comprehensive Plan [which] broadly addressed the general
direction and type of development in the County. It [was] not intended to specifL exact
standards that must be met ..." Id.
G

This Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Judicially Review the Board of Countv
Commissioners' Comprehensive Plan Amendment, including the Future Land Use
Map Designation. as it is a Legislative Matter.
Powderhorn's approved Comprehensive Plan Amendment is a legislative matter. The

Application applied to the entire geographic area known as the Powderhom Peninsula.
Kootenai County Planner Mark Mussman admitted and documented that this Application was a
"legislative matter" involving "numerous pieces of property." R. Vol. 1, p. 131 (emphasis
added).
"Promulgation or enactment of general plans and ordinances is a legislative action."I7
"Action is legislative when it affects a large area consisting of many parcels of property in
disparate ownership. Conversely, action is considered quasi-judicial when it applies a general
rule to a specific interest, such as a zoning change affecting a single piece of property,'8 a
variance, or a conditional use permit."'9

Burt v. Cify oflduho Fulls, I05 Idaho 65,665 P.2d 1075 f 1983).
Contrary to the "single piece of property" requirement for a quasi-judicial matter, this Application dealt with
approximately 186 pieces of property.
19
Id at 68 n.4.; citing Marrin Cy. v. Yusem, 690 So.2d 1288, 1292 (Ela. 1997).
I'

18
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In Martin Cy. v.

us ern:^ the Court held that legislative actions "result in the

formulation of a general rule of policy," and quasi-judicial actions "result in the a ~ ~ l i c a t i oofn a
general rule of policy." The comprehensive plan formulates the general rules of policy and is
therefore legislative. A subsequent permit or development approval may actually apply the
comprehensive plan rules and is therefore quasi-judicial.
The Court in Yusem, held:
We expressly conclude that amendments to comprehensive land use plans are
legislative decisions. This conclusion is not affected by the fact that the
amendments to comprehensive land use plans are being sought as part of an
application in respect to only one piece of property.

***

...[T]here is no reason to treat a county's decision rejecting a proposed
modification of a previously adopted land use plan as any less legislative in
nature than the decision initially adopting the plan.

***

Our conclusion that amendments to comprehensive plans are legislative
decisions is fu-@hersupported by the procedures for effecting such amendments
under the Act."'
In Burt v. City of Idaho ~ a l l sthe
, ~Supreme
~
Court of Idaho specifically held that "the
annexation of land, the subsequent amendment of the comprehensive plan and the zoning of
the annexed land" was a leeislative function, as opposed to quasi-judicial function. Id. at 68.23
The ldaho Court further held that "such lleeislativel actions are not subject to direct judicial

review."24 "Legislative action is shielded from direct judicial review by its high visibility and
widely felt impact on the theory that an appropriate remedy can be had at the polls."25 As with
all legislative matters, Powderhorn's Comp. Plan Amendment certainly and undeniably had
690 So.2d 1288, 1292 (Fla. 1997).
" Morfin Cy v. Yusem, 690 So.2d 1288, 1293 (Fla. 1997).
22 Burt v. Ciry ofldoho Falls, 105 ldaho 65,665 P.2d 1075 (1983).
" Because the subject land was being annexed into the City of Idaho Falls, it obviously involved "a specifically
identiiiable property." However, simply because the comprehensive plan amendment dealt with "specifically
identifiable land," it did not mean that the comprehensive plan amendment somehow became a quasi-judicial
decision. It did not, it remained a legislative decision.
24 Id,
20
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"high visibility and widely felt impact" throughout Kootenai County. R. Vol. 2-6. An
appropriate remedy could certainly be had at the polls.
In Burt, the Court expressly stated as follows:
We hold that in the annexation of land, the subsequent amendment of the
comprehensive plan and the zoning of the annexed land, I.C. F) 67-6525, the
city council acted in a legislative manner, see Cooper, supra; Dawson, supra;
Harrell, supra; see also City of Louisville v. District Court In and For County of
Boulder, 190 Colo. 33, 543 P.2d 67 (Colo.1975); Golden v. City ofoverland
Park, 224 Kan. 591,584 P.2d 130 (Kan. 1978), and that such actions are not
subiect to direct iudicial review. See, e.g., Dawson, supra. Costs awarded to
defendants-respondents.26
Powderhom's Comprehensive Plan Amendment is likewise legislative and is not subject to
direct judicial review.
Aside from Burt, which held that Comprehensive Plan Amendments are legislative
matters not subject to judicial review, no other Idaho appellate decisions appear to have
addressed this issue. However, by analogy, numerous courts in other jurisdictions have
similarly ruled that amendments to a comprehensive plan are legislative actions. For example,
in Coastal Development v. City ofJacksonville

the Court expressly held that glJ

comprehensive ~ l a namendments, including comorehensive plan amendments to only the
future land use map, are Iegisiative. The comprehensive plan amendment at issue in Coastal
Development did not involve a proposed change to comprehensive plan goals, policies, and
objectives, but, as was the case with the Powderhorn Peninsula Comprehensive Plan
Amendment, the Application only sought a land use change to the Comprehensive Plan's
Future Land Use Map (FLUM) designation. Id. In holding that the Comprehensive Plan
Future Land Use Map amendment was legislative, the Court stated as follows:

"Burt v, Idaho Falls, 105 Idaho 65,68,665 P. 2d 1075 (1983).
Coastal Development v. Cifyof Jacksonville Beach, 788 So.2d 204,2001 Fla. LEXIS 743 (200 I ) ,

27
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A comprehensive plan is composed of several elements. One element of the
comprehensive plan is the future land use element. The future land use element
designates "proposed future general distribution, location, and extent of the uses
of land for residential uses, commercial uses, industry, agriculture, recreation,
conservation, education, public buildings and grounds, other public facilities,
and other categories of the public and privates uses of land." The future land use
map (FLUM) is a component of the future land use element of the
comprehensive plan. See Yusem, 690 So.2d at 1292. The FLUM is a pictorial
depiction of the future land use element and is supplemented by written "goals,
policies, and measurable objectives." The FLUM must be internally consistent
with the other elements of the comprehensive plan.

***

In Yusem, we held that all comprehensive plan amendments are legislative
decisions.

***

made of partichar tract of land. Rather, the comprehensive plan as a whole,
including the future land use map and all of the other policies of the plan,
consists of legislative policies that must be applied to determine what uses can
be made of a specific tract of land.28
Additional courts have similarly so held. In Holbrook v. Clark c',~~ the Washington
Court of Appeals held that the adoption of an area-wide comprehensive plan designation was
legislative, despite the fact that the comprehensive plan designation adversely affected specific
and identifiable landowners. The Court ruled as follows:
No bright line separates judicial from legislative actions. Rayaes v.
Leavenworth, 118 Wn.2d 237,243,821 P.2d 1204 (1992). But area-wide
actions, such as the adoption of comprehensive plans and zoning ordinances,
involving the e x e r c s o f the le~islativebody's policv-making role, are
enerallv considered legislative . . . . And such actions are not made quasi?udicial simply because they affect specific individuals, even if the method
khosen by t&<legislative bddy to acquire input from the property owners allows
the owners to discuss their own properties. . . The determining factor is whether
the decision is a policy-making one: "Although legislative decisions may appear
adjudicatory when groups focus on how the particular decisions will affect their
See Coastal Development v. Cify ofJacksonville Beach, 788 So.2d 204,2001 Fla. LEXIS 743 (2001), citing
Martin Cy. v. Yusem, 690 So.2d 1288, 1292 (Fla. 1997) and Thomas G. Pelham, Quasi-Judicial Rezonings: A
Commentary on the Snyder Decision and the Consistency Requirement, 9 .I.
Land Use & Envtl. L. 243, 300-3001
( I 994).
29 112 Wn. App. 354,365,49 P.3d 142 (2002),
28
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' HEARTLAND'S

individual rights, all yolicy decisions begin with the consideration and balancing
of individual rights."

'

In Jones v. King c~.,"the Washington Court of Appeals likewise held that revisions to
comprehensive plans (even for a specific designated neighborhood) are legislative
determinations. In defining and explaining what local land use decisions should not be
considered quasi-judicial, the Court wrote as follows:
Quasi-judicial actions of local decision-making bodies are those actions of the
legislative body, planning commission, hearing examiner, zoning adjuster, board
of adjustment, or boards which determine the legal rights, duties, or privileges of
specific parties in a hearing or other contested case proceeding. Quasi-judicial
actions do not include the legislative actions adopting, amendinv. or
revising comprehensive, community, or neighborhood plans or other land
use planning documents or the adoption of area-wide zoning ordinan5:s or
the adoption of a zoning amendment that is of area-wide significance.
Numerous other courts have followed these rulings in concluding that amendments to
comprehensive plans are legislative decisions.33
In conclusion, Kootenai County, through its Planner Mark Mussman and its Legal
Counsel John Cafferty, has documented, admitted, and confirmed that not only is Powderhorn's
Comprehensive Plan Amendment a legislative matter, but the other Comp. Plan amendments
(internal citations omitted).
74 Wn. App. 467,874 P.2d 853 (1994)
32 Jones v. King Cy., 74 Wn. App. 467,874 P.2d 853 (1994) (emphasis original).
33
See e.g., Yusem, 690 So.2d at 1293 ("...we expressly conclude that amendments to comprehensive land use
plans are legislative decisions. This conclusion is not affected by the fact that the amendments to the
comprehensive land use plans are being sought as part of a rezoning application in respect lo only one piece of
property"); see City Envtl. Servs. LandrfiN, Inc. v. Holntes Cy,, 677 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. IS' D.C.A. 1996) (Court held,
"The resolution of this case hinges on whether the board of county commissioners' denial of petitioner's proposed
amendments to the comprehensive land use plan was a legislative action ... or a quasi-judicial action ... The case
law indicates that the board of county commissioner's action in this case [amending the comprehensive plan] was
legislative."); See Summit Ridge Develop. Co. v. City oflndependence, 821 S.W.2d 51 6 (1991) (the "exercise of
the zoning powers delegated to the cities including the enactment of ordinances amending the comprehensive plan
is a legislative function"); See Martin Cy. v. Section 28 Partnership, Lld., 676 So.2d 532 (Fla. 4Ih D.C.A. 1996);
Bd. of Cty. Comm 'rs v. Karp. 662 So.2d 718 (Fla. 2d. D.C.A. 1995) (Pursuant to a comprehensive plan, the board
of county commissioners adopted a corridor plan for a specific area of respondent's property, and included in the
corridor plan, a conditional easement that was applicable only to respondents' property. The court held that the
adoption of the corridor plan by the board of county commissioners as part of the comprehensive plan, was a
legislative, not quasi-judicial, act.)
" Id.
31
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being proposed around the County through the "Meeting in a Box" process are likewise
legislative. Because this legislative matter is not subject to judicial review, this Court lacks
jurisdiction. The Petitions should be dismissed.

H.

Declaratorv Relief is Not Recoverable in this Petition for Judicial Review.
Petitioners' Declaratory Relief claim was not only waived by Petitioners' failure to raise

it before the Commissioners, but it is not a proper claim for a Petition for Judicial Review.
Idaho Code 67-5270 and Urrutia v. Blaine County Board ofCommissioners, 134 Idaho 353,
360,2 P.3d 738 (2000). Petitioners seek to put in all kinds of new evidence to obtain
declaratory relief, but the exhibits outside the Record should be stricken and the declaratory
relief claim fails. See Powderhorn's Motion to Strike evidence outside the Record on Appeal.

1.

Powderhorn is Entitled to Attorney's Fees and Costs.
Powderhorn seeks an award of attorney's fees pursuant to I.C.

3 12-12],

The mandatory

statute provides:

3 12-1 17. Attorney's fees, witness fees and expenses awarded in certain
instances:
(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative or civil judicial
proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency, a city, a county or other
taxing district and a person, the court shall award the prevailing party reasonable
attorney's fees, witness fees and reasonable expenses, if the court finds that the
party against whom the judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in
fact or law.
(2) If the prevailing party is awarded a partial judgment and the court finds the
party against whom partial judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable
basis in fact or law, the court shall allow the prevailing party's attorney's fees,
witness fees and expenses in an amount which reflects the person's partial
recovery.
Idaho Code 5 12- 1 17.
The statute is not discretionary but provides that the court must award attorney's fees
where a party did not act with a reasonable basis in fact or law in a proceeding involving a
person who prevails in the action. See Depft of Finance v. Resource Service Co., Inc., 134
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Idaho 282,284, I P.3d 783, 785 (2000). An award under this statute is appropriate if the Court
is left with the abiding belief that the appeal was brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably
or without foundation. Nat'I Union Fire Ins. Co. ofpittshurgh, P.A. v. Dixon, 141 Idaho 537,
542, 112 P.3d 825,830 (2005); Fischer v. City ofKetchum, 141 Idaho 349, 109 P.3d 1091
(2005).
Pursuant to Idaho Code 12-1 17, Powderhorn is entitled to an award of attorney's fees
and costs. No Idaho case law is cited or supports Petitioners' case. As a whole, this is a
frivolous suit brought without any reasonable basis in fact or law. Petitioners admit that Idaho
has no law supporting their so-called "conflict of interest" claim. In a lack of candor to the
Court, Petitioners not only failed to point out the unfavorable authority of Cowan, which is
directly on point, hut Petitioners seek to have the Court make or create a contrary rule herein.
Additionally, Petitioners continue their personal attack on Commissioner Brodie
without a reasonable basis in law or fact. The curative measures set out in Idaho Code 67-5253
the Eacret, and in Idaho Historic demonstrate Commissioner Brodie properly disclosed the
disputed communications and properly gave public notice and the opportunity to address the
comments. No legal authority exists holding that these curative measures did not resolve any
due process issues.
Similarly, Petitioners have absolutely no facts in this Record to show any evidence of
bias. Instead, they rather desperately grasp at straws by improperly attaching and referencing
another case, another application, from years ago about "warm exchanges" with Rand
Wichman. These comments do not show bias, and they certainly do not show actual bias as
required by Idaho law. Thus, no facts in the Record, or even outside the Record from another
case, provide any reasonable basis for Petitioners' claim.
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Next, no facts or law support Petitioners' claim that the Commissioners' Decision
lacked factual support in the Record or was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.
Farmer after farmer testified the land was no longer viable for agriculture. The expert Chad
Goldsmith agreed. Similarly, the timber expert Lany Eisenberg submitted his report in the
Record that timber production was also no longer viable on the Peninsula. Thus, Petitioners'
claim that substantial evidence in the Record failed to support the change from Agriculture and
Timber redesignations to Rural is completely meritless. Petitioners failed to support their
claims with a reasonable basis in law or fact and attorney's fees should be awarded under
I.C. 12-117.

CONCLUSION
Powderhorn seeks dismissal of all Petitions because:
1.

From the inception of this matter, the Court has been without jurisdiction;

2.

Legislative matters, such as this Comprehensive Plan Amendment, are not

subject to Petitions for Judicial Review;
3.

LLUPA has specific time deadlines and Petitioners failed to timely appeal the

final order in this matter issued by Kootenai County on November 16,2006;
4.

The November 15, 2006, Petition was premature in that it did not appeal a final

order and it was rendered moot by the November 16,2006, Amended Petition;
5.

Petitioners' First Cause of Action fails under I.C. 67-5279(3), because "(c ) no

unlawful procedure deprived Petitioners of their due process rights; (d) substantial evidence on
the record as a whole supported the decision; and (e) the Commissioners' decision was not
arbitrary, capricious, or the result of an abuse of discretion." Even if Petitioners established a
violation of subsections (c), (d), or (e) (which they have not), their appeal must be denied
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because Petitioners failed to allege or establish that a substantial right of the claimant has been
prejudiced;

6.

Petitioners' Second Cause of Action entitled "Unlawful Ex Parte

Communication" fails to state a legally cognizable claim;

7.

Petitioners' Third Cause of Action entitled "Wichman Conflict of Interest" fails

to state a legally cognizable claim;

8.

Petitioners' Fourth Cause of Action fails because Declaratory Relief claims

cannot properly be joined with this LLUPA appeal and because Petitioners waived this claim
by failing to raise it before the Commissioners; and,

9.

Petitioners seek to tortuously interfere with the business relations and business

expectancy of Rand Wichman Planning Services LLC.
The Petition should be denied with costs and attorney's fees awarded to Powderhorn.
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DATED this 27th day of April, 2007.
LUKINS & ANNIS, P.S.
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POWDERHORN COMMUNITIES, LLC,
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LAND COMPANY, and H. F.
MAGNUSON,

COME NOW Intervenors, Coeur d'Alene Land Company and H. F. Magnuson, pursuant
to I.R.C.P. 84 and I.C. 5 67-5276, and join in the "Motion to Strike" filed by Intervenors
Powderhorn and Heartland on April 27,2007.
Dated this 41h day of May, 2007.

w for Intervenors Coeur d'Alene Land Co.
Attorney
and Harry F. Magnuson
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Attomey for Intervenors Coeur d'Alene Land Company and
H. F. Magnuson

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
NEIGHBORS FOR RESPONSIBLE
GROWTH, a non-profit unincorporated
association; PRESERVE OUR RURAL
COMMUNITIES, a non-profit
unincorporated association; KOOTENAI
ENVIRONMENTAL ALLIANCE, INC.,
a non-profit corporation; NORBERT and
BEVERLY TWILLMANN; GREG and
JANET TORLINE; SUSAN MELKA;
MERLYN and JEAN NELSON,

KOOTENAI COUNTY, a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho acting
through the KOOTENAI COUNTY
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS; S.J.
"GUS" JOHNSON, CHAIRMAN;
ELMER R. "RICK" CURRIE and KATIE
BRODIE, COMMISSIONERS, in their
official capacities; and KATIE BRODIE,
personally and individually,
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NO. CV-06-8574

RESPONSE BRIEF OF
INTERVENORS COEUR D'ALENE
LAND COMPANY AND H. F.
MAGNUSON

and
POWDERHORN COMMUNITIES, LLC,
HEARTLAND, LLC, COEUR D'ALENE
LAND COMPANY, and H. F.
MAGNUSON,

COMENOW Coeur d'Alene Land Company and H. F. Magnuson, intervenors in the abovecaptioned matter pursuant to the Court's March 6,2007 "Order Granting Motion to Intervene," by
and through their counsel of record, John F. Magnuson, and respectfully submit this Memorandum
in response to the "Opening Brief' filed by Petitioners on February 14,2007

I. INTRODUCTION
This proceeding arises out of a "Petition for Judicial Review" filed by the Petitioners
pursuant to I.C.

9 67-6251. See Petition at 7 7.'

The Petition specifically seeks review from the

County's November 9,2006 Order of Decision amending Kootenai County's Comprehensive Plan.
Id. at $/ 33.
Intervenor/Respondent Powderhom Communities, LLC (hereafter "Powderhorn"), with the
assistance of Heartland, LLC (hereafter "Heartland"), initially requested that the County amend its
'Although the initial Petition ostensibly set forth two (2) "causes of action," it seems that
the Petitioners have in actuality alleged two (2) alternative bases for appellate reversal of the
Kootenai County's November 9,2006 Order of Decision. The two (2) "causes of action," labeled
as "Remand of Order of Decision" and "Unlawful Ex Parte Communications," are raised under
I.C. $9 67-5279(3) and 67-5263, respectively, both found in the Idaho Administrative Procedures
Act (1.C. $9 67-5201 et seq.). Aside from their alternative theories for reversal and vacatur of the
November 7,2006 Order, as advanced to this Court in its appellate capacity under the applicable
provisions of the IDAPA, Petitioners have yet to properly procedurally plead an independent
claim for declaratory relief, whether under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (I.C. 5 101201, et seq.) or otherwise.
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Comprehensive Plan to change the designation of 2,725 acres from Agricultural to Rural Residential.
R., Vol. I, pp. 20-23, 141-152. IntervenorsIRespondents Coeur d'Alene Land Company and H. F.
Magnuson (hereafter collectively referred to as "Magnuson") own approximately four hundred
seventy (470) of the acres made subject to the request.

d.at p. 32. The remaining owners include

Bla Bar, Inc. and Charles R. Blakley (219 acres), Eastpoint Farms, Inc. (533 acres), and Powderhorn
Communities, LLC. R., Vol. I, pp. 30, 32,64.
Following multiple hearings, described more fully below, and based on substantial and
significant evidence, the County approved the requested amendment to its Comprehensive Plan. In
so doing, the County clearly acted in its legislative capacity. Notwithstanding the same, the
Petitioners, who own

land within the area subject to the amendment, have petitioned this Court

for appellate review, under the IDAPA, improperly seeking appellate review of a legislative
determination. In support of their request, the Petitioners have filed and lodged reams and reams of
written submittals in a shot-gun approach to distract the Court's attention from the fact that this
proceeding is jurisdictionally defective and substantively meritless. The Petitioners attempt to paint
a picture that seemingly resembles Peyton Place when in actuality it smacks more of Fantasia. For
the reasons set forth below, and for those separately advanced by Powderhorn and Heartland (which
are incorporated herein as though set forth in full), Intervenor Magnuson respectfully requests that
the subject Petition be dismissed with prejudice and in its entirety.
11. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A.

Administrative Backeround.

On December 16, 2005, Heartland, as agent for the owners of approximately 2,725 acres
(including Magnuson), requested that the County amend the designation for said acreage, as
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contained in the Comprehensive Plan, from Agricultural to Rural Residential. R., Vol. I, p. 57.'
The County's Planning Commission, following an April 27,2006 hearing on the Application,
recommended denial of the same. R., Vol. 111, pp. 569-72. The Commissioners, without passing on
the merits of the request in detail, recommended that the applicants involve themselves in a
subsequent legislative process to "update" the County's existing Comprehensive Plan. Id.
Approximately thirty (30) days after the Planning Commission's recommended denial, Rand
Wichman, then Kootenai County Planning Director, resigned. Three (3) months after Wichman's
resignation, the matter came on for hearing anew before the County's Board of Commissioners.
Wichman, having entered private practice in Kootenai County as a consultant following his
resignation from the County, provided professional services to the applicants with respect to various
issues, including the subject Application.
Approximately ten (10) days after the September 26, 2006 public hearing concluded, the
County Commissioners conducted a site visit to the property encompassed by the proposed
amendment. Tr., Vol. I, pp. 106-201. The Commissioners were accompanied on their inspection by
Petitioner Twillman, representatives of the applicants, and County Attorney John Cafferty.
The day after the visit (September 26,2006), Petitioners objected to alleged exparte conduct
during the visit which, although notwithstanding the intimations and conjecture of Petitioners,
occurred in their plain view. R., Vol. 11, pp. 367,374.
On September 28,2006, the Commissioners convened to hold deliberations on the subject
requests. Given the allegations raised by Petitioners, including the allegations of Petitioner

2The Application was subsequently amended so as to request an amendment from
Agricultural to Rural. R., Vol. 111, pp. 682-83.
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Twillman, the Commissioners determined to reopen public testimony for a new public hearing,
related to the issues arising out of the site visit, and set the same for October 4,2006. Tr., Vol. I, pp.
204-09.j
On October 5,2006, the County Commissioners held deliberations on the subject application.
R., Vol. 111, p. 618; Tr., Vol. I, pp. 229-234. Following deliberation and weighing of the evidence,
Chairman Johnson and Commissioner Brodie voted to approve the requested amendment to the
County's Comprehensive Plan, changing the designation of the subject property from Agricultural
to Rural. Tr., Vol. I, p. 234.
On November 9, 2006, the Commissioners signed an Order of Decision changing the
Comprehensive Plan Use Map designation for the subject property from Agricultural to Rural. R.,
Vol. 111, pp. 604-14. As this was a legislative matter, the Board contemporaneously passed a
Resolution adopting the amendment to the Comprehensive Plan. R., Vol. I, pp. 100-04.
On November 16, 2006, the Board of Commissioners modified their November 9, 2006
Decision, and adopted an Amended Order of Decision which superseded the November 9, 2006
Order of Decision. R., Vol. 111, pp. 591-600. The November 16, 2006 Amended Order constituted
the final action taken by the Commissioners with respect to the subject application and amendment
to the Comprehensive Plan. For purposes of this Memorandum, the November 9, 2006 Order of
Decision (R., Vol. 111, pp. 604-1 3) will be referred to as "the Initial Order." The November 16,2006
Amended Order of Decisioil (R., Voi. 111, pp. 591-600) shall be referred to as "the Final Order."

31ntervenors/RespondentsPowderhorn and Heartland have fully and accurately
summarized the course of proceedings at the October 4,2006 re-opened public hearing in their
Opposition Brief at pp. 7-12. That summary will not be repeated here. It is incorporated as
though set forth in full.
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On November 9,2006, the County's Board adopted the Initial Order (R., Vol. 111, pp. 60413). Contemporaneously therewith, the Board, by unanimous decision, adopted ResolutionNo. 200692, which legislatively modified the County's Comprehensive Plan, pursuant to I.C. 5 67-6509, as
to the property at issue. Six days later, the Petitioners filed their "Petition for Judicial Review" which
sought the following:
"review of the issuance on November 9, 2006 of Findings of Fact,
Applicable Legal Standards, Conclusions of Law, Comprehensive
Plan Analysis and Order of Decision in Case No. CP-080-05 granting
arequest by Powderhorn Communities, LLC . . .for acomprehensive
Plan amendment from Agricultural to Rural. . . ."
See Petition for Judicial Review at p. 2. The statutory authority upon which the action was brought
was identified as I.C. 5 67-6521 and

$5 67-5270-67-5277.4

Petitioners thereafter, on an ex parte basis as to

aif owners of property

within the area

encompassed by the Initial Order, including Intervenors Magnuson, moved to stay further
proceedings before the County Board, including Intervenor multiple applications for zone changes
consistent with the newly-adopted amendment to the Comprehensive Plan. The authority for the
motion was IRCP 84(m).'

'LC. 5 67-6521 is included in the "Local Land Use Planning Act." Section 67-6521
provides for a judicial appeal from a final decision regarding the "denial of a permit authorizing .
. . development. . . ." Pursuant to 5 67-6521(1)(d), the &must be filed within twenty-eight
(28) days after the decision is entered. If timely filed, the appeal is to be processed under I.C. $5
67-5270 through 67-5277 of the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act (IDAPA).
$Rule 84(m) authorizes a stay of agency action during an appeal provided no less than
two conditions are met. First, the appeal must be one with jurisdiction (i.e., it cannot be an appeal
from a purely legislative act of the "agency"). Second, any stay must be "on appropriate terms."
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Powderhorn and Heartland thereafter moved to intervene. Powderhorn and Heartland also
sought to oppose the stay requested by the Petitioners. Following hearing, the Court entered its
December 19, 2006 Order authorizing Powderhorn and Heartland to intervene and granting the
Petitioners' Motion for Stay without any corresponding security, bond, or other ~ndertaking.~
On January 29,2007, Powderhorn and Heartland moved the Court to dismiss the Petitioners'
"Petition for Judicial Review," asserting that this Court lacked jurisdiction to review the Initial Order
in that it constituted a legislative determination of the Board. The Intervenors also argued that the
Petition had been rendered moot since it sought judicial review of the Initial Order, which was
thereafter superseded by the Final Order (entered November 15,2006).
Recognizing the legal infirmity created by their request for judicial review from a legislative
action, the Petitioners, sua soonte, filed an "Amended Petition for Judicial Review" on February 5,
2007. The attempted Amended Petition sought judicial review from the November 16,2006 Final
Order even though the Petition was filed well outside of the twenty-eight (28) date limitations set
forth in the Local Land Use Planning Act (I.C. 5 67-6521(1)(d)). Further, the Amended Petition
sought to "skirt" the jurisdictional defect (i.e., an attempted appeal from a legislative determination)
by adding a claim for declaratory relief under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (I.C. 5 101201 et seq ).

'jIn addition to arguing that no stay should enter given that the Petition was improperly
filed from a legislative determination, Intervenors Powderhorn and Heartland argued that any
stay needed to be supported by an appropriate undertaking given that the owners of the subject
property had spent in excess of $30,000.00 getting ready for the public hearings (which were
enjoined by the Court) and .the additional estimated canying costs of $20,000.00 in interest
expense as a result of what was then thought to be a three (3) month delay.
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In any and all events, the attempted filing ofthe Amended Petition ran directly afoul of IRCP

15. Under the circumstances, as discussed more fully below, the Petitioners could only amend their
pleading by leave of Court. Under any and all events, said leave cannot be granted when it would
revive a claim otherwise barred by the intervening running of the applicable statute of limitations
(which in this case is the twenty-eight (28) day period set forth in I.C. 5 67-6521).
Landowners Coeur d'Alene Land Company and Magnuson thereafter petitioned the Court
for permission to intervene as parties actually owning property subject to the Board's Final Order
of November 16,2006. Intervenors Powderhorn and Heartland objected to the Amended Petition
which the Petitioners had attempted to file and contemporaneously moved to strike the same. On
February 27, 2007, following hearing, the Court granted Magnuson's Motion for Permissive
Intervention. The Court also denied the PowderhorniHeartland Motion to Dismiss the Petitioners'
Initial Petition on the ground of mootness. While reserving ruling on the propriety of an appeal from
a legislative action and the propriety of the Petitioners' sua monte attempted filing of an Amended
Petition, the Court appeared to hold that the Board's issuance of a Final Order after the Initial Order
which did not modify or change the ultimate outcome of the Initial Order did not render the initial
Petition for Review moot. Given the Court's observations, the Petitioners followed the hearing by
filing an "Alternative Motion for Leave To Amend," seeking leave of the Court to file the Amended
Petition for Review which they had lodged or attempted to file some two months prior.
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111. ARGUMENT.

A.

The Petition for Review Should Be Dismissed On Jurisdictional Grounds In
that It Imuroperly Seeks Judicial Review of A Legislative Determination.
1.

There is no statutom right for direct appellate review of a
Countv's amendment to its Comurehensive Plan.

The provisions of the Local Land Use Planning Act (I.C. $ 67-6501 et seq.) make clear that
a county board's adoption and subsequent amendment of a Comprehensive Plan is a legislative
matter. The Act further makes clear that there is no right to seek direct judicial review, through the
appellate process, of such a legislative determination
Section 67-6508 authorizes counties to develop Comprehensive Plans applicable to all land
within the given county's jurisdiction.

See I.C. $67-6508.

Such Plan is to "consider previous and

existing conditions, trends, desirable goals and objectives, or desirable future situations" for each
applicable planning component. Id.The adoption of the Plan, by the county's governing board, must
be by resolution and is in and of itself a legislative act. &g I.C. 5 67-6509(b). See also Gumurecht
v. Citv of Coeur d'Alene, 104 Idaho 615,661 P.2d 1214 (1983). Such a plan, once adopted, may be
amended upon proper notice and hearing. See I.C. $ 67-6509(a). As with the initial adoption of a
Comprehensive Plan, the subsequent amendment thereof is equally a legislative act. A plan or part
of a plan may only be amended by resolution. &g I.C. $ 67-6509(c).
The Local Land Use Planning Act makes clear that one who claims to be aggrieved by a
county board's adoption of a resolution to amend a portion of a Comprehensive Plan may not seek
direct judicial appellate review. I.C. 3 67-6521 provides for direct judicial review under the Act, but
that right to review is limited to determinations related to "the issuance or denial of a permit
authorizing. . . development." See I.C. $ 67-6521(1)(a). There has been no decision by the County
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either issuing or denying a permit so as to allow development on any of the property encompassed
by the amendment adopted by the Initial Order or the Final Order. Indeed, any such further action
has been stayed by this Court. Only those persons claiming to be adversely affected by the "issuance
or denial of a permit authorizing. . . development," as opposed to persons claiming to be adversely
affected from a legislative determination to amend a Comprehensive Plan, may seek judicial review.
Even so, those seeking judicial review must do so within twenty-eight (28) days after entry of the
challenged Order.
2.

Idaho Case Law Makes Clear that the Act of Amending A
Comprehensive Plan is A Legislative Act.

The Local Land Use Planning Act was first adopted in 1975. Every appellate decision
thereafter entered which has addressed the issue, either directly or inferentially, has held that the
adoption or amendment of a Comprehensive Plan is a legislative act. For example, in Gumprecht v.
Citv of Coeur d'Alene, 104 Idaho 61 5,661 P.2d 1214 (I 983), the Supreme Court was called upon
to determine "whether local zoning ordinances may b e . . . amended in Idaho through an initiative
election." Gummecht, 104 Idaho at 61 6. The Court rejected the contention that a local zoning
ordinance could be amended through the,initiative process. In so doing, the Court commented at
length upon the nature of Idaho's local (county) zoning power and its legislative basis.
"The power of counties . . . to zone is a police power authorized by
Article 12, Section 2, of the Idaho Constitution . . . ." Article 12,
Section 2, of the Idaho Constitution provides:
LOCAL POLICE REGULATIONS AUTHORIZED - Any county . . . may make and enforce, within its
limits, all such local police, sanitary and other
regulations as are not in conflict with its charter or
with the general laws.

...
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In 1975, the Idaho Legislature adopted a comprehensive
recodification and revision of the laws of the State relating to
planning and zoning, in the Local Planning Act of 1975. See, I.C. $3
67-6501 et seq. . . . . Exercise of the authority to zone and plan,
whether by governing board or by the established commissions, is
made mandatory by I.C. 5 67-6503.

Statutes must be interpreted to give effect to legislative intent and
purpose . . . . The Legislature clearly intended that the authority to
enact comprehensive plans, establish zoning districts and adopt
amendatory ordinances be exercised exclusively by City and County
legislative or governing bodies and pursuant to specific prescribed
procedures . . . ."
Gum~recht,104 Idaho at 61 7-1 8 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
In Burt v. Citv of Idaho Falls, 105 Idaho 65,665 P.2d 1073 (1983), decided three months
after Gum~recht,the Court conclusively resolved the issue at bar. The City Council of Idaho Falls,
after conducting hearings and other required procedures, amended its Comprehensive Plan.
Following said amendment, the City annexed certain property, zoning the same consistent with the
amendment to the Comprehensive Plan. The plaintiff, John Burt, owned a portion of the annexed
land and filed a Petition for Review in the District Court pursuant to LC.

3 67-6521 (the same

statutory authority relied upon by the Petitioners at bar). The Court specifically found the City's
actions to be legislative in nature and that the plaintiff had no right of appellate review from the
same. In so doing, the Court affinned the trial court's decision that "the questioned activity [was]
legislative and therefore not subject to direct judicial review." Burt v. Citv of Idaho Falls, 105 Idaho

RESPONSE BRIEF OF INTERVENORS COEUR D'ALENE
LAND COMPANY AND H. F. MAGNUSON -- PAGE 11

The Court analyzed the issue as follows:
"To determine if the appellant, Burt, has an avenue of appeal from the
decision of the City Council requires an examination of the
provisions of the "Local Planning Act of 1975," Title 67, Chapter 65,
I.C., and a determination of whether the questioned activity is
legislative or quasi-judicial. Burt contends that pursuant to I.C. 5 676521 that he was entitled to bring an appeal to the District Court. We
disagree.

"[P]romulgation or enactment of general zoning plans and ordinances
is legislative action.". . . .
In Cooper v. Board of Countv Commissioners of Ada County, m,
we were faced with determining the procedural due process
requirements necessary to support a rezoning decision. In that case,
the applicants for the rezoning appealed to the District Court from a
denial of their application. We held that the action of the Board of
Commissioners in acting upon a rezoning request was quasi-judicial
in nature. Legislative activitv bv a zoning entitv is differentiated from
auasi-iudicial activitv by the result - - legislative activity uroduces a
rule or policv which has application to an open class whereas auasijudicial activity impacts specific individuals. interests. or situations
. . . . Legislative action is shielded from direct judicial review by "its
high visibility and widely felt impact, on the theory that appropriate
remedy can be had at the polls.". . . .
Burt v. Citv of Idaho Falls, 105 Idaho at 67-68 (citations omitted) (quoting, Cooper v. Board of
Countv Commissioners of Ada County, 101 Idaho 407,614 P.2d 947 (1980)).
The foregoing authorities make clear that the action embodied in the Initial Order, and the
Final Order as well, was purely legislative, is not subject to direct judicial review pursuant to I.C.

5 67-6521, and is not subject to the provisions of I.R.C.P. 84 (formerly I.R.C.P. 83(c).'
'Accordingly, the stay of further proceedings before the County, as ordered by this Court
under the authority of I.R.C.P. 84(m), should be dissolved. Burt v. Idaho Falls makes clear that
since no direct judicial review may be had from the legislative action at issue, that I.R.C.P. 84,
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3.

Consistent With the Local Land Use Planning Act and Idaho
Law, the Countv Recognized and Amreciated that Its Actions
Were Legislative in Nature.

Kootenai County's attorney acknowledged and advised that the amendment to the
Comprehensive Plan was legislative in nature. Tr., Vol. I, p. 114. The Kootenai County Planning
Department recognized that its action was legislative in nature. R., Vol. I, p. 130. The County
Coinmissioners, in adopting ResolutionNo. 2006-92, explicitly acknowledged that their action was
legislative in nature as capable of only being accomplished through a resolution. R., Vol. 111, pp.
602-03.
The Petitioners cannot seriously challenge that neither the Initial Order (from which they
have appealed) nor the Final Order (from which they have not timely appealed) are anything but
legislative. Apparently, they are dissatisfied that the Commissioners did not wait for a county-wide
Comprehensive Plan update process to be completed, which is still apparently incomplete and
perhaps a year away.

Petition for Judicial Review at 1 10. Yet at the same time, Petitioners

speak out of both sides of their mouths. Specifically, in adopting the amendment, the County
Comn~issionersmade a legislative determination that, with respect to the property encompassed by
the amendment, "There has been substantial changes in the actual conditions in the area to warrant
a change in the future land use designation. . . ." R., Vol. 111, p. 602. The Petitioners acknowledge

including the stay provisions therein, do not apply. Moreover, even if Rule 84 applied, the
Petitioners wholly-failed to comply therewith. Rule 84(b) requires that Petitions for Judicial
Review be concurrently served upon the agency "and all other parties to the proceeding before
the agency . . . ." Further, proof of service on "all parties" shall be filed with the Court in the
form required by I.R.C.P. 5(f). This Court enjoined Intervenors Magnuson and Coeur d'Alene
Land Company from pursuing their requested zone change application (Kootenai County
Planning Case No. 2-789-06) without any notice, service, opportunity to be heard, or other due
process protections.
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these substantial changes, admitting that "rapidly increasing growth and development" has far
exceeded "projections at the time of the adoption of the last Comprehensive Plan in 1994. . . ." See
Petition for Judicial Review at 11 1. In other words, Petitioners acknowledge both the significance
and the rapidness of the changes that were relied upon by the County in determining to grant the
requested amendment and not to wait for the completion of an update with an undetermined delivery
date.
B.

Dismissal of These Proceedings is Procedurallv Reauired.
1.

The Petitioners' Initial
Jurisdictionallv Defective.

"Petition

for

Review"

Is

The Petitioners' initial Petition for Review, which seeks review exclusively under I.C. $5 67.
6521, 67-6270 through 67-5277, and I.R.C.P. 84 (Petition for Judicial Review at p. 2), is
jurisdictionally defective. As has been shown, it is beyond question that the Initial Order was purely
and exclusively a legislative act not susceptible to judicial review under either the Idaho
Administrative Procedure Act or the Local Land Use Planning Act (the very authority cited by
Petitioners).
2.

The Amended Petition Is An Improver Pleading and Should
Be Stricken.

The Amended Petition, which Petitioners attempted to file on February 5, 2007, is a
procedurally improper pleading and should be stricken. As with the initial Petition for Review,
Petitioners predicate the same causes of action (as contained in the original Petition) upon Idaho
Code 5 67-6521, $5 67-5270 through 67-5277, and I.R.C.P. 84. See Amended Petition for Judicial
Review at

7 2.

As to these claims (which essentially represent alternative efforts to assail a

legislative act), they should be dismissed.
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Further, Petitioners have failed to adhere to the requirements of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure (specifically Rule 15) by sua suonte and in the absence of a motion or order, filing the
Amended Petition. Rule 15(a) requires a party to obtain leave of court to file an amended pleading
if a pleading has been filed in response to the initiating pleading to which the amendment pertains.
In this case, following Petitioners' filing of their Petition for Judicial Review, Intervenors
Powderhorn and Heartland filed a responsive pleading.

Motion to Dismiss (filed January 29,

2007).' Pursuant to Rule 15(a), given the responsive pleading filed by Heartland and Powderhorn,
Petitioners could not unilaterally and sua sponte amend their Petition for Judicial Review as they
have attempted to do,
In an attempt to cure this patent defect, Petitioners now ask the Court, alternatively, for leave
to file an amended Petition pursuant to Rule 15(a). However, at this juncture in the proceedings, said
Motion should be denied for failure to comply with Rule 15(c).
Rule 15(c) precludes a party from amending a prior pleading to assert a claim that is now
time-barred based upon the running ofthe applicable statute of limitations. In this particular instance,
Petitioners seek leave pursuant to Rule 15(a) to amend their Petition, in the form filed or lodged, as
the case may be, on February 5, 2007. To the extent that the Amended Petition seeks to raise any
claim arising from or under the Final Order, entered by the County on November 16,2006, it must
fail. The statute of limitations applicable to a petition for review under the Local Land Use Planning
Act and the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act is twenty-eight (28) days. k 1 . C . $67-6521(1)(d).
Since the Amended Petition was filed after the statute of limitations had run on the right to appeal

81.R.C.P. 12(b) provides that a defense of lack ofjurisdiction over the subject matter may
be interposed as a defense, by motion, in response to a pleading.
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from the Final Order, the granting of the Motion to Amend, insofar as it seeks to resuscitate an
appeal applicable to the Final Order, must be denied.
The Petitioners are stuck with an appeal from an Order that no longer applies. They cannot
now, after the period within which to appeal from the Final Order has run, seek to correct the error.
It is too late. Their remedy would have been one of the following, none of which were accomplished:
(1) the filing of an Amended Petition in this proceeding, within the twenty-eight (28) days following
entry of the November 16, 2006 Order and prior to filing of any responsive pleading (such as a
motion to dismiss); or (2) the filing of a motion to amend prior to the expiration of the twenty-eight
(28) day limitations, after entry of the November 16,2006 Order; or (3) the initiation of a separate
judicial proceeding, also brought under the IDAPA in a timely manner under the November1 6,2006
Order, with a subsequent motion to consolidate that proceeding with this proceeding. None of the
foregoing occurred. It is too late for them to occur now.
Petitioners may argue that the Amended Petition should relate back because Powderhorn or
Heartland knew or should have known that the action had been timely initiated based upon the Initial
Order and that but for a mistake on the part of Petitioners, the action should have included the Final
Order. See Rule 15(c) (providing for a relation back if a party received notice of the institution of
the action in a timely manner and the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the
merits). The problem with this argument, if advanced, is that Petitioners have, arguing that
jurisdiction lies under the Local Land Use Planning Act, IDAPA, and Rule 84,

failed to

comply with the requirements of Rule 84.
Specifically, Rule 84(b) requires that the party filing the petition for judicial review
"concunently serve copies of the notice of petition for judicial review upon the agency . . .
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other parties to the proceeding before the agency . . . ." (Emphasis added). Proof of service on "all
parties" shall be filed with the Court in the form required by Rule 5(f).
While Heartland, Powderhorn, and Magnuson have intervened notwithstanding the fact that
they were never served by Petitioners, there is no evidence that the other parties to the requested
amendment (Charles Blakley, Eastpoint Farms, Inc., or Bla Bar, Inc.) were ever served or that any
proof of service was ever filed. The time for now serving those other parties has long-since passed.
Under Rule 4(a)(2), the time for effecting service is six (6) months after filing of the action
Accordingly, dismissal as to those parties, at this juncture, is effectively required. Hincks v. Neilson,
137 Idaho 610,51 P.3d 424 (Ct. App. 2002). Further, given the jurisdictional time frame involved,
and the intervening running of the statute of limitations (twenty-eight (28) days), as to those parties,
the action cannot now be re-instituted by either an amendment in this proceeding or by the filing of
a subsequent petition for review.
3.

The Petitioners' Attempted Amended Petition Is Procedurallv
Improper. and Anv Attempt to Now Advance Claims for
Declaratorv Relief Should Be Denied.

Through their attempted Amended Petition for Review, the Petitioners seek to include a
claim for declaratory relief pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, I.C. § 10-1201 ei
seq. The bases upon which to deny the Motion, insofar as it seeks to create an appellate right from

a legislative act, are set forth above. Insofar as the declaratory judgment claim is concerned, the
Motion should be denied on separate but equally significant grounds.
What the Petitioners have attempted to do here is to join a petition for appellate review with
a claim for a declaratory relief. Different evidentiary standards and burdens of proof apply to the
same. As the Court can well appreciate, the Petition for Judicial Review requires that this Court sit
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in its appellate capacity. As such, its review is limited to the matters properly included in the record.
Specific statutory and procedural authorities limit a party's ability to throw extraneous materials into
the mix for consideration on appeal. See I.R.C.P. 84(1) and I.C.

$5 67-5276 and 67-5277.

In any and all events, any motion to present additional evidence must be timely made (within
twenty-one (21) days of the filing of the transcript and record),

it must be supported by affidavit

evidence as to why the materials were not included in the record in the first place. Neither
requirement has been met in this case. Yet, Petitioners seek to throw materials into the mix,
ostensibly in aid of their declaratory judgment claim, with the hope that said materials have some
sub-silentio impact on the appellate side of the equation.
Given the divergent evidentiary standards, and the divergent standards for admissible proof,
these Intervenors submit that it is procedurally improper, under the facts at bar, to allow for the
joinder of a claim for declaratory relief with a claim for appellate review. That is not to say that the
Petitioners cannot, should they so choose, advance a claim for declaratory relief in a separate
proceeding. The Supreme Court has acknowledged the availability of such a remedy. See Burt v.
Citv of Idaho Falls, 105 Idaho 65,66,665 P.2d 1075 (1983).
While we hold that a legislative zoning decision is not subject to
direct judicial review, it nonetheless may be scrutinized by means of
collateral actions such as declaratory actions . . . . In such instances,
the decision will not be disturbed absent a clear showing that it is
confiscatoni, arbitraw, unreasonable or cawricious.
Burt v. City of Idaho Falls, 105 Idaho at 66 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). By referring to
such an avenue of relief as "collateral," the Supreme Court implicitly ifnot explicitly acknowledged
the impropriety of including the two claims (for appellate review and declaratory relief) in the same
proceeding. Should these Petitioners choose to initiate such a proceeding, they will be held to the
RESPONSE BRIEF OF INTERVENORS COEUR D'ALENE
LAND COMPANY AND H. F. MAGNUSON -- PAGE 18

weighty evidentiary standards therein. Further, I.R.C.P. 84 will not apply and should the Petitioners
seek a stay of any further proceedings, so as to cause further unnecessary expense and delay to the
Intervenors, they will he subject to the requirements of I.R.C.P. 65, including the necessity of posting

an undertaking.
C.

There is No Factual or Legal Basis for Voiding the Board's Decision Based
On the Ex Parte Contact Described bv Petitioners.
1.

Petitioners Have Cited No Legal Authoritv to Suaoort the
Proposition that A Legislative Act Can Be Voided Based on
Ex Parte Contact.

All authorities cited by Petitioners in support of their exparte argument are inapplicable and
do not support the Petitioners' request for relief. The act undertaken by the Board was, for the
reasons set forth above, clearly legislative. &Burt v. Citv of Idaho Falls, m.The only "contrary"
authority cited by Petitioners are I.C.

5 67-5253 and Eacret v. Bonner County,

139 Idaho 780, 86

P.3d 494 (2004). Neither of the cited authorities supports the Petitioners' argument.
First,

5

67-5253 applies lo prohibit ex parie communications, except upon notice and

opportunity for all parties to participate in the communication, to "a presiding officer serving in a
contested case." The proceedings below were

a contested case. The Board is not a "hearing

officer." The Board is an elected body. Further, a "contested case" is determined exclusively by entry
of an order. I.C.

5

67-5201(6). The proceedings below were neither a "case" nor were they

determined by the issuance of an "order." They were determined by an elected body's legislative
enactment of a resolution.
Second, the case of Eacret v. Bonner County, suora, does not apply. In

w,the Court

heard an appeal from an individualized request for a variance submitted to the Bonner County Board
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by a property owner. The Board, in the application for the rezone, sat in a quasi-judicial capacity.
As such, the hearing, unlike the hearing at bar, was a "contested case" that resulted in entry of an
"order," and was subject to the requirements of I.C. 5 67-5253. The holdings and discussion set forth
in &g@do not apply to legislative acts nor could they. Do Petitioners suggest that all state
legislators, upon the convening of a legislative session, insulate themselves from their constituents
in toto so as to wholly-mitigate against any exparte contact that may have a bearing on any proposed
-legislation? Certainly not. The result is no different here.
2.

There is No Evidence that Anv Recorded Ex Parte Contact
Had Anything to do With the Subiect Amendment.

While Petitioners go to great lengths to describe some nefarious plot evidenced by three
pages of transcript prepared from the recording of the on-site visit of September 26,2006, a careful
review of the transcript reveals the rather banal and innocuous nature of the banter. For example,
Wichman stated that he planned to go mule deer hunting in October. Tr., Vol. I, p. 62. That exchange
certainly had a lot to do with the matter at hand.
The next recorded exchange between Wichman and Commissioner Brodie and Chairman
Johnson dealt with Wichman's willingness to meet with Ken Covalchik, an applicant for a position
with the Kootenai County Planning Department. Tr., Vol. I, pp. 62-64. Covalchik had apparently
made application to the County while Wichman was in the County's employ.

Id. Covalchik

apparently remained interested in the position and since his contact had been with Wiclunan, the
Board requested that Wichman informally discuss the job duties with the candidate.
certainly had a lot to do with the subject of the amendment to the Comprehensive Plan.
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Id. That

The Petitioners apparently argue or contend that no one can talk with an elected official about
anything unrelated to a legislative matter white the legislative matter is under consideration. This
would preclude individuals from engaging in nonnally civil or friendly exchanges commonplace in
a small community. Apparently, this reasoning would extend to preclude counsel from, for example,
discussing Vandal football with Judge Mitchell while the parties await for opposing counsel who
may be running late for a hearing. Such a suggestion is unworkable, preposterous, and ludicrous.
There is no authority that supports the Petitioners' position whatsoever.
3.

Petitioners Have Produced No Evidence of Anv Unrecorded
Ex Parte Conduct that Caused Anv Harm or Error.

Petitioners further allege that certain unrecorded exchanges took place between members of
the Commission and representatives of the landowners during the on-site inspection of September
26,2006. Ignoring for the moment the fact that the Board was undertaking a legislative exercise, the
conversations, as alleged, created no prejudice and were fully disclosed and rectified in any event.
When the issue of the unrecorded exparie exchange was brought to the Board's attention
the Petitioners, the Board reopened the public hearing and allowed the Petitioners, without limitation
as to time, to fully refute or comment upon the complained of exchange and to supplement their
testimony with any written materials of any nature that they deemed probative. This process, and the
exactitude and detail with which it was followed, is h l l y described in the Opposition Brief of
Powderhorn and Heartland at pages 7 though 13, and will not be repeated here. The cited briefing
is incorporated herein as though set forth in full and is adopted by these Intervenors.
Even if (as is not the case) it was improper for the Board to receive comment when
considering a legislative matter, and even if 1.C. § 67-5253 applies (which it does not), this is truly
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a case of "no harm, no foul." Based upon the Board's determination to reopen the public hearing,
and to accept the Petitioners' written and oral submissions, without limitation, any "defect" was fully
cured. Petitioners' reliance upon Eacret v. Bonner County, is misplaced.
Any exparte communication must be disclosed at the public hearing,
including a "general description of the communication." . . . . The
purpose of the disclosure requirement is to afford opposing parties
with an opportunity to rebut the substance of any ex parte
communications.
Eacret v. Bonner County, 139 Idaho at 786 (citing Idaho Historic Preservation Council v. Cit,
Council of Citv of Boise, 134 Idaho 65 1, 8 P.3d 646 (2000)).
D.

There is No Basis For Voiding the Board's Decision Based Uuon Petitioners'
Allegations of "Conflict of Interest" or "Bias."
1.

Wichman's Claimed "Conflict of Interest" Is An Argument
Lacking In Practicalitv, Substance. and Legal Suuuort.

Without articulating

legal basis or supporting authority, Petitioners claim that it was

unfair, untoward, and a conflict of interest for Wichman to leave his employ with Kootenai County
and thereafter enter into private practice as a consultant on this request. According to Petitioners,
Wichman is some sort of Svengali who hypnotized the County Commissioners into making a
decision wholly inconsistent with the position previously adopted by the Planning Department orthe
Planning Commission. Not only does the Petitioners' argument lack in legal support, it doesn't
square up with the facts.
In April of 2006, Staff Planner Mussman analyzed the request as follows:
It does appear the applicant has done a reasonable job of arguing that
the conditions in the area have changed sufficiently to merit a
different future land use designation. However, it is questionable
because of the location and the access issues, whether a Rural
Residential designation is the most appropriate . . . . The subject
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property is in close proximity to Rural designation on the west side
of Coeur d'Alene Lake. Perhaps a Rural designation could be
appropriate in this location as well.
R., Vol. I, p. 137.
The Planning Commission thereafter recommended denial of the application for different
reasons. Tr., Vol. I, pp. 1-17. The Commission, while not disagreeing with Mussman's analysis,
believed it appropriate to wait until the entire Countywide Comprehensive Plan was re-written. Id.
Hence, the merits of the application were acknowledged by the County prior to Wichman's exodus
and were not thereafter changed, modified, or recreated while acting under his spell.
The Commissioners disagreed with the Commission that the applicant should wait for the
re-write of the entire Comprehensive Plan. The Commissioners' decision was based upon
"substantial changes in the actual conditions in the area to warrant a change in the future land use
designation." R., Vol. 111, p. 602. These include the same changes acknowledged by Petitioners
(described as "rapidly increasing growth and development far exceeding projections at the time of
the adoption of the last Comprehensive Plan in 1994").

Petition for Judicial Review at f/ 11.

What Petitioners essentially posit is that Wichman, as a former County employee, and with
no legal proscriptions or limitations on his ability to thereafter seek private employment, cannot
represent

in front of the County, or be employed as a private consultant for such matters,

because he used to work for the County. Does this mean Wichman can no longer engage in planningrelated services in Kootenai County and must either relocate or find a new profession? Does this
mean that his training and experience may only be utilized bv the Countv for the rest of time?
Petitioners seem to ignore the fact that Wichman, in the context of being a consultant for
Powderhorn, was not a decision-maker for the County. This is not the same scenario as if Wichman,
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having previously been employed in private planning practice for a client, then went to work for the
County with the opportunity to pass upon the propriety of projects for which he previously served
as a private planning consultant. Wichman, except for his alleged Svengali powers, had no ability
to issue or cause to be issued the decision of which the Petitioners complain. The same legislative
determination would likely have been made even if the Petitioners had hired Wichman, which they
were free to do.

2.

The Unarticulated Brodie "Bias" Is Unsupported.

Petitioners argue that the entire process was apparently tainted due to a comment made by
Commissioner Brodie, in a record of other proceedings held years ago, while Wichman was in the
County's employ, wherein she acknowledged that she had worked with Wichman for fourteen years
and that "most" of their dealings had "been great, warm, wonderful exchanges." Petitioners'
argument is a stretch to say the least. It is unsupported in fact, law, and practical reality. Is Wichman
forever precluded from representing a client in a planning matter involving Kootenai County until
the last person at Kootenai County, with whom Wichman previously worked, has left? For that
matter, is every member of the judiciary incapable of sitting in any matter wherein the judge
previously worked or socialized with one of the counsel and had "pleasant exchanges" during those
times? Are we to all assume that business can only be undertaken if we deal with people we have
never met? Petitioners have shown no &bias m a n y indication that any actual bias ever existed.
The record is simply devoid of any supporting evidence and Petitioners have cited to no supporting
authority.
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E.

The Petitioners Have Otherwise Failed to Demonstrate Any Basis for
Reversal or Vacatur of the Board's Decision.
1.

Aooeal Under the IDAPA.

Petitioners urge reversal under I.C.
reversal is appropriate

Q&

67-5279(3)(c), (d), and (e). Under these standards,

if the Court finds that the Commissioners' action was "made upon

unlawful procedure," "not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole," or "arbitrary,
capricious, or an abuse of discretion." Since Petitioners seek to challenge a legislative act, the cited
provisions do not apply. Nonetheless, in the event the Court chooses to find the provisions
applicable, then Petitioners have failed to make a satisfactory showing warranting reversal or
vacatur. The grounds and bases which support the Intervenors' position in this regard were
adequately set forth by Powderhorn and Heartland in their Opposition Brief, including pages 3 1
through 36, and will not be repeated here. Said provisions are incorporated herein as though set forth
in full.
2.

The Claim for Declaratow Relief.

As set forth above, the claim for declaratory relief has been improperly joined with an
attempted petition for review under th IDAPA and Local Land Use Planning Act. In the event the
Court sees fit to nonetheless proceed to address the merits of the claim, through this proceeding, then
the claim must fail. The Petitioners bear the burden of making "a clear showing" that the Board's
action was "confiscatory, arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious." Burt v. City of Idaho Falls, 105
Idaho at 66. For the reasons separately set forth in the Opposition Brief of Powderhorn and
Heartland, said argument must fail.
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IV. ATTORNEY FEES.
Intervenors Coeur d'Alene Land Company and Magnuson respectfully request an award of
attorney fees incurred in defending Petitioners' claims. The basis for said claim is I.C.

5

12-1 17.

Petitioners have persisted in this action without a reasonable basis in fact or law, and an award of
attorney fees is merited. The facts and circumstances which support this claim include, but are not
limited to, the following:
(1)

Petitioners filed a Petition for Review from a non-appealable legislative act;

(2)

Petitioners filed a Petition for Review from the Boards' interim Order rather than
from the Board's Final Order;

(3)

Petitioners failed to comply with the requirements of I.R.C.P. 84 by effecting
personal service ofthe Petition on the parties who requested the subject amendment;

(4)

Without the required personal service and through improper means, for the purposes
of causing Intervenors' delay and undue expense, Petitioners sought an inappropriate
stay (under Rule 84 which does not apply to challenges to legislative acts), without
notice, through personal service or otherwise, to all affected parties;

(5)

Having been advised of the procedural and jurisdictional impropriety of their
Petition, Petitioners nonetheless improperly attempted to unilaterally amend the
same, in violation of Rule 15, to join therein claims for declaratory relief which
would otherwise be required to be the subject of a separate action; and

(6)

Petitioners refused to dismiss this actiqn and to separately file an action for
declaratory relief, thereby negating the need for Intervenors to incur the expense and
cost of defending this proceeding.
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V. CONCLUSION.

Based upon the reasons and authorities set forth herein, and those separately set forth by
Powderhorn and Heartland, Intervenors Magnuson and Coeur d' Alene Land Company respectfully
request that the Court deny the subject Petition for Review in its entirety, dismissing the same with
prejudice. Intervenors further request an award of their reasonable attorney fees and costs to hereafter
be supported in conformity with I.R.C.P. 54.
Dated this 4Ihday of May, 2007.

Attom&& Intervenors Coeur c$/AleneLand Co.
and Harry F. Magnuson
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served upon the
following, via facsimile and U.S. Mail, postage prepaid this 41h day of May, 2007:
Scott W. Reed
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box A
Coeur d' Alene, ID 838 16
Fax: 208\765-5117
John A. Cafferty, Sr. Staff Attorney
Kootenai County Department of
Legal Services
45 1 Government Way
P.O. Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, ID 838 16-9000
Fax: 208\446-1621

CDALAND CiFM - RESP DRFwpd

RESPONSE BRIEF OF INTERVENORS COEUR D'ALENE
LAND COMPANY AND H. F. MAGNUSON -- PAGE 28

Mischelle Fulgham
Lukins & Annis, PS
1600 Washington Trust Financial Center
7 17 W. Sprague Avenue
Spokane, WA 99201-0466
Fax: 509\747-2323

